Catherine Alexander v. Glut Food Coop

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1658
CATHERINE ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GLUT FOOD COOP; CHRISTOPHER DOYLE; JAIME MOORBY; NICOLA
THOMPSON; JENNIFER BERGDORF; ANDRE SPENCER; DAVID MCDUFFY;
DAVID DUFFY; RAQUEL BROWN; DENATRA LEWIS; KIMBERLY PETERSON;
NELAJAH DAVIS; TEE BROWN; ADRIAN MADSEN; HAMADY KASSAMBARA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:10-cv-00955-AW)
Submitted: October 28, 2013 Decided: November 8, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Catherine Alexander, Appellant Pro Se. Kenneth Sigman, Susan
Clare Silber, Metody A. Tilev, SILBER PERLMAN SIGMAN & TILEV,
PA, Takoma Park, Maryland, for Appellees Glut Food Coop and
Christopher Doyle.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In this employment discrimination proceeding,
Catherine Alexander appeals the district court’s orders granting
summary judgment against her and denying her motion for
reconsideration. Appellees have moved to dismiss Alexander’s
appeal as untimely.
Parties in a civil action in which the United States
is not a party have thirty days following entry of judgment in
which to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
214 (2007); see United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th
Cir. 2009) (discussing Bowles and the appeal periods under Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)).
Alexander’s notice of appeal, filed more than thirty
days after the district court entered its order granting summary
judgment, was untimely as to that order. Moreover, we find that
Alexander’s motion for reconsideration, which was filed more
than twenty-eight days after the district court’s order granting
the motion for summary judgment, did not toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal of the underlying order because it was
not a timely-filed Rule 59(e) motion. See Panhorst v. United
States, 241 F.3d 367, 369-73 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting mandatory
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nature of Rule 59 time limits). Thus, as to the order granting
summary judgment, we grant the motion to dismiss.
Alexander’ notice of appeal was, however, timely as to
the district court’s order denying her motion for
reconsideration. Thus, we decline Appellees’ request to dismiss
the appeal as to that order. Upon review of the record, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying relief pursuant to either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See
Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir.
2010) (standard of review for Rule 59(e)); MLC Auto., LLC v.
Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008) (standard of
review for Rule 60(b)). Thus, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Alexander’s motion for reconsideration.
In sum, we dismiss Alexander’s appeal of the district
court’s order granting summary judgment against Alexander and
affirm the district court’s denial of Alexander’s motion for
reconsideration. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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