Holiday v. New Hanover County Registrar of Deeds

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-2120
RUBY M. HOLIDAY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NEW HANOVER COUNTY REGISTRAR OF DEEDS; REBECCA TUCKER SMITH,
in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as New
Hanover County Registrar of Deeds,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (7:05-cv-00204-BR)
Submitted: February 11, 2009 Decided: March 13, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Angela Newell Gray, GRAY NEWELL, LLP, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. James R. Morgan, Jr., Mary Craven
Adams, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ruby Holiday filed the instant action against New
Hanover County Registrar of Deeds Rebecca Tucker Smith, in her
official and individual capacities, alleging violations of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143-422.2; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), arising from Holiday’s
employment termination. The district court granted Smith’s
motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549
F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted
only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
To survive summary judgment, Holiday must come forth
with either direct evidence of discrimination or establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Holiday submitted no
direct evidence of racial discrimination. To establish a prima
facie case of discriminatory termination under Title VII,
§ 1983, or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2, Holiday must show that:
(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified
for her job and performing at a satisfactory level; (3) she was
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terminated; and (4) she was replaced by a similarly situated
applicant outside her protected class. See St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Williams v.
Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1989).
Establishment of this prima facie case of discrimination “in
effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employee.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Where a plaintiff
makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the
employer produces a legitimate reason for the action, the burden
once again shifts to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s
rationale is just a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
Here, it is not clear that Holiday established a prima
facie case of discriminatory termination. Though both parties
agree that Holiday is a member of a protected class, was
terminated, and was replaced by someone not in her protected
class, the parties differ as to whether Holiday was performing
at a satisfactory level. Smith presented evidence that Holiday
made slanderous statements about a co-worker’s husband, abused
attendance policies, engaged in insubordinate behavior, and
repeatedly engaged in conversations of a personal nature, in
violation of office policy.
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Even assuming that Holiday was able to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory termination, however, Smith
articulated ample legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
Holiday’s termination. In so doing, Smith successfully rebutted
any discriminatory presumptions raised by Holiday.
Though Holiday had “the full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate . . . that the proffered reason[s] [were] not the
true reason for the employment decision,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256, she failed to do so. While Holiday contends “[s]he had no
previous written reprimands or documented work performance
issues,” this assertion is belied by the record. Holiday
further argues that Smith exhibited a “pattern and practice of
disparate treatment toward black employees.” However, evidence
of systematic discrimination alone cannot prove the elements of
a discrimination claim. See, e.g., Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast
Line R. Co., 676 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (holding
that one “proceeding as an individual under Title VII must prove
the elements of a [discrimination] claim as set forth in
McDonnell Douglas”). A plaintiff must provide evidence of
discrimination she has personally experienced. Id. Holiday’s
unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations of racial animus are
insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir.
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2002) (noting that “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do
not suffice” to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting Smith’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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