Coursey v. University of Maryland Eastern Shore

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1626
LEON COURSEY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND EASTERN SHORE; STATE OF MARYLAND,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:11-cv-01957-CCB)
Argued: March 20, 2014 Decided: July 1, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and Max O.
COGBURN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western
District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Robin Ringgold Cockey, COCKEY, BRENNAN & MALONEY, PC,
Salisbury, Maryland, for Appellant. Jennifer L. Katz, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General,
Katherine D. Bainbridge, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises from the termination in 2010 of
Professor Leon Coursey by his long-term employer, the University
of Maryland Eastern Shore (“UMES”). Following his discharge,
Dr. Coursey filed this civil action in the District of Maryland,
seeking relief from UMES and the State of Maryland. Coursey has
alleged multiple claims, including discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as retaliatory discharge
under the ADA. In April 2013, the district court awarded
summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. See Coursey
v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. 1:11-cv-01957 (D. Md. Apr. 30,
2013), ECF No. 31 (the “Opinion”). 1 Coursey seeks appellate
relief from the court’s adverse judgment on his ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims. As explained below, however, we
affirm.
I.
A.
The summary judgment record reflects that Dr. Coursey
joined the UMES faculty in 1972 as Director of Athletics and
1
The district court’s unpublished Opinion is found at J.A.
388-401. (Citations herein to “J.A. ____” refer to the contents
of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
2
Assistant Professor of Physical Education. He was promoted to
Associate Professor in 1973, and to full Professor in 2001.
During his time at UMES, Coursey served on numerous committees
and as Acting Chair of the Department of Physical Education
(later called the Department of Exercise Science).
1.
In late 2004, several female students lodged complaints
against Dr. Coursey with UMES. Their allegations included that
Coursey made inappropriate sexual comments, belittled students
in class, graded arbitrarily, and unfairly favored certain
students. The UMES Director of Human Resources investigated the
complaints and deemed them credible. She further concluded that
Coursey had sought to retaliate against students who complained.
Coursey was reprimanded and required to participate in sexual
harassment training.
In 2007, certain faculty members complained to the UMES
administration about Dr. Coursey’s erratic and unprofessional
behavior, including being overly aggressive with colleagues and
disparaging them, often in the presence of students. Faculty
members also reported that Coursey did not adhere to UMES
policies governing travel, class coverage, and grading. In late
2008 and early 2009, UMES received additional student complaints
about Coursey’s grading and classroom behavior. Several
students also alleged that Coursey was erratic and verbally
3
abusive, asserting that he “was unstable,” “had lost it,” and
“went berserk” on students in class. See J.A. 62-63.
On January 13, 2009, Dr. James Heimdal, Chair of the
Exercise Science Department, prepared and sent Dr. Coursey a
memorandum summarizing student concerns about his conduct,
including “course content, grading/evaluation, and
unprofessional behavior,” as well as fear “of retaliation from
Instructor associated with concerns/complaints.” J.A. 60.
Heimdal informed Coursey that twelve students had contacted him
to voice such concerns, and Heimdal requested a meeting with
Coursey “ASAP.” Id. There is no indication, however, that such
a meeting ever occurred. Shortly after Heimdal sent the
memorandum, another faculty member overheard Coursey ranting and
yelling at his students, telling them “I am the highest ranking
professor on this campus and no one can touch me.” Id. at 61.
On February 3, 2009, UMES removed Dr. Coursey from campus
and suspended him from his position. As then explained by Dr.
Charles Williams, the Vice President of Academic Affairs, UMES
had received “several significant complaints regarding
[Coursey’s] behavior in class,” and, to that end, Williams asked
Dean Nicholas Blanchard to “perform a full investigation into
[the] allegations.” J.A. 279. Dr. Williams’s letter explained
that Coursey would be on paid leave while suspended; he was not
to return to campus without prior approval of the UMES
4
administration, nor was he permitted to have contact with “any
students, especially those [he had] previously questioned or
confronted.” Id. 2
2.
During February 2009, Dean Blanchard investigated the
allegations against Dr. Coursey and documented his findings and
recommendations by memorandum. Blanchard spoke with several of
the complaining students, while others declined to be
interviewed. As part of his investigation, Blanchard also met
with Coursey. Blanchard observed that, although Coursey was
“civil in attitude,” his answers in the interview were often
unresponsive and vague. See J.A. 309. Blanchard recalled
Coursey declaring that people at UMES were “out to get him.”
Id. Blanchard recommended that Coursey “not be placed back in
the classroom,” and “highly recommend[ed] that [he] receive a
mental health evaluation.” Id. at 310.
In the meantime, Dr. Coursey lodged a grievance with the
UMES administration, alleging that he had been suspended without
2
Dr. Coursey maintains on appeal that he “was unaware of
any allegations of misconduct or complaints regarding his
teaching” prior to his February 3, 2009 removal and suspension
from campus. See Br. of Appellant 4. That assertion, however,
is belied by the record, which includes several copies of Dr.
Heimdal’s January 13, 2009 memorandum to Coursey. Notably,
Coursey has not moved to strike that memorandum, he does not
challenge its authenticity, and he has not denied receiving it
in January 2009.
5
cause and not given any information about the complaints against
him. As a result, UMES convened a faculty grievance board (the
“Grievance Board”), which conducted a hearing on May 14, 2009.
Two weeks later, on May 29, 2009, the Grievance Board
unanimously concluded that UMES had violated the applicable
procedures in suspending and investigating Coursey and had
failed to advise the complaining students of the appropriate
grievance procedures. Accordingly, the Board recommended that
Coursey’s suspension be lifted, he be allowed to “resume his
regular duties,” and all of his “rights and privileges be
restored.” J.A 282.
Pursuant to UMES policy, President Thelma Thompson had the
ultimate authority to decide whether to reinstate Dr. Coursey.
On June 4, 2009, after reviewing the Grievance Board’s
recommendations and Dean Blanchard’s report, President Thompson
requested that Coursey have a “medical evaluation and/or mental
health evaluation to ascertain his fitness for duty.” J.A. 317.3
Although the Board had recommended Coursey’s reinstatement —
without any evaluation — Thompson incorrectly asserted that she
3
Throughout Coursey’s employment dispute, the parties have
used various terms to describe President Thompson’s requested
evaluation, including “medical evaluation and/or mental health
evaluation,” “fitness for duty evaluation,” and “mental/medical
examination.” For consistency, we use the term “mental health
evaluation” unless quoting from the record.
6
was acting upon the Board’s recommendation in requesting that
Coursey undergo a mental health evaluation. See id. at 317,
321. Over the next two months, UMES representatives
corresponded with Coursey — through his attorney — about his
need to undergo a mental health evaluation before UMES could
consider reinstating him for the fall 2009 term. Coursey
consistently refused to submit to the evaluation and remained
suspended on paid leave.
On October 28, 2009, Dr. Coursey filed a discrimination
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the
“EEOC”) and notified UMES of his actions. Coursey’s EEOC
complaint alleged that UMES had contravened the ADA by
“attempting to subject [him] to a fitness for duty exam for the
sole purpose of determining whether [he] ha[d] a disability
and/or the nature or severity of [his] disability.” J.A. 208.
Coursey asserted that the Grievance Board’s report undercut the
University’s request for a mental health evaluation and
evidenced its inappropriate “ulterior motive.” Id.
3.
On May 25, 2010, formal charges of termination were filed
against Dr. Coursey on grounds of professional misconduct,
incompetence, and insubordination. The following day, President
Thompson notified Coursey by letter that he was immediately
relieved of all duties and, as of August 1, 2010, would be
7
suspended without pay “until the conclusion of the termination
proceedings.” J.A. 49. Thompson’s letter outlined options for
Coursey prior to her decision. Coursey could request a hearing,
either “by an impartial hearing officer appointed by [Thompson]”
or before a faculty review board, or he could simply resign.
Id. In response, on June 22, 2010, Coursey requested a hearing
with a faculty review board.
Shortly thereafter, UMES convened a five-member faculty
panel (the “Termination Panel”) to review the charges lodged
against Dr. Coursey and determine whether UMES had cause to
terminate him from his position as a full Professor. The
Termination Panel met nine times between August 26 and September
28, 2010, heard testimony from nineteen witnesses, and received
and considered more than 100 exhibits. Among the exhibits was
Coursey’s then-pending EEOC complaint, which was introduced into
evidence by UMES. Coursey subsequently amended his EEOC
complaint to include a retaliation claim, alleging that UMES had
illegally initiated the termination proceedings in retaliation
for his filing of the EEOC complaint.
Dr. Coursey was represented by counsel before the
Termination Panel. Aside from his assertions that UMES lacked
cause to terminate him, Coursey contended that the Panel’s
review should be limited to whether his refusal to submit to the
mental health evaluation constituted insubordination. In
8
Coursey’s view, the 2009 Grievance Board hearing and the Board’s
subsequent report had exonerated him of any wrongdoing, and the
Termination Panel had no right to consider the prior allegations
of misconduct in assessing the issue of termination. 4
On November 4, 2010, the Termination Panel issued its
report to President Thompson, recommending that Dr. Coursey be
terminated for incompetence and professional misconduct and
concluding that he had “failed to maintain the standards” of the
teaching profession. See J.A. 97. The Panel emphasized that
Coursey had been “verbally abusive toward students,” was
disrespectful towards his colleagues and supervisors, and had
once approached a female colleague from behind and put his
tongue in her ear. Id. The Panel viewed Coursey’s continued
refusal to submit to a “fitness for duty” evaluation as
insubordination and misconduct. Id.
Dr. Coursey appealed the Termination Panel’s findings and
recommendations to President Thompson. She then heard oral
argument from Coursey and representatives of UMES, and
determined that Coursey’s termination was appropriate. By
4
Dr. Coursey’s contention that the Grievance Board’s 2009
findings were conclusive on the issue before the Termination
Board was rejected in the UMES administrative proceedings and by
the district court. We also reject that contention. Coursey
has provided no authority for the proposition that the
Termination Panel was precluded from entertaining evidence that
had been before the Grievance Board.
9
letter of December 17, 2010, Thompson notified Coursey that he
was “hereby terminated from his position,” but had the right to
appeal to the University System of Maryland’s Board of Regents.
See J.A. 101. Coursey pursued that appeal, and, on June 17,
2011, the Board of Regents affirmed Thompson’s termination
decision, concluding that there was “substantial evidence” in
support thereof. Id. at 133. 5
B.
On July 18, 2011, Dr. Coursey initiated this civil action
against the defendants in the District of Maryland. On November
29, 2011, he filed an amended complaint (the operative
“Complaint” herein). The Complaint first alleges that UMES
violated the ADA in requesting that Coursey undergo a mental
health evaluation (Count One). The Complaint also asserts that
Coursey’s termination violated the ADA (Count Two) and the
Rehabilitation Act (Count Six), in that Coursey was discharged
because he was regarded as disabled. Additionally, the
Complaint alleges that Coursey’s termination was illegal under
5
Meanwhile, on April 29, 2011, the EEOC dismissed Coursey’s
EEOC complaint, reciting that it was “unable to conclude that
the information obtained establishe[d] violations of the
statutes.” J.A. 17.
10
the ADA because it was in retaliation for his filing of the EEOC
complaint (Count Three). 6
For reasons explained in its Opinion of April 30, 2013, the
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The
court concluded that UMES’s request that Dr. Coursey undergo a
mental health evaluation — the basis for his ADA claim in Count
One — “was consistent with business necessity,” and Coursey
“submitted no significant evidence of his own in rebuttal.”
Opinion 10. In disposing of Coursey’s wrongful termination
claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the court
reasoned that, “[b]ecause no reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that UMES regarded Dr. Coursey as disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, he [could not] establish a prima facie case
of wrongful discharge.” Id. at 8. Addressing Count Three’s
ADA retaliation claim, the court determined that Dr. Coursey had
failed “to identify a single intervening instance of retaliatory
conduct” between his EEOC complaint and his termination “that
might suggest a causal link between his complaint and the
initiation of termination proceedings.” Id. at 11. The court
went on to explain that, assuming Coursey had “established a
6
The Complaint also includes a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Four), and a state
law breach of contract claim (Count Five). Dr. Coursey has
abandoned both of those claims.
11
prima facie case of retaliation, UMES had a non-discriminatory”
reason for terminating him. Id. The Opinion concluded that
because Coursey had failed to show “that UMES’s reason for
terminating him [was] pretextual, his claim of retaliation
[could not] succeed.” Id. Coursey has timely appealed, and we
possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s award of summary
judgment, applying the same legal standards as the district
court. See Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008).
Under those standards, summary judgment may only be awarded when
there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Id. As we have
explained, “courts must take special care when considering a
motion for summary judgment in a discrimination case because
motive is often the critical issue”; however, “summary judgment
disposition remains appropriate if the plaintiff cannot prevail
as a matter of law.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,
80 F.3d 954, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1996). If, after considering the
record as a whole, we determine “that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for [the plaintiff], then a genuine factual
dispute exists and summary judgment is improper.” Id. at 959.
12
A.
Count One of the Complaint alleges that UMES contravened
§ 102 of the ADA (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112), by requesting
that Dr. Coursey undergo a mental health evaluation that “was
neither job-related nor consistent with a business necessity.”
J.A. 11. Section 102 prohibits an employer “from requiring a
medical examination or making inquiries of an employee as to
whether he is an ‘individual with a disability or as to the
nature or severity of the disability unless such examination or
inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity.’” Porter v. U.S. Alumoweld Co., 125 F.3d 243, 246
(4th Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)).
Nevertheless, the relevant EEOC regulations authorize an
employer “‘to make inquiries or require medical examinations
(fitness for duty exams) when there is a need to determine
whether an employee is still able to perform the essential
functions of his or her job.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
App. § 1630.14(c)). Whether a required mental health evaluation
is “job-related and consistent with business necessity” is
assessed under an objective standard. See Tice v. Ctr. Area
Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 518 (3d Cir. 2001). A business
necessity must be based on more than “mere expediency,” and will
be found to exist where the employer can “identify legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons to doubt the employee’s capacity to
13
perform his or her duties.” See Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007).
Dr. Coursey’s position as a full Professor at UMES required
that he instruct, supervise, and interact with students and
faculty in a professional and non-threatening manner. Given the
plethora of complaints about Coursey’s violent outbursts,
erratic and inappropriate behavior, as well as his disregard for
UMES policies, UMES has shown that it had valid concerns about
Coursey’s ability to perform his duties. A university is in the
business of educating students; as such, it is essential that
its faculty members be able to fulfill that role.
Dr. Coursey counters that because the Grievance Board
recommended his reinstatement and President Thompson falsely
believed that the Board had recommended the mental health
evaluation, “any allegations regarding Dr. Coursey’s conduct are
merely afterthoughts.” Br. of Appellant 16. Thus, Coursey
contends, the President’s request that he undergo an evaluation
was improper, in that it was not based on “evidence obtained, or
available to the employer, prior to making a disability related
inquiry.” Id. Coursey’s contention in this regard ignores the
evidence supporting the directive that Coursey submit to a
mental health evaluation, including student complaints and Dean
Blanchard’s independent report, which made an explicit
14
recommendation that Coursey be so evaluated. Moreover,
Coursey’s argument mischaracterizes the role of the Grievance
Board in 2009. Thompson possessed the ultimate authority to
lift Coursey’s suspension, see J.A. 153, and she was acting
within her discretion in seeking more information before doing
so. That she erred in relying on the Board’s report for support
of her request for the mental health evaluation does not mean
that her actions ran afoul of the ADA. Coursey has not forecast
any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on that
point, and the district court properly granted summary judgment
against him on Count One.
B.
Counts Two and Six of the Complaint allege that Coursey was
wrongfully discharged, in contravention of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. 7 As we have explained, “[t]o the extent
possible, we construe the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to impose
similar requirements.” Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health
Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). Although the two
statutes employ differing terminology, they have generally been
read to “require a plaintiff to demonstrate the same elements to
7
Although Count Two alleges ADA violations under § 102 (42
U.S.C. § 12112), Count Six does not identify any particular
provision of the Rehabilitation Act. Like the district court,
we read Count Six to allege a violation of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794).
15
establish liability.” Id. Thus, to make a prima facie case for
a wrongful discharge, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) he is within the ADA’s protected class; (2) he was
discharged; (3) at the time of his discharge, he was
performing the job at a level that met his employer’s
legitimate expectations; and (4) his discharge
occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable
inference of unlawful discrimination.
Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 2001).
A crucial distinction between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
is found in the third element of a wrongful discharge claim,
that is, causation. Halpern, 669 F.3d at 461. Under the
Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that he was subject to
employment discrimination “solely by reason of her or his
disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In contrast, the ADA
prohibits discrimination against a “qualified individual on the
basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Although the
causation requirements of the statutes are slightly different,
that distinction does not bear on our analysis of the summary
judgment award on Counts Two and Six. Because Coursey has
failed to establish the first common element of those wrongful
discharge claims — membership in a protected class — we need
not reach the issue of causation on either Count Two or Count
Six.
Under the framework outlined above, to establish membership
in an ADA protected class, a plaintiff must show that he is “a
16
qualified individual with a disability.” Haulbrook, 252 F.3d at
702. The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental
impairment” that “substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of an individual,” and that includes a record of
such an impairment or “being regarded as having such an
impairment.” Id. at 702-03. In pursuing his wrongful discharge
claims, Dr. Coursey does not maintain that he actually has a
disability; rather, he maintains that UMES must have regarded
him as disabled because President Thompson requested that he
undergo a mental health evaluation. To establish that he was
regarded as disabled, Coursey must show that: (1) UMES
mistakenly believed that he had a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limited one or more major life activities, or
(2) UMES mistakenly believed that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limited him in one or more major life
activities. See Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 390 (4th Cir.
2001).
We have not decided whether an employer’s request for an
evaluation of its employee is, in and of itself, sufficient to
show that the employer regarded the employee as disabled for
purposes of the ADA. Of the courts of appeals to address this
issue, however, all have concluded that it is not. See Tice,
247 F.3d at 508-9 (“[A]n employer’s request for a medical
examination, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish that
17
the employer regarded the employee as disabled, and thus cannot
itself form the basis for establishing membership in the
protected class under the ADA.”); Sullivan v. River Valley Sch.
Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Colwell v.
Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 647 (2d Cir. 1998)
(same). As the Third Circuit explained in Tice, an ADA
plaintiff must point to other evidence showing that his employer
regarded him as disabled — that is, substantially limited in a
major life activity — and not just that it harbored concerns
about his ability to perform his job. See 247 F.3d at 513; see
also Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir.
2005) (explaining that “major life activity of working” is not
limited to one position or type thereof). This record does not
reveal that UMES regarded Dr. Coursey as disabled, nor has
Coursey pointed to evidence suggesting that there is a genuine
issue of material fact on that issue. We are therefore
satisfied to affirm the award of summary judgment to the
defendants on Counts Two and Six.
C.
In Count Three of the Complaint, Dr. Coursey alleges that
he was terminated in retaliation for his EEOC complaint against
UMES, in violation of § 503 of the ADA (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203). Section 503 prohibits discrimination against any
individual “because such individual made a charge, testified,
18
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a). To make a prima facie case of retaliatory
discharge, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in a
protected activity; (2) his employer acted adversely against
him; and (3) the protected activity was causally connected to
the employer’s adverse action. See Rhoads, 257 F.3d at 392.
When those elements are satisfied, the burden shifts to the
employer “to rebut the presumption of retaliation by
articulating a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its
actions.” Id. If the employer satisfies that burden, “the
plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pre-
text for forbidden retaliation.’” Id. (quoting Haulbrook, 252
F.3d at 706).
The district court granted summary judgment against Dr.
Coursey on Count Three, determining that he had failed to make a
prima facie showing of retaliatory discharge and that, in any
event, UMES had established that it possessed a non-
discriminatory, non-pretextual reason for terminating him.
Contrary to the district court, we are satisfied that Coursey
made a prima facie case. We nevertheless affirm the judgment
because we agree with the court’s alternative ruling that UMES
had solid non-discriminatory and non-pretextual reasons for
terminating Coursey.
19
As for the prima facie showing, Dr. Coursey’s filing of his
EEOC complaint in October 2009, and his subsequent termination
by UMES in 2010, suffice to satisfy the first two elements. Our
remaining inquiry is whether Coursey has shown a causal
relationship between the two events — that is, did his
termination by UMES result from his earlier EEOC filing? We are
satisfied that Coursey has established the element of causation
and thus met his initial burden on the retaliatory discharge
claim.
We have recognized that the discharge of an employee soon
after he engages in a protected activity is “strongly suggestive
of retaliatory motive,” Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th
Cir. 1994), and “gives rise to a sufficient inference of
causation to satisfy the prima facie requirement,” King v.
Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2003). There is no
precise formula as to when an employer’s actions will trigger
application of that inference. In the context of this case,
however, the seven-month period between Dr. Coursey’s 2009 EEOC
complaint and UMES’s initiation of termination proceedings
against him in May of 2010 supports an inference of retaliatory
motive. Moreover, that UMES actually introduced the EEOC
complaint into evidence before the Termination Panel is highly
suggestive of a causal link. See Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc.,
871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that employer’s
20
knowledge of discrimination charge shortly before employee’s
termination “certainly satisfies the less onerous burden of
making a prima facie case of causality”); see also Shirley v.
Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 43-44 (5th Cir. 1992)
(deeming supervisor’s repeated mention of employee’s EEOC
complaint sufficient to establish causation). UMES’s decision
to present Coursey’s EEOC complaint as evidence in his
termination proceedings was undeniably flawed, and we are
unwilling to condone such a practice. To the contrary, UMES and
other employers should know that the filing of an EEOC complaint
is a protected activity and must be zealously secured “to ensure
employees’ continuing access to the EEOC and the enforcement
process.” See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d
253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998).
Because Dr. Coursey has made a prima facie showing of
retaliatory discharge, we must decide whether UMES has
demonstrated that it had a legitimate and non-retaliatory reason
for terminating him. If so, we assess whether Coursey can
successfully rebut that legitimate and non-retaliatory reason by
showing it to be pretextual. See Dowe v. Total Action Against
Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 656 (4th Cir. 1998).
The record is replete with evidence supporting UMES’s
justification for terminating Dr. Coursey, including complaints
from multiple faculty members and students about Coursey’s
21
conduct, documented violations of UMES policies, and Coursey’s
refusal to submit to the mental health evaluation. As such,
UMES has satisfied its burden of showing a legitimate and non-
retaliatory reason for Coursey’s termination.
Dr. Coursey counters by pointing to the discrepancy between
the findings of the Grievance Board and the report of the
Termination Panel. Coursey contends that, because “the evidence
presented to the Boards was substantially similar, at the very
least, a factual dispute exists as to whether [UMES] had grounds
to terminate [him].” Br. of Appellant 22. Coursey also
reiterates that UMES placed his EEOC complaint into evidence
before the Termination Board and emphasizes that he remained
suspended from the UMES campus for the seven months between the
filing of his EEOC complaint and his termination.
Dr. Coursey’s rebuttal contentions fail for multiple
reasons. First, the two faculty panels — the Grievance Board in
2009 and the Termination Panel in 2010 — were tasked with
resolving different issues. The Grievance Board evaluated the
propriety of suspending Coursey, based largely on relevant UMES
procedures, while the Termination Panel determined whether UMES
had cause to terminate him. Second, even viewing the record in
the light most favorable to Coursey, UMES possessed substantial
evidence of his misconduct over an extended period of time.
Such evidence provided a proper basis for President Thompson’s
22
ultimate decision to terminate Coursey. Third, Coursey has not
pointed to any evidence suggesting that the Termination Panel,
President Thompson, or the Board of Regents used his EEOC
complaint against him. Finally, the record indicates that UMES
had already taken action — albeit not rising to the level of
termination — to address Coursey’s misconduct before he filed
his EEOC complaint in 2009. Simply put, UMES has satisfied its
burden and Coursey has failed to establish the existence of any
genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. We therefore
affirm the award of summary judgment to the defendants on Count
Three.
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
23