Scott Tyree v. United States

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7528
SCOTT TYREE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:14-ct-03158-BO)
Submitted: February 19, 2016 Decided: March 23, 2016
Before MOTZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott Tyree, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Bredenberg, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Scott William Tyree, a federal prison inmate, appeals from
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the
Government in Tyree’s suit filed under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (“FTCA”). Tyree alleged that prison officials failed to
protect him from, and failed to respond in a timely manner to,
an attack by his cellmate. Based upon the Government’s
affidavits accompanying its motion for summary judgment, the
district court ruled that the prison guards responded
immediately to the altercation, and that Tyree did not assert a
claim that prison officials should have known of the danger
prior to the attack. On appeal, Tyree contends that the
district court abused its discretion in entering summary
judgment prior to discovery. We agree and remand for further
proceedings.
We “review de novo a district court’s award of summary
judgment, viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873 (4th Cir. 2013).
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows ‘that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The relevant inquiry on
summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
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disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
To withstand a summary judgment motion, the non-movant must
produce competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of
a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Thompson v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving
party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We will
uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment unless we
conclude that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
non-moving party on the evidence presented. See EEOC v. Cent.
Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2009).
Under the FTCA, the Government has waived sovereign
immunity for “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). With
respect to federal prisoners, the Supreme Court has determined
that the duty of care owed by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) is
fixed by 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (2012), independent of any
inconsistent state rule. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,
164-65 (1963). The BOP’s duty of care owed to a prisoner is
“the exercise of ordinary diligence to keep prisoners safe and
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free from harm.” Jones v. United States, 534 F.2d 53, 54 (5th
Cir. 1976). Regarding prisoner placement, BOP personnel can
only be deemed negligent in violation of this duty when
personnel knew or reasonably should have known of potential
problems between inmates. Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d
629, 637 (7th Cir. 2008).
Rule 56(d) requires “that summary judgment be refused where
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover
information that is essential to his opposition.” Nguyen v. CNA
Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing predecessor
to Rule 56(d)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule “is
intended as a safeguard against a premature grant of summary
judgment.” King v. Cooke, 26 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 1994).
Requests pursuant to the rule should be denied, however, “if the
additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by
itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
defeat summary judgment.” Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195
(4th Cir. 2006) (addressing predecessor to Rule 56(d)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We will not reverse the denial of a
Rule 56(d) request unless there was “a clear abuse of discretion
or, unless there is a real possibility the party was prejudiced
by the denial of an extension.” Id.Here, Tyree, acting pro se, urged the district court to
defer ruling on the motion for summary judgment until after he
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had an opportunity for discovery. Specifically, Tyree asserted
that the parties were in disagreement about the timeline of
events. Tyree claimed that, after an emergency light was
activated in his cell, he was beaten by his cellmate for five
minutes before officers arrived. The officers averred that they
responded immediately. Tyree claims that video surveillance and
written reports in the control of the BOP would assist in
determining the actual timeline. Tyree also asserted that
prison records could show whether his cellmate had anything on
his record that would have indicated that he should not have
been housed with Tyree. Tyree also questioned whether the
emergency system was fully operational, given that neither
officer stated that they heard the emergency tone that is
designed to activate together with the emergency light. The
district court did not address Tyree’s contentions or rule on
Tyree’s motion.
We find that discovery on these topics would potentially
have created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
defeat summary judgment. Accepting Tyree’s assertions as true,
prison officials did not respond for over five minutes after the
emergency light was activated. The record is devoid of
information regarding whether this alleged five minute delay was
reasonable. See Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 432 (7th
Cir. 2003) (providing scenarios whereby failure to respond in
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timely manner could constitute negligence). Given that the
affidavits in the record do not describe the same timeline and
that Tyree’s discovery requests could result in relevant
evidence to which he would otherwise have no access, we conclude
that the district court’s failure to rule on Tyree’s Rule 56(d)
motion was an abuse of discretion.
While we express no opinion on the Government’s defenses
that were not addressed by the district court or the scope of
proper discovery, we find that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment based solely on the Government’s
disputed timeline without permitting discovery. Accordingly, we
vacate and remand for further proceedings. We deny Tyree’s
motion to grant appeal by default. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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