Cody Hearn v. Lancaster County

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1588
CODY A. HEARN; CHRISTOPHER A. HEARN, individually and as
Personal Representatives of the Estate of Henry C. Hearn,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
LANCASTER COUNTY; BARRY S. FAILE, individually and in his
official capacity as the Sheriff of Lancaster County;
DEBBIE HORNE, individually and in her official capacity as
Jail Administrator; CHUCK KIRKLEY, individually and in his
official capacity as Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff;
DONOVAN SMALL, individually and in his official capacity as
Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff; MITZI SNIPES, individually
and in her official capacity as Lancaster County Deputy
Sheriff; JAMES WHITAKER, individually and in his official
capacity as Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff; JOHN DOE 1,
individually and in his official capacity as Lancaster
County Deputy Sheriff; OFFICER JOHN DOE 2, individually and
in his official capacity as Lancaster County Deputy
Sheriff; JOHN DOE 3, individually and in his official
capacity as Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff; JOHN DOE 4,
individually and in his official capacity as Lancaster
County Deputy Sheriff; JOHN DOE 5, individually and in his
official capacity as Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff; JOHN
DOE 6, individually and in his official capacity as
Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff; JOHN DOE 7, individually
and in his official capacity as Lancaster County Correction
Officer; JOHN DOE 8, individually and in his official
capacity as Lancaster County Correction Officer; JOHN DOE
9, individually and in his official capacity as Lancaster
County Correction Officer; JOHN DOE 10, individually and in
his official capacity as Lancaster County Correction
Officer; JOHN DOE 11, individually and in his official
capacity as Lancaster County Correction Officer; JOHN DOE
12, individually and in his official capacity as Lancaster
County Correction Officer,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Richard M. Gergel, District Judge.
(9:11-cv-01074-RMG)
Argued: January 30, 2014 Decided: April 15, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, DIAZ, Circuit Judge, and Liam
O’GRADY, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,
in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge O’Grady joined.
ARGUED: William Angus McKinnon, MCGOWAN, HOOD & FELDER, LLC,
Rock Hill, South Carolina, for Appellants. Andrew Lindemann,
DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brent P. Stewart, STEWART LAW OFFICES,
LLC, Rock Hill, South Carolina, for Appellants. James M. Davis,
Jr., DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
The personal representatives of Henry Hearn’s estate sued
several officers of the Lancaster County Sheriff’s Office under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers acted with
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that Hearn would
commit suicide while detained in the Lancaster County Detention
Center. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, primarily because the plaintiffs could not
establish that any defendant was subjectively aware of Hearn’s
suicidal tendencies at the time of his arrest or detention. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we view
the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Bland
v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 2013).
A.
On September 13, 2009, Henry Hearn’s ex-wife, Darcie Hearn,
called the Lancaster County Sheriff’s Office to report concerns
about Hearn’s behavior. Darcie Hearn explained that Hearn was
living in the woods behind her home, and that she thought he was
entering her home to take things when she was not present.
Deputy Sheriff Donovan Small responded to the call. When he
arrived at Darcie Hearn’s home, she directed him to the area of
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the woods where she believed Hearn had been living. In the
woods, Small found a campsite, which largely consisted of a few
sheets on the ground.
Sergeant James Whitaker arrived at the scene shortly
thereafter to assist Small. Although Small and Whitaker did not
find Hearn at the campsite, they did find a yellow notepad on
the top of the sheets, the first five pages of which consisted
of a handwritten note, which was composed by Hearn and addressed
to Darcie Hearn. Although the parties debate how thoroughly
Small and Whitaker reviewed the note, we will assume for summary
judgment purposes that they both read it.
After reviewing the note, Small and Whitaker left Hearn’s
campsite. Small returned alone after Darcie Hearn placed
another call to the Sheriff’s Office. This time Hearn was
present at the site. Small called his supervisor, Lieutenant
Chuck Kirkley, about the situation and arrested Hearn on a
charge of criminal domestic violence.
Small and Hearn engaged in casual conversation while he
transported Hearn to the detention center. Among other things,
Small asked Hearn what he did for a living. Hearn said that he
normally worked on oil rigs in Florida but explained that the
work had slowed down recently. Small asked Hearn if he had any
medical problems, to which Hearn answered “‘No, I’m fine.’”
J.A. 113. Small also questioned Hearn about the meaning of the
4
note. Hearn reportedly “said it meant that . . . he was
leaving; he was going out west, and he was telling his [] wife
and [others] goodbye.” Id. At some point during the
conversation, Hearn asked Small to retrieve some property that
he had buried in the woods at a different campsite, which Small
agreed to do after he dropped Hearn off.
When they arrived at the detention center, at approximately
3:20 p.m., Small turned Hearn over to Sergeant Mitzi Snipes for
booking. He also gave Snipes the notepad. Without reading it,
she “flipped through the notebook” to look for contraband. J.A.
161. At no point did Small mention to Snipes that he had any
concerns about Hearn’s mental or physical wellbeing.
As booking officer, Snipes was responsible for collecting
Hearn’s personal information, such as his name, address, and
contact information. Hearn declined to provide an emergency
contact. Snipes also conducted a standard medical screening of
Hearn, which required her to ask, among other things, whether
Hearn was having any suicidal thoughts. Hearn responded “‘No’”
to that question. J.A. 160. Snipes described Hearn’s demeanor
throughout the booking process as “calm” and “cooperative.”
J.A. 158.
While Snipes was booking Hearn, Small consulted Kirkley
about what to do with the notepad, as Small thought it might
have been evidence. After reviewing the note, Kirkley told
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Small that it was personal property and instructed him to put it
with Hearn’s other belongings. After doing so, Small drove back
out to retrieve Hearn’s other property.
At approximately 6:15 p.m., just three hours after he
arrived at the detention center, Hearn hanged himself in his
jail cell.
B.
Hearn’s sons, Cody and Christopher Hearn, individually and
as representatives of his estate, filed suit against Small,
Kirkley, Snipes, and Whitaker, among others, 1 in the Lancaster
County Court of Common Pleas. In addition to state-law claims
alleging gross negligence against Sheriff Faile and Lancaster
County, the complaint alleged that the defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that Hearn would
commit suicide while detained in the Lancaster County Detention
Center, in violation of his 14th Amendment right to due process.
The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for
summary judgment, arguing that they were not deliberately
1
The complaint also named as defendants Lancaster County;
Barry Faile, the County Sheriff; Debbie Horne, the administrator
of the detention center; and unnamed employees of the Sheriff’s
Department. Hearn’s representatives are not challenging the
grant of summary judgment as to those defendants. The complaint
also brought claims against the defendants in their official
capacities, but the plaintiffs are now only pursuing their
individual-capacity claims.
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indifferent because no officer knew that Hearn was having
suicidal thoughts on September 13. Alternatively, the
defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
Without reaching the latter question, the district court
granted the defendants’ motion. It concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect
to an essential element of a deliberate-indifference claim:
namely, that any defendant had subjective knowledge that there
was a substantial risk that Hearn would commit suicide while
detained. The court determined that Hearn’s note was
insufficient to support an inference that the officers actually
knew that Hearn was suicidal because it lacked an explicit
suicide threat. It also emphasized that one of the plaintiffs’
experts testified that the meaning of the note was ambiguous.
To the extent that any officer perceived any red flags with
respect to Hearn’s condition, the court concluded that the
defendants’ conduct was, at most, negligent.
Having dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the court remanded the state-law claims. This
appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Bland, 730 F.3d at
7
373. “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
A.
A government official violates the constitutional rights of
a pretrial detainee when he knows of but disregards a serious
risk of harm to the detainee. See Parrish ex rel. Lee v.
Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). We consider here whether
the plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether
any of the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent
to a serious risk that Hearn would commit suicide while detained
in the Lancaster County Detention Center.
“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard” that is
generally only satisfied by government conduct that shocks the
conscience. Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The plaintiffs must make a two-part showing to
satisfy the standard’s high burden. Id. at 303. First, they
must establish that the defendant had a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Specifically, the plaintiffs must demonstrate
“that the official in question subjectively recognized a
substantial risk of harm” to the detainee. Parrish, 372 F.3d at
8
303. In a prison suicide case, this means that the evidence
must show that the defendant actually knew of the detainee’s
suicidal intent, not merely that he should have recognized it.
Second, even if the plaintiffs can satisfy their burden
with respect to an official’s subjective awareness, the evidence
must also show “that the official in question subjectively
recognized that his actions were ‘inappropriate in light of that
risk.’” Id. (quoting Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1997)). Again, “it is not enough that the official should
have recognized that his actions were inappropriate; the
official actually must have recognized that his actions were
insufficient.” Id.Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge for
either prong “is a question of fact subject to demonstration in
the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial
evidence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Although “it is not enough
that a reasonable officer would have found the risk to be
obvious,” a factfinder may conclude that an officer “‘knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’”
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). For
example, the risk of injury might have been “so obvious that the
factfinder could conclude that the [officer] did know of it
because he could not have failed to know of it.” Brice v.
Virginia Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Additionally, an official cannot escape liability under this
standard if it is shown “that he merely refused to verify
underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, which,
if verified, would have compelled him to realize that the
claimant needed immediate medical attention, or that he declined
to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to
exist.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.
We turn to examine whether summary judgment was appropriate
as to each of the defendants.
1.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, the evidence does not raise a triable issue of fact
that Deputy Small subjectively knew that there was a serious
risk that Hearn would commit suicide.
The plaintiffs argue that Small was subjectively aware of
Hearn’s suicidal tendencies because he read Hearn’s note. They
contend that the note so obviously signaled Hearn’s suicidal
ideation that Small could not have failed to recognize that
Hearn was suicidal.
Like the district court, however, we do not believe the
note is so clear. The note is a five-page stream of
consciousness that touches on a variety of subjects. Much of it
details Hearn’s regret over being unable to repair his
10
relationship with his ex-wife. Although the note certainly
reflects Hearn’s disappointment over his situation, it lacks an
explicit statement that Hearn was thinking about harming
himself.
With the benefit of hindsight, some of the language can
certainly be construed as macabre. For example, the note opens
with the statement that “I just simply can’t take the hurt no
more.” J.A. 219. Later, Hearn reflects on wishing he had been
“the kind of man and father” Darcie Hearn wanted him to be, and
states, “I only have 2 options[,] us--or this.” Id. The second
page of the note contains a map of a location in the woods where
Hearn buried, among other things, $225 in cash, his clothes, and
a book with an Elvis autograph, and it directs Darcie Hearn to
retrieve the items. Near the end of the note, Hearn states: “By
the way, I don’t want my face sunk in.” J.A. 221. It then
lists four songs that Hearn liked. 2
Notwithstanding the above, we emphasize, as did the
district court, that the note lacks an explicit suicide threat.
Given that, we cannot say that the note is sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact that a police officer in Small’s position-
2
The songs listed are: (1) “I can only imagin” [sic], for
which Hearn did not provide an artist; (2) “The Dance,” by Garth
Brooks; (3) “It Goes,” by Josh Turner; and (4) “Lay Me to
Sleep,” by AFI. See J.A. 221-22.
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-without any other knowledge of Hearn’s psychological condition-
-knew that Hearn was suicidal. Cf. Gordon v. Kidd, 971 F.2d
1087, 1094 (4th Cir. 1992) (“In the absence of a previous threat
of or an earlier attempt at suicide, we know of no federal court
in the nation . . . that has concluded that official conduct in
failing to prevent a suicide constitutes deliberate
indifference.” (quoting Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1275
(11th Cir. 1989))). We are especially reluctant to hold as much
given that one of the plaintiffs’ experts admitted that the
meaning of the note is “open to interpretation.” J.A. 207.
Although Small testified that he did not interpret the
letter as a suicide note, the plaintiffs argue that his
subsequent actions belie that claim. They point to the fact
that Small initiated a discussion with Hearn about the meaning
of the note, and contend that his questioning suggests that he
was, in fact, concerned about its contents.
But even if we accept the plaintiffs’ view that Small’s
questioning suggested that he was concerned about the
implications of the note, that is a far cry from establishing
that Small knew Hearn was suicidal. Moreover, we think Hearn’s
responses to Small’s questions negate an inference that Small
must have known that Hearn was contemplating suicide. In
addition to denying any medical problems, Hearn told Small that
the note was simply a goodbye letter to his ex-wife because he
12
was moving away. As part of the same discussion, Hearn asked
Small to retrieve his property “‘so [he would] have it.’” J.A.
119. This interaction hardly signaled to Small that Hearn had
imminent plans to end his life. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d
383, 390 (4th Cir. 2001) (evaluating the “substantiality of the
risk” an officer perceived in light of “everything that he was
told and observed”). 3
To the extent that Small appreciated any red flags from the
note or otherwise, we think Small’s questioning of Hearn defeats
the plaintiffs’ claim that he was deliberately indifferent to
Hearn’s medical needs. See Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (“[T]o the
extent the officers recognized any risk at all, we are concerned
with the risk as they perceived it, not as a reasonable officer
under the circumstances should have perceived it . . . .”). If
Small recognized any warning signs from Hearn or the note, he
did not ignore them. Rather, he specifically asked Hearn about
3
The plaintiffs argue that summary judgment is
inappropriate because there are credibility issues with respect
to Small’s testimony that he did not read the note but only
skimmed it. The plaintiffs are correct, of course, that
credibility determinations are not appropriate in a summary
judgment proceeding, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986), but the district court did not make such
determinations. Rather, it concluded that the note was not
sufficient to support an inference that Small subjectively knew
Hearn was suicidal even if he did read it. The plaintiffs’
other credibility argument is equally unavailing. The mere fact
that Small questioned Hearn does not raise a credibility issue
about his testimony writ large.
13
his health and the meaning of the note. Hearn’s responses
seemed to dispel any concern. Perhaps Small’s reliance on
Hearn’s representations was negligent, but it was not
constitutionally unreasonable.
In sum, the plaintiffs have failed to forecast sufficient
evidence to support the inference that Small knew Hearn was
suicidal. To the extent that the evidence suggests that Small
perceived any risk to Hearn’s wellbeing, Small’s response did
not amount to deliberate indifference. Accordingly, judgment
for Small was appropriate as a matter of law.
2.
The plaintiffs base their claim against Lieutenant Kirkley
on the fact that he had basically the same information as Deputy
Small on September 13. Because he was Small’s supervisor that
day, Kirkley knew all of the information leading to Hearn’s
arrest, including his living situation. Kirkley also read the
note. Although Kirkley, like Small, denied interpreting the
letter as a suicide note, the plaintiffs say that he could not
have failed to recognize that Hearn was suicidal. His
subsequent inaction, they argue, therefore constituted
deliberate indifference.
We do not believe Hearn’s suicide risk was so obvious that
Kirkley must have recognized it as such. As explained with
respect to Small, the note did not clearly signal that Hearn was
14
suicidal. In fact, the note is fairly read as a letter to
Hearn’s ex-wife, which is how Kirkley testified to interpreting
it.
Even if we accept that Kirkley could not have failed to
recognize that the note raised red flags about Hearn’s mental
health, the plaintiffs have not offered evidence suggesting that
Kirkley knew his inaction after reading the note was
constitutionally unreasonable in light of the risk that he did
perceive. There is simply no evidence in the record, in the
form of contemporaneous statements or otherwise, that Kirkley
appreciated that Hearn was in need of immediate medical
attention, or that he knew his inaction during the brief window
between reading the note and Hearn’s death was inadequate. See
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 307 (noting that this court has found
deliberate indifference when the uncontroverted evidence “showed
that the officials in question responded to a perceived risk
with subjective awareness that their response was
inappropriate”). Perhaps it was negligent for Kirkley not to do
anything further, but that does not satisfy the deliberate-
indifference threshold.
3.
With respect to Sergeant Whitaker, the plaintiffs argue
that he was deliberately indifferent because he read Hearn’s
15
note but then “made no response to Mr. Hearn’s medical need.”
Appellant’s Br. at 27.
As discussed above, we do not believe the note is
sufficient, by itself, to establish subjective awareness of
Hearn’s suicidal tendencies. But there is an even bigger
problem with the plaintiffs’ claim against Whitaker: he was not
personally involved with Hearn’s arrest or detention.
“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it
must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted
personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.”
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Whitaker left Hearn’s campsite
shortly after he read the note, and he never came into contact
with Hearn. Whitaker was also in no position to direct Small’s
conduct with respect to Hearn, since there is no evidence that
he even knew Hearn was arrested on September 13. On these
facts, we cannot conclude that Whitaker had any “personal
knowledge” or “involvement” in the alleged deprivation of
Hearn’s constitutional rights. See id.
4.
We also find no error in the district court’s decision to
grant summary judgment to Sergeant Snipes, the officer who
processed Hearn at the detention center. It is uncontested that
Snipes did not read the note, and Small never told her that he
16
was concerned about Hearn’s mental or physical condition. Hearn
was calm and cooperative during the booking process, and when
Snipes asked Hearn if he was having suicidal thoughts, Hearn
said no. We hardly think this raises a triable issue of fact as
to whether Snipes knew Hearn was suicidal. Cf. Gordon, 971 F.2d
at 1095 (finding that prison officials could not be deliberately
indifferent because no one warned them that the prisoner had
made suicide threats).
The plaintiffs nonetheless contend that the observations
Snipes made as she was processing Hearn--e.g., his failure to
provide an emergency contact--should have alerted her to Hearn’s
condition. But an officer’s failure to appreciate a warning
sign is, at most, negligent and not sufficient to establish
deliberate indifference. Cf. Ward v. Holmes, 28 F.3d 1212, 1994
WL 313624, at *5 (4th Cir. June 30, 1994) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (concluding that a prison official was, at most,
negligent when he failed to realize that a detainee was suicidal
from the fact that the detainee was drunk, had a large scar
across his wrist, and spoke of giving away his bike).
III.
Henry Hearn’s death was undeniably tragic. However, the
district court correctly determined that none of the officers
involved in Hearn’s arrest or detention violated his
17
constitutional rights. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED
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