United States v. Jacob Covington

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6832
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JACOB TREMAIN COVINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:07-cr-00191-WO-1)
Submitted: June 29, 2012 Decided: July 10, 2012
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert J. McAfee, MCAFEE LAW, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Paul Alexander Weinman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The district court accepted Jacob Tremain Covington’s
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to the charge of
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). After a hearing, the
district court concluded that Covington had failed to
demonstrate that his release would not pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury or damage to property of another, and committed
Covington to the custody of the Attorney General. Covington
appeals, and appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether
the district court erred in committing Covington. Covington has
also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising additional
issues. * Finding no error, we affirm.
Appellate courts review a district court’s order
committing a defendant to the custody of the Attorney General
for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d
266, 273 (3d Cir. 2006). Under 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a)-(c) (2006),
upon finding that a defendant is not guilty of a criminal
offense by reason of insanity, a district court must commit the
*
We have considered the issues raised in Covington’s pro se
brief and conclude they lack merit.
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defendant to a suitable facility, order that a psychiatric
evaluation of the defendant be completed and a report prepared,
and conduct a hearing within forty-five days to determine
whether the defendant should remain in custody. At the hearing,
a defendant charged with an offense involving bodily injury or
serious damage to the property of another must prove “by clear
and convincing evidence that his release would not create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to the property of another due to a present mental
disease or defect.” 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (2006). For any other
offense, the defendant must make this showing by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id.Moreover, if after the hearing the court finds that
the defendant failed to meet his burden of proof, the court
“shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney
General.” 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e) (2006). We have thoroughly
reviewed the record and conclude that the district court
complied with the statutory requirements and did not err in
determining that Covington failed to carry his burden of proving
that he would not pose a substantial risk of injury or property
damage if released.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
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court. This court requires that counsel inform Covington, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Covington requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Covington. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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