United States v. Pretty Boy Coe

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4060
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PRETTY BOY COE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-00092-HEH-1)
Submitted: July 13, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Robert J.
Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Megan A. Kerwin,
Research and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Stephen W.
Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pretty Boy Coe appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress prior to his guilty plea to possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006), and possession of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006). We
affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying a
district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634
F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial of a
suppression motion, this court construes the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. Id. “We defer to the
district court’s credibility findings, as it is the role of the
district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility
during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v.
Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Pursuant to a lawful
stop, “an officer who has reasonable suspicion to believe that a
vehicle contains illegal drugs may order its occupants out of
the vehicle and pat them down for weapons.” United States v.
Rooks, 596 F.3d 204, 210 (4th Cir. 2010).
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
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It must be evaluated using common sense and measured by a
totality of the circumstances. United States v. Powell, 666
F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2011). Courts are entitled to credit
the practical experience of police officers who encounter
criminal activity on a regular basis. United States v. Branch,
537 F.3d 328, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2008). A “person’s possible
involvement in prior criminal activity . . . can be relevant in
establishing reasonable suspicion.” Powell, 666 F.3d at 188;
United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997).
This information must be paired with other, concrete factors.
Foster, 634 F.3d at 247. An area’s propensity for crime may
also be considered. Branch, 537 F.3d at 338.
Coe does not contest the legitimacy of the traffic
stop. He instead argues that the factors present at the time
the officers conducted a pat-down do not support a finding of
reasonable suspicion. We disagree. Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that the facts known to the officers
supported reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained
controlled substances, which allowed the officers to remove the
occupants and conduct a pat-down of each for weapons.
Coe argues that even if reasonable suspicion existed,
the officers’ actions indicated that they did not subjectively
believe he was armed. Because the test is an objective one, we
reject this argument. See, e.g., Rooks, 596 F.3d at 210 (“we
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must uphold a police officer’s actions — regardless of the
officer’s subjective intent — if sufficient objective evidence
exists to validate the challenged conduct”); Powell, 666 F.3d at
186 (the reasonable suspicion standard is an objective one).
Coe lastly argues that the district court erred in not
considering his race and that of the officers as a factor in its
analysis of reasonable suspicion. Because race is not an
appropriate factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis, we also
reject this argument.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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