United States v. Eduardo Martinez

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4847
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDUARDO ROMERO MARTINEZ, a/k/a Lalo,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 18-4865
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDUARDO ROMERO MARTINEZ, a/k/a Lalo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
at Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:08-cr-00039-D-1; 7:18-cr-00012-
D-1)
Submitted: June 20, 2019 Decided: July 19, 2019
Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, Eduardo Romero Martinez appeals the revocation
judgment imposed following Martinez’s admission to violating the terms of his
supervised release, which was imposed in conjunction with Martinez’s 2009 federal drug
trafficking conviction (No. 18-4847), and the 60-month upward variant sentence imposed
following Martinez’s guilty plea, in a separate criminal proceeding, to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (No. 18-4865).
Martinez argues on appeal that (1) the supervised release revocation and resulting
sentence violate the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against successive
punishments for the same offense because the same underlying conduct formed the basis
for the new criminal proceeding; and (2) the 60-month upward variant sentence is
substantively unreasonable. Finding no error in the former and no abuse of discretion in
the latter, we affirm both judgments.
First, as to the double jeopardy argument pressed in No. 18-4847, “[w]e review de
novo questions concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Schnittker,
807 F.3d 77, 81 (4th Cir. 2015). Martinez properly concedes that his argument is
foreclosed by binding precedent. We have previously determined that “[t]he sentence
imposed upon revocation of a term of supervised release is an authorized part of the
original sentence,” intended to sanction the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust in
violating the terms of his release, “leaving the punishment for any new criminal conduct
to the court responsible for imposing the sentence for that offense.” United States v.
Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
3
omitted); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (“We therefore
attribute postrevocation penalties to the original conviction.”); United States v. Ketter,
908 F.3d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he term of supervised release, the revocation of that
term, and any additional term of imprisonment imposed for violating the terms of the
supervised release are all part of the original sentence.”) (quoting United States v. Evans,
159 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1998)). Because the punishment imposed on a defendant for
violating his supervised release terms is “properly considered punishment” for his
original offense, not for his subsequent offense, “the punishment imposed for this latter
offense is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Woodrup, 86 F.3d at 362.
It is well settled that “[a] decision of a panel of this court becomes the law of the
circuit and is binding on other panels unless it is overruled by a subsequent en banc
opinion of this court or a superseding contrary decision of the Supreme Court.” United
States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As Woodrup has not been affected by any intervening en banc or Supreme Court
decision, Martinez’s argument is foreclosed. Accordingly, we affirm the revocation
judgment on appeal in No. 18-4847.
Turning to No. 18-4865, Martinez challenges the substantive reasonableness of the
60-month upward variant sentence the district court imposed in his new criminal
proceeding. In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, this court “take[s]
into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). While “[a] major
departure from the advisory range ‘should be supported by a more significant justification
4
than a minor one,’” United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50), “district courts have extremely broad discretion when determining
the weight to be given each of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors,” United States
v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011). While this court will vacate a variant
sentence upon concluding that the district court offered inadequate reasoning “or if it
relie[d] on improper factors,” we must and will “defer to the district court and affirm a
reasonable sentence, even if we would have imposed something different.” United States
v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 915 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Upon review, we hold that the record demonstrates the district court’s proper and
well-reasoned basis for varying upward from Martinez’s Guidelines range of 37-46
months to impose a 60-month sentence. The district court’s primary reasons for the
upward variance went hand in glove: Martinez’s demonstrated history of drug trafficking
coupled with Martinez’s resistance to all prior efforts to curb his recidivism, which was
chronic and unabated for many years. The court further opined that an upward variance
was necessary to deter others from similar conduct. Finally, a longer sentence was
warranted, in the court’s view, to protect the public from future crimes by Martinez, who
consistently showed himself unwilling to conform his conduct to the law even after an
extended period of federal incarceration and while on federal supervised release.
In light of the deference accorded to a district court’s sentencing decision, we hold
that Martinez has failed to establish that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. See
United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming 60-month
upward variant sentence imposed on defendant whose assumed Guidelines range was 0-6
5
months); see also United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 2010) (“All that
matters is that the sentence imposed be reasonable in relation to the ‘package’ of reasons
given by the court . . . .”). Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment on appeal in
No. 18-4865.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6