United States v. Hope Jackson-Forsythe

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4425
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HOPE LANITA JACKSON-FORSYTHE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-4430
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDWARDO MANUELL FORSYTHE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00202-2; 3:11-cr-00202-1)
Submitted: November 20, 2012 Decided: November 29, 2012
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louie T. Price, HOLROYD & YOST, Charleston, West Virginia; John
A. Proctor, PROCTOR LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Huntington, West
Virginia, for Appellants. R. Booth Goodwin, II, United States
Attorney, R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Hope Lanita Jackson-Forsythe (“Hope”) and Edwardo
Manuell Forsythe appeal their convictions, entered pursuant to
their conditional guilty pleas to an indictment charging them
each with one count of possession with intent to distribute
oxycodone and oxymorphone, and aiding and abetting each other in
that offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). On appeal, Appellants challenge the
district court’s denial of their joint motion to suppress
evidence obtained from their vehicle and their hotel room.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In considering the district court’s denial of a motion
to suppress, “[w]e review the district court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear
error.” United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
2010). When the district court has denied a suppression motion,
“we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” Id. “We particularly defer to a district court’s
credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district
court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a
pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Appellants first challenge the traffic stop and
evidence seized during the subsequent search of their vehicle.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may
conduct a brief investigatory stop “when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion
requires an officer to have “a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” based on “the totality of
the circumstances.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Officers may “draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With the above
standards in mind, and upon review of the record, we conclude
that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the
officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that a drug
transaction had occurred in Appellants’ vehicle, justifying the
traffic stop.
Turning to the vehicle search and seizure of evidence,
Appellants contend that the warrantless search of Hope’s purse,
which was inside the vehicle, and her subsequent non-Mirandized
questioning ran afoul of the Constitution. Appellants ignore
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that “[t]here is a well-established exception to [the warrant]
requirement . . . for automobile searches. Under this
exception, ‘[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause
exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment
. . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.’”
Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S.
938, 940 (1996) (citation omitted)). Moreover, “it is well
settled that a positive alert from a drug detection dog, in and
of itself, provides probable cause to search a vehicle.” 1 United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, once the canine
positively alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle,
officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment,
including Hope’s purse. See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 (“[O]nce
police have probable cause, they may search ‘every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.’”) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825
(1982) (citation omitted)).
Appellants next contend that the police violated
Hope’s Miranda 2 rights by questioning her following the vehicle
1
Appellants do not challenge the canine sniff of the
vehicle, nor do they dispute that the canine positively
indicated the presence of drugs in the vehicle.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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search. “[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or
its functional equivalent,” which includes “any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)
(footnote omitted). We conclude that the detective’s simple
inquiry as to whether Appellants were staying at a particular
hotel cannot be construed as “reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.” Thus, we conclude that Hope’s
statement was not elicited in violation of her Miranda rights.
Finally, Appellants challenge the search of their
hotel room and the seizure of evidence found therein.
Appellants’ “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument is meritless
in light of our resolution of their challenges to the vehicle
search and seizure and Hope’s questioning. Appellants’ second
argument, that police illegally searched their hotel room and
seized items prior to issuance of the search warrant, also is
meritless.
Warrantless searches “‘are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.’” United States v.
Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 275 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mincey v.
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Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)). The independent source
doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are two distinct
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 3 See Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (discussing doctrines). The inevitable
discovery doctrine allows admission of evidence “[i]f the
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means.” Id. at 444. Even if police
illegally searched Appellants’ hotel room and seized evidence
prior to the issuance of the search warrant, the district court
properly found that the evidence inevitably would have been
lawfully discovered and seized during execution of the search
warrant, which Appellants concede was valid. Thus, this claim
is meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3
While the district court discuss both doctrines, it is
apparent that the court relied on the inevitable discovery
doctrine to find that the hotel room evidence was admissible.
Thus, we need not consider the applicability of the independent
source doctrine.
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