United States v. Davares Archie

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4669
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVARES ANTONIO ARCHIE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00667-JFA-1)
Submitted: July 28, 2016 Decided: August 4, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua Snow Kendrick, KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C., Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John David Rowell, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Davares Antonio Archie appeals his conviction and 120-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). On appeal, counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning (1) whether the district court erred in
accepting Archie’s guilty plea, and (2) whether the district
court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Archie was notified of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done
so. The Government has declined to file a response brief. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must
conduct a colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the
charges to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum penalties he faces, and the rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1);
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
The court must ensure that the defendant’s plea is knowing,
voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3).
2
Because Archie did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or
otherwise preserve error in the plea proceedings, we review the
adequacy of the plea colloquy for plain error. United States v.
Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009). Archie
establishes plain error by demonstrating that (1) the district
court erred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected
his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1121, 1126 (2013). In the guilty plea context, a defendant
establishes that an error affected his substantial rights if he
demonstrates a reasonable probability that he would not have
entered his plea but for the error. United States v. Aplicano-
Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 427 (4th Cir. 2015). Even if these
requirements are met, we will “correct the error only if it
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d
376, 381 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court substantially complied with the
requirements of Rule 11 in conducting the plea colloquy.
Although the court made minor omissions during the colloquy, see
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(K), (O), the record provides no basis
to conclude that these errors affected Archie’s substantial
rights. See Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d at 427. Further, while
we note that the plea agreement mischaracterized the drug
weights involved in the conspiracy offense with which Archie was
3
charged, we conclude the record otherwise demonstrates that
Archie’s guilty plea to the charged offense was both knowing and
voluntary.
We review Archie’s sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We must first determine whether
the district court committed significant procedural error, such
as incorrect calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range,
inadequate consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, or insufficient explanation of the sentence imposed.
United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir. 2014). If
we find no procedural error, we also examine the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy
the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume
on appeal that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively
reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014). Archie bears the burden to rebut this presumption
“by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Our review of the record reveals that Archie’s sentence is
reasonable. The district court properly calculated Archie’s
Guidelines range, heard sentencing arguments from both parties,
4
and explained its rationale for the sentence it imposed.
Although the court’s explanation was not lengthy, it
specifically referenced the § 3553(a) factors and was sufficient
to justify its decision to sentence Archie to the statutory
minimum — the precise sentence requested by both Archie and the
Government. Further, Archie fails to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Archie, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Archie requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Archie.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5