Georgina Owusu v. Loretta Lynch

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1167
GEORGINA OWUSU,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 16-1168
YAW BOATENG,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: August 12, 2016 Decided: August 26, 2016
Before SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petitions denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York, for Petitioners. Benjamin
C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John S.
Hogan, Assistant Director, Ashley Martin, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated petitions for review, Georgina Owusu
and Yaw Boateng, natives and citizens of Ghana, seek review of
two separate orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board)
dismissing their appeals from the immigration judge’s denial of
their applications for cancellation of removal. ∗
On appeal, the Petitioners first argue that the agency
erred in concluding that they failed to establish the requisite
good moral character required for a grant of cancellation of
removal. The Attorney General may cancel the removal of a
nonpermanent resident alien if the alien (1) has been physically
present in the United States continuously for at least 10 years;
(2) has had good moral character during that time period;
(3) has not been convicted of certain enumerated offenses; and
(4) establishes that removal would result in “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1) (2012); Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 403 n.1
(4th Cir. 2005).
∗ Although the immigration judge also denied Owusu’s
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture, Owusu does not challenge
the denial of these forms of relief on appeal. She has
therefore waived appellate review of these issues. See Ngarurih
v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004).
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Upon review, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the agency’s finding that the Petitioners were statutorily
precluded from establishing good moral character pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2012) (providing that “[n]o person shall be
regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character
who, during the period for which good moral character is
required to be established, is, or was . . . one who has given
false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under
this chapter.”). See Ramos v. Holder, 660 F.3d 200, 203 (4th
Cir. 2011) (noting that the “determination that an alien is per
se ineligible to establish the good moral character necessary
for cancellation of removal is essentially a legal determination
involving the application of law to factual findings” and that
“our review of the agency’s factual determinations is
necessarily limited” and must be upheld if “supported by
substantial evidence from the record as a whole” (alterations
and citations omitted)). We therefore uphold the denial of
relief for the reasons stated by the Board. In re Owusu, No.
16-1167 (B.I.A. Feb. 1, 2016); In re Boateng, No. 16-1168
(B.I.A. Feb. 1, 2016).
Additionally, the Petitioners argue that the immigration
judge erred in failing to sua sponte recuse himself and that the
Board erred in dismissing their due process arguments on the
ground that the immigration judge’s statements were not made on
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the record. We conclude that the Board did not err in declining
to address the alleged off-the-record statements in light of the
Petitioners’ failure to raise the issue before the immigration
judge. “[T]he failure to raise an issue before the [immigration
judge] properly waives the argument on appeal to the [Board].”
Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1023 (10th Cir.
2007) (declining to consider argument that alien failed to raise
before [the immigration judge] and that Board subsequently
deemed procedurally barred). In any event, our review of the
Petitioners’ due process claim reveals that they failed to
demonstrate the requisite prejudice. See Anim v. Mukasey, 535
F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008); Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 320
(4th Cir. 2002).
We therefore deny the petitions for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITIONS DENIED
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