Gary Wall v. James Wade

Filed: February 4, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6355
(7:11-cv-00191-JLK-RSB)
GARY WALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES WADE, Food Services Manager, ROSP; ROBERT ROWLETTE,
Assistant Warden of ROSP; T. RAY, Warden of ROSP;
J. STALLARD, Counselor of ROSP,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
C. SELYERS, Food Services Supervisor, ROSP;
CAPTAIN K. MCCOY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT C. GILBERT,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. ADAMS, Investigator of ROSP;
CORPORAL D. LEE, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. FARMER,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL PHILLIPS, Employee of ROSP;
K. CROWDER-AUSTIN, Western Regional Grievance Ombudsman for
VADOC; LIEUTENANT J. FANNIN, Employee of ROSP;
LIEUTENANT S. DAY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. HALE,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT UNKNOWN, Employee of ROSP;
CORPORAL BARROWMAN, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL GIBSON,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. VANDOVER, Property Officer of
ROSP; CORPORAL UNKOWN, Employee of ROSP; R. MULLINS,
Grievance Coordinator of ROSP; JOHN GARMAN,
Defendants.
O R D E R
The Court amends its opinion filed February 3, 2014,
as follows:
On page 3, section I., line 6 -- the word “sunrise” is
added after the word “before.”
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
2
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6355
GARY WALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES WADE, Food Services Manager, ROSP; ROBERT ROWLETTE,
Assistant Warden of ROSP; T. RAY, Warden of ROSP;
J. STALLARD, Counselor of ROSP,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
C. SELYERS, Food Services Supervisor, ROSP;
CAPTAIN K. MCCOY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT C. GILBERT,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. ADAMS, Investigator of ROSP;
CORPORAL D. LEE, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. FARMER,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL PHILLIPS, Employee of ROSP;
K. CROWDER-AUSTIN, Western Regional Grievance Ombudsman for
VADOC; LIEUTENANT J. FANNIN, Employee of ROSP;
LIEUTENANT S. DAY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. HALE,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT UNKNOWN, Employee of ROSP;
CORPORAL BARROWMAN, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL GIBSON,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. VANDOVER, Property Officer of
ROSP; CORPORAL UNKOWN, Employee of ROSP; R. MULLINS,
Grievance Coordinator of ROSP; JOHN GARMAN,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (7:11-cv-00191-JLK-RSB)
Argued: December 11, 2013 Decided: February 3, 2014
Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Elizabeth Scott Turner, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY,
Williamsburg Virginia, for Appellant. Earle Duncan Getchell,
Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Tillman J. Breckenridge,
Washington, D.C., Robert M. Luck III, REED SMITH LLP, Richmond,
Virginia; Patricia E. Roberts, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL
APPELLATE AND SUPREME COURT CLINIC, Williamsburg, Virginia, for
Appellant. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of
Virginia, Michael H. Brady, Assistant Solicitor General,
Patricia L. West, Chief Deputy Attorney General,
Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
2
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal we review the application of a state
prison’s policy conditioning an inmate’s request for a religious
accommodation on his possession of physical indicia of faith.
We also address whether the inmate’s claims for equitable relief
were mooted after the prison abandoned the policy. We vacate
the district court’s summary judgment order granting the
defendants qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claims for
monetary relief. We also vacate the district court’s decision
that the prison’s abandonment of the policy mooted the claims
for equitable relief. We remand to the district court for such
further proceedings as may be appropriate.
I.
The plaintiff, Gary Wall, is a state prisoner housed at Red
Onion State Prison (“ROSP”) in Pound, Virginia. As a member of
the Nation of Islam, in 2008 and 2009 Wall was allowed to
observe the holy month of Ramadan while in state custody. To
accommodate Ramadan observance, prison officials provide
participating inmates with special meals served before sunrise
and after sunset. While at ROSP, Wall also received “common
fare” meals, which satisfied his religious beliefs.
Prior to 2010, Muslim inmates at ROSP simply had to sign up
to participate in Ramadan. In 2009, approximately half of the
3
inmate population signed up. ROSP staff later determined that a
significant number of the participating inmates were not, in
fact, practicing Muslims. As a result, ROSP devised a new
eligibility policy for 2010: in addition to signing up, inmates
had to provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith, such as a
Quran, Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained
from the prison Chaplain’s office. 1 ROSP inmates who did not
have such materials or refused to acquire them were deemed
insincere in their religious beliefs and were prohibited from
participating in Ramadan. 2
Wall was one of the inmates who was not allowed to
participate. After initially signing up, Wall was asked by
defendants James Wade, C. Selyers, and J. Stallard to provide
physical evidence of the sincerity of his beliefs in accordance
with the new policy. Wall stated that all his belongings,
including his articles of faith, had been lost during his
1
This policy was somewhat unique among Virginia Department
of Corrections (“VDOC”) facilities. Most prisons maintain a
“religious pass list,” which keeps track of which inmates
participate in specific religious services. However, because
most ROSP inmates are in long-term administrative segregation,
ROSP does not offer group religious services. Consequently,
ROSP does not keep a religious pass list.
2
In 2010, with the new policy in place, only 176 of the 360
inmates who signed up to participate provided the necessary
materials. The other 187 inmates were prohibited from observing
the fasting hours.
4
transfer to ROSP. He showed Wade a state court judgment against
the Commonwealth as proof that VDOC had lost his possessions. 3
Wall also produced documents showing that he was receiving
common fare meals in accordance with his faith, and he informed
the officers that he had observed Ramadan in 2008 and 2009.
Despite this, Wade responded, “that don’t mean anything,” and
instructed Stallard and Selyers to remove Wall from the Ramadan
list. J.A. 139.
Wall then filed an informal complaint, again explaining
that his religious materials had been lost and requesting to be
allowed to participate. In a memo in response to the complaint,
Wade reiterated ROSP’s new policy, stating:
[ROSP] does not have religious services so the
following rules apply to this institution. You are
required to have religious material such as ([ku]f
[i], [Qu]r[a]n, prayer rug or religious pamphlets that
pertain to the Ramadan month long fasting.) Food
service went to every inmate[’]s cell to inspect the
above religious material. Either you had no religious
material or refused to present material[.] [T]his is
why you were removed from the Ramadan pass list.
J.A. 42.
On August 11, 2010, the first morning of Ramadan, Wall did
not eat breakfast and concealed a portion of his meal in his
3
Although the judgment itself does not reference the nature
of Wall’s underlying claim, he later received a letter from the
Virginia Attorney General’s office explaining that it was in
response to “founded grievances regarding . . . lost property
. . . .” J.A. 126.
5
cell to save until after sunset. ROSP staff found the food and
threatened to charge him with possessing contraband. Faced with
choosing between starvation and sanctions, Wall ate during the
day and violated his religious beliefs.
On August 15, Wall filed a formal grievance, which was also
denied. Six days later, he had a conversation with Wade and
Assistant Warden Robert Rowlette, in which Rowlette asked if he
would like to be put back on the Ramadan list provided it could
be verified that he had truly lost his belongings. According to
Wall, he responded that he still wanted to participate, but that
he also wanted an explanation for why he was taken off the list
in the first place. Rowlette replied, “[o]kay,” and then walked
away while Wall shouted “I want to participate in Ramadan! I
want my Ramadan, Rowlette!” J.A. 140. According to the
defendants, however, Wall refused Rowlette’s offer to be put
back on the list, saying, “[n]o, I’m going to pursue this in
court.” J.A. 93. Ultimately, Wall was not allowed to
participate in Ramadan in 2010.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Wall filed
suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In an amended complaint, Wall alleged violations of
RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, in
addition to several related state law claims. The amended
6
complaint sought “[a] declaratory judgment, nominal damages,
unspecified joint and several compensatory damages, $10,000 in
punitive damages from each defendant, and any additional relief
this court deems just, proper, and equitable.” J.A. 32-33.
Shortly after the suit was filed, Wall was transferred out
of ROSP to a lower-security facility. Subsequently, the
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, finding that any claims for equitable relief were moot
following Wall’s transfer, and ruling that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claim for
damages.
Following the district court’s ruling, Wall was transferred
back to ROSP. The defendants claim that ROSP has since
abandoned its policy of requiring prisoners to possess physical
indicia of faith in order to participate in Ramadan or other
religious observations. The new policy, adopted in a September
13, 2011 memo by VDOC’s Chief of Corrections Operations, 4 states
that inmates in segregation facilities, such as ROSP, may
demonstrate sincerity by showing that they have in the past
borrowed religious material such as DVDs, CDs, or literature
4
The memo was not submitted as evidence in this case and is
therefore not part of the record, but it was referenced in a
related case involving the same policy. DePaola v. Wade, No.
7:11-cv-00198, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340, *7-10 (W.D. Va. Mar.
30, 2012).
7
from the Chaplain’s office. The memo states that the change was
made following an investigation by VDOC’s Inspector General,
which concluded that “it is not appropriate to require inmates
to buy something which is related to exercising First Amendment
[r]ights.” Following the policy change, Wall and other inmates
who were prohibited from observing Ramadan in 2010 were allowed
to participate in a “make-up” Ramadan in April 2012.
II.
We review two issues in this appeal: whether the district
court correctly determined that Wall’s equitable claims under
RLUIPA and the First Amendment were moot following ROSP’s
decision to abandon the 2010 Ramadan policy; and whether the
district court correctly granted the defendants qualified
immunity on Wall’s First Amendment claim for damages. 5 Both
issues are questions of law which we review de novo. See Green
v. City of Raleigh, 523 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2008)
(mootness); Johnson v. Caudill, 475 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir.
2007) (qualified immunity). We address the issues in turn.
5
We note at the forefront that Congress did not authorize
damages claims against state officials under RLUIPA. See
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011) (prohibiting
damages claims against state officials in their official
capacity); Rendleman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 2009)
(same for individual capacity). Therefore, the plaintiff’s only
potential remedies under RLUIPA are equitable.
8
A.
In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
the district court found that Wall’s transfer to another
facility mooted his request for equitable relief. 6 Although
Wall’s subsequent return to ROSP rendered this justification
obsolete, the district court also ruled that in such an event
Wall’s claims would remain moot in light of VDOC’s decision to
terminate the 2010 Ramadan policy.
It is well established that a defendant’s “voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice” moots an action only if
“subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 189 (2000); see Knox v. Service Employees Intern.
6
As an initial matter, the defendants argue that, to the
extent Wall has a justiciable claim for equitable relief, his
amended complaint failed to request injunctive relief in
particular. While it is true that his original complaint was
more specific than the amended complaint, we are comfortable
reading Wall’s prayer for any relief deemed “just, proper, and
equitable” as encompassing a claim for injunctive relief. An
appropriately liberal reading of the amended complaint indicates
that Wall sought to prevent the defendants from wrongfully
limiting his observance of Ramadan in the future through the
issuance of an injunction. See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d
520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Courts must] afford liberal
construction to the allegations in pro se complaints raising
civil rights issues.”). We also note that the district court,
while not explicitly ruling on the issue, referred to Wall’s
claim as a request for “injunctive relief.” J.A. 142.
9
Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (“The voluntary
cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a
case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a
resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is
dismissed.”). Were it otherwise, “courts would be compelled to
leave ‘[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.’”
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10
(1982) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
632 (1953)). “The ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court that
the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up
again lies with the party asserting mootness.” Laidlaw, 528
U.S. at 189 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
We have no difficulty concluding that the defendants failed
to meet their “heavy burden” of establishing that it is
“absolutely clear” the 2010 Ramadan policy will not be
reinstated. Id. Unsubstantiated assurances in their appellate
brief aside, the defendants have failed to put forth even a
single piece of evidence establishing that the practice of
requiring physical indicia of faith has been terminated once and
for all. The September 13, 2011 memorandum describing VDOC’s
purported change in policy –- which was only submitted in a
10
different case 7 –- also fails to establish that VDOC will not
reinstate the policy following completion of this lawsuit. We
have previously held that when a defendant retains the authority
and capacity to repeat an alleged harm, a plaintiff’s claims
should not be dismissed as moot. Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko,
728 F.3d 391, 395 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d
307, 316 (4th Cir. 2013); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes,
Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 2001). Nothing in the memo
suggests that VDOC is actually barred –- or even considers
itself barred -- from reinstating the 2010 Ramadan policy should
it so choose. To the contrary, the fact that at least three
separate policies have been utilized at ROSP since 2009
indicates some degree of doubt that the new policy will remain
in place for long.
The defendants invite us to adopt an approach employed by
several of our sister circuits, in which governmental defendants
are held to a less demanding burden of proof than private
defendants. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In practice
. . . , Laidlaw’s heavy burden frequently has not prevented
governmental officials from discontinuing challenged practices
7
While we are confident in our authority to take judicial
notice of the memorandum, we note that litigants do themselves
no favor in relying on our willingness to do so.
11
and mooting a case.”); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts are justified in treating a voluntary
governmental cessation of possibly wrongful conduct with some
solicitude, mooting cases that might have been allowed to
proceed had the defendant not been a public entity.”). However,
even if we were to adopt this approach, a question which we
expressly do not decide, we would have no trouble determining
that the defendants’ near total failure to provide the Court
with information regarding the change would remain insufficient
even under a lesser standard. In short, bald assertions of a
defendant –- whether governmental or private –- that it will not
resume a challenged policy fail to satisfy any burden of showing
that a claim is moot. 8 We therefore vacate the district court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s equitable claims.
8
Nor do we find any merit in the defendants’ contention
that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply in this
case because the change in policy was unrelated to the
litigation. See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic
Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he voluntary
cessation doctrine does not apply when the voluntary cessation
of the challenged activity occurs because of reasons unrelated
to the litigation.”) (quoting M. Redish, Moore’s Federal
Practice, § 101.99[2]). It is undisputed that the September 13,
2011 memo was issued after the plaintiff’s original complaint
was filed; and, as noted above, the change was made in the midst
of a separate lawsuit filed by another ROSP inmate challenging
the same policy. The timing strongly indicates that the change
was at least somewhat related to the two pending lawsuits.
12
B.
Turning to the plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages under
the First Amendment, the district court ruled that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 9 Qualified
immunity protects government officials performing discretionary
functions unless: “(1) the allegations underlying the claim, if
true, substantiate the violation of a federal statutory or
constitutional right; and (2) this violation was of a clearly
established right of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d
292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
we conclude that the defendants have failed to establish as a
matter of law that the 2010 Ramadan policy, as applied to the
plaintiff, did not violate his First Amendment rights. We also
hold that their alleged actions violated the plaintiff’s clearly
established rights, and that they are therefore not entitled to
qualified immunity.
9
The plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief are not
affected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which “has no
application to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.”
South Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436,
446-47 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d
1326, 1331 (4th Cir. 1974)).
13
1.
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids
the adoption of laws designed to suppress religious beliefs or
practices.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir.
2001). This encompasses policies that impose a substantial
burden on a prisoner’s right to practice his religion. Lovelace
v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2006). “Under . . .
the Free Exercise Clause . . . , a prisoner has a ‘clearly
established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . .
religious scruples,’ including proper food during Ramadan.” Id.
at 198-99 (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2nd Cir.
2003)). The defendants concede that denying Wall the
opportunity to observe Ramadan imposed a substantial burden on
his religious freedom.
However, free exercise restrictions that are “reasonably
adapted to achieving a legitimate penological objective” are
permissible. Id. at 200. In other words, then, prison
officials may restrict an inmate’s religious practices subject
to a “reasonableness” test that accords substantial deference to
the professional judgment of correctional officers. See Overton
v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). 10
10
This differs from the test utilized under RLUIPA, which
requires that restrictions be narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Thus, in the
(Continued)
14
A prison regulation is reasonable and thus permissible if
it satisfies the four factors established in Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987). That test asks: (1) whether there is a
“valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation or
action and the interest asserted by the government, or whether
this interest is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational”; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the
right . . . remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what impact the
desired accommodation would have on security staff, inmates, and
the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist
any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation or
action. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at
89-92).
As a preliminary matter, “prison officials may
appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity,
asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is
authentic.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13
(2005); see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971)
(“[T]he ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question; rather, the
prison context, the First Amendment affords officials greater
latitude than RLUIPA. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199 n. 8. (“RLUIPA
adopts a ‘more searching standard’ of review than that used for
parallel First Amendment claims, strict scrutiny instead of
reasonableness.”) (quoting Madison v. Ritter, 355 F.3d 310, 314-
15 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)).
15
question is whether the objector’s beliefs are ‘truly held.’”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accepting that prisons may
limit religious accommodations to sincere believers, the
question in this case is whether ROSP’s specific means of
testing Wall’s sincerity was permissible; that is, whether ROSP
was allowed to require him to possess specific, physical items
of Islamic faith as proof of belief.
We hold that under the current record, the defendants’
application of the 2010 Ramadan policy fails an analysis under
the Turner factors. 11 First, demanding specific physical items
as proof of faith will rarely be an acceptable means of
achieving the prison’s stated interest in reducing costs.
Strict application of such a rule fails even a rational
connection requirement. Although we recognize that prison
officials must make determinations of who is entitled to
accommodations, it exceeds their authority to decide which, if
any, religious relics are sufficiently important as to
11
With limited exceptions, much of the material facts
regarding the defendants’ actions are undisputed. However, for
the plaintiff to ultimately succeed on remand, he must still
prove that the defendants’ actions were intentional. Lovelace,
472 F.3d at 194-95, 201-02 (holding that suits under both RLUIPA
and the First Amendment require a showing of “conscious or
intentional interference” with the plaintiff’s rights). In
evaluating the legality of the policy in this section of the
opinion, we focus on the largely undisputed allegations of the
defendants’ actions, and not their as yet unproven intent.
16
constitute an appropriate gauge of faith. This Court has held,
albeit under RLUIPA’s more exacting standard, that prison
administrators may not assume that a “lack of sincerity (or
religiosity) with respect to one practice [of a given religion]
means lack of sincerity with respect to others.” Lovelace, 472
F.3d at 188. Thus, the fact that Wall did not have, for
example, a prayer rug in his possession is not a sufficiently
reliable indicator of whether he is a practicing Muslim. A
prison may not condition an inmate’s constitutionally protected
rights on so narrow a set of grounds without “render[ing] the
policy arbitrary or irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
Indeed, the circumstances of Wall’s case highlight exactly
why such an unyielding policy is unreasonable. Despite Wall’s
other outward manifestations of faith, most notably his past
participation in Ramadan and common fare diet, 12 he was
prohibited from observing the fast solely because he did not
possess any of the approved items. The defendants also ignored
Wall’s perfectly believable explanation, later verified, that he
did not have the items only because VDOC had lost all of his
12
The defendants note that members of a number of different
faiths receive the common fare diet, making it an over-inclusive
test. However, Wall’s amended complaint states that he
presented Selyers with his common fare signup form, which
specifically notes his Islamic faith as the justification for
participating in the diet.
17
belongings during his transfer to ROSP. Nor was Wall’s attempt
to store food in his cell on the first day of Ramadan enough to
convince ROSP officials that he was sincere in his desire to
observe the fasting requirements. Wall also continued to pursue
the issue after his initial denial, filing several grievances
and requesting to be placed back on the list. The defendants
rejected these requests and simply reiterated their policy
without further consideration of Wall’s circumstances. Finally,
at least according to Wall, on August 21, 2011, Rowlette offered
to place Wall back on the participation list provided he could
verify that Wall’s belongings had actually been lost. Rowlette
then rescinded the offer once Wall stated that he intended to
pursue a formal adjudication of the matter regardless. Taking
this fact in the light most favorable to Wall, it indicates that
the officials were more interested in protecting their earlier
decision than in honestly discerning whether Wall should be
permitted to participate.
In short, Wall has alleged that the defendants ignored
numerous signs that he is a practicing Muslim who was merely
seeking to exercise his genuinely held beliefs. By applying the
policy in so rigid a manner, the restriction lost whatever
18
“valid, rational connection” to the government’s stated interest
that might have existed at the time it was adopted. 13
An analysis of the remaining Turner factors also supports
the plaintiff’s claims. The second factor asks whether
“alternative means of exercising the right . . . remain open to
[the] prison[er].” 482 U.S. at 90. It is clear that Wall was
absolutely precluded from observing Ramadan because of the
defendants’ actions. When he attempted to adhere to the fasting
requirements on his own by storing food in his cell, he was
threatened with disciplinary action. The only alternative means
proffered by the defendants is that had Wall obeyed the policy,
he would have been allowed to participate. This suggestion, of
course, it is not an “alternative means” at all, it is merely a
13
We note our disagreement with the defendants’ suggestion
that the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987), is controlling. In O’Lone,
the Court examined a prison’s policy of prohibiting inmates
assigned to outside work duty from returning to the prison
during the day in order to attend Jumu’ah, an Islamic
congregational service held on Friday afternoons. Id. at 349.
The Court deemed that the policy was logically related to the
prison’s legitimate interest in maintaining “institutional order
and security” by relieving overcrowding, easing “congestion and
delays at the main gate,” and lessening the pressure on the
guards who previously had to evaluate individual return
requests. Id. at 350-51. While the O’Lone decision certainly
supports the general proposition that courts should be
deferential to the decisions of prison administrators, the case
does not examine the relevant issue in this case -- the
reasonableness of a sincerity test –- and is therefore largely
inapposite.
19
reiteration of the same rigid requirements Wall was unable to
meet. 14
We also believe that the third Turner factor, which
examines the impact the requested accommodation would have on
the prison’s efficient operation, also supports the plaintiff’s
claim. 482 U.S. at 92. We are not satisfied that the
defendants have sufficiently explained how a less restrictive
policy would have imposed a significant burden on prison
resources. The defendants contend generally that Ramadan is
expensive because participants require special meals, and the
schedules of both inmates and guards must be rearranged to
accommodate pre-dawn and post-sunset meals. However, the record
is void of any specific information regarding these purported
costs, and we are not content to permit a prison to deny an
inmate’s constitutional right in the face of such generalized
14
We recognize that in O’Lone the Supreme Court interpreted
the concept of alternative means broadly, asking not only
whether a particular religious practice has been impeded, but
instead addressing “all forms of religious exercise” of the
prisoner’s faith. 482 U.S. at 352. However, such an
interpretation is unduly restrictive with respect to Wall’s
case. Ramadan, unlike Jumu’ah, is one of the five pillars of
Islam, and its observance is integral to all practicing Muslims.
Moreover, we have previously held that “a prisoner has a clearly
established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . .
religious scruples, including proper food during Ramadan.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198-99 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We decline to read O’Lone, decided before
Lovelace, as conflicting with the latter’s holding.
20
concerns. This is especially so in light of the negligible
costs associated with adding one additional inmate to an already
existent program. Nor have the defendants presented a
convincing argument why an individualized interpretation in
Wall’s case would have been unduly burdensome. To the contrary,
Wall presented the officials with significant evidence of his
Muslim faith, which the defendants could have accepted without
the need to conduct any further investigation on their own.
Finally, we are satisfied that there existed “easy[] [and]
obvious alternatives” to the challenged regulation. Id. at 93.
This is most plainly seen in the fact that ROSP ultimately
changed its policy, which has since allowed Wall and others to
observe Ramadan without incident. Additionally, a VDOC guidance
document issued June 25, 2010 addressed how inmates who were not
on an institution’s designated religious pass list could
demonstrate eligibility for Ramadan observance. One
consideration utilized was past involvement in Ramadan fasting.
ROSP, which does not maintain religious pass lists due to its
status as a segregation facility, could have utilized the same,
less restrictive criterion for determining eligibility.
In sum, viewing the current record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants’ application of the
2010 Ramadan policy to Wall was unconstitutional. The
defendants relied exclusively on a narrow set of parameters
21
while ignoring obvious indications of the sincerity of Wall’s
beliefs. The First Amendment demands a more reasoned approach,
even within the difficult confines of a prison environment. 15
2.
Having established a claim for a constitutional violation,
we must now ask whether the defendants transgressed law that was
“clearly established” at the time of the violation. Ridpath,
447 F.3d at 306. We conclude that, given Wall’s circumstances,
his right to participate in Ramadan was clearly established, and
the defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.
As noted, we have previously held that under “the Free
Exercise Clause . . . a prisoner has a clearly established . . .
right to a diet consistent with his . . . religious scruples,
including proper food during Ramadan.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at
198-99 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Further, “[a] prison official violates this clearly
established right if he intentionally and without sufficient
15
To be clear, we do not decide that prisons may never
require some tangible evidence of faith in support of a
religious accommodation. Rather, our reasoning merely restricts
prisons from requiring specific physical indicia of faith in the
face of significant alternative evidence that an inmate’s
beliefs are sincere. Nor do we mean to suggest that bright line
rules have no place in governing religious accommodation
requests, but only that prison officials may not turn a blind
eye to obvious justifications for exceptions when they present
themselves so plainly.
22
justification denies an inmate his religiously mandated diet.”
Id. at 199. We take these statements to mean quite exactly what
they say: that Wall’s right to participate in Ramadan was
clearly established, and when the defendants abridged this right
without first satisfying Turner’s reasonableness test, they
subjected themselves to the potential for liability. As
expressed above, the defendants’ application of their policy to
Wall was unnecessarily strict. They overlooked (at best)
significant evidence that Wall was, in fact, a practicing Muslim
who was entitled to participate in Ramadan. We cannot conclude
that a reasonable official in the defendants’ position, giving
proper consideration to our statement in Lovelace that the right
is clearly established, and to Turner’s objective reasonableness
test, would have felt it permissible to apply the policy in so
strict a fashion.
The defendants attempt to avoid this rather straightforward
result by arguing that there is a lack of case law elucidating
exactly how prisons may utilize sincerity tests in determining
eligibility for religious accommodations. While it may be true
that we have never specifically evaluated a sincerity test, 16
16
Although not directly on point, we believe the result in
Lovelace is relevant for reasons beyond its general affirmation
that inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations.
In that case, we reviewed a prison’s policy of removing inmates
from its Ramadan list if they were observed breaking the fast
(Continued)
23
this argument overlooks the broader right at issue: that
inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations absent
a legitimate reason to the contrary. As we have previously
stated, clearly established “includes not only already
specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly included
within more general applications of the core constitutional
principle invoked.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th
Cir. 1992). In light of our unequivocal statement in Lovelace
that inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations,
we need not to have previously passed judgment on the
appropriateness of particular sincerity tests in order to demand
that prison officials act reasonably in administering that
right. An expectation of reasonableness in this context is not
a high bar, and does not punish officials for “bad guesses in
gray areas.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.
1992). To the contrary, it offers only a minimal level of
even a single time. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 181. We held that,
under RLUIPA’s more demanding standard, the policy was not the
least restrictive means of furthering the government’s interest
in efficiently running the prison. Id. at 190-94. Although the
policy was intended as a disciplinary measure and the inmate’s
sincerity was never in question, id. at 187 n. 2, the case
remains an example of how a harsh and unyielding policy may be
unlawful in the context of clearly protected individual rights.
It thus provided at least some degree of guidance to the
defendants in this case, if not enough to be dispositive.
24
protection to inmates seeking to exercise their constitutionally
protected rights.
Having found that the plaintiff has established a claim for
a violation of his clearly established First Amendment rights,
we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for damages.
III.
For the reasons explained above, we vacate the district
court’s decision concluding that (1) the plaintiff’s equitable
claims are moot, and (2) the defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s First Amendment damages
claim. In so doing, we necessarily find that the plaintiff’s
claim under RLUIPA survives summary judgment as well, as such
claims are evaluated under the same factors, but subject to a
less demanding standard of proof. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at
190. Accordingly, we remand this action to the district court
for further proceedings as appropriate.
VACATED AND REMANDED
25