Westfield Insurance Company v. Carpenter Reclamation, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2027
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARPENTER RECLAMATION, INC., a West Virginia corporation,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GREENBRIER COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA,
a statutory corporation,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:13-cv-12818)
Submitted: May 29, 2015 Decided: June 9, 2015
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carl J. Roncaglione, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF CARL J. RONCAGLIONE,
JR., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Brent K. Kesner,
KESNER & KESNER, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Carpenter Reclamation, Inc. (Carpenter), appeals from the
district court’s order granting Westfield Insurance Company
(Westfield)’s motion for summary judgment in its declaratory
judgment action. Carpenter challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in Westfield’s favor and the denial in
part and denial of its motions to compel discovery. We conclude
that Carpenter fails to establish reversible error in the
district court’s judgment and affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s award of summary
judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 873
(4th Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the
record shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). To withstand a
summary judgment motion, the non-moving party must produce
competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Thompson v.
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Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving
party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We will
uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment unless a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party
on the evidence presented. See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc.,
573 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2009).
We conclude after review of the record and the parties’
briefs that the district court did not reversibly err in
granting summary judgment to Westfield. Westfield sought a
declaratory judgment that its insurance policy did not provide
coverage for the defense or indemnification of Carpenter and
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Carpenter against
claims asserted in state court by Defendant the Board of
Education of Greenbrier County, West Virginia (Board), arising
from Carpenter’s contract with the Board. We reject as without
merit Carpenter’s challenge to the district court’s
determinations that the Board’s petitions in state court did not
allege conduct covered under the policy and thus did not trigger
Westfield’s duty to defend. Contrary to Carpenter’s suggestion,
the district court did not violate West Virginia law or
otherwise reversibly err in concluding that the Board’s
petitions did not allege property damage caused by an occurrence
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covered under the policy. See Cherrington v. Erie Ins. Prop. &
Cas. Co., 745 S.E.2d 508, 511, 520 (W. Va. 2013); W. Va. Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 492 (W. Va. 2004). We also
reject as unsupported and otherwise without merit Carpenter’s
remaining arguments challenging the district court’s
determination that Westfield’s duty to defend was not triggered
in this case and decline Carpenter’s invitation to certify
issues to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Carpenter also challenges the magistrate judge’s order
denying in part its motion to compel and the district court’s
ruling denying as moot its other motions to compel. District
courts are afforded substantial discretion in managing
discovery, and this court reviews discovery rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002).
Evidentiary rulings in the district court, even if constituting
an abuse of discretion, are reversible only if they affect
Carpenter’s substantial rights. See Buckley v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). “[E]videntiary errors do not
affect substantial rights, and thus are harmless, if [a]
reviewing court is able to say with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
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swayed by the errors.” Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We need not resolve the merits of Carptenter’s challenges
to the denial and denial in part of its motions to compel. Even
assuming that the denials were erroneous, we conclude after
review of the briefs that Carpenter has not plausibly suggested
any basis for concluding that the documents it sought in its
motions would have any bearing on the dispositive issues in this
case. Accordingly, any error in the denial of the motions was
harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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