Clark v. Humane Society of Carroll County, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1846
DAWN K. CLARK, On behalf of herself and others similarly
situated; ELIZABETH TIEDEMANN, On behalf of herself and
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
HUMANE SOCIETY OF CARROLL COUNTY, INCORPORATED, A Maryland
non-Stock Corporation; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF CARROLL
COUNTY, MARYLAND, A Maryland Body Politic; CAROLYN NICKY
RATCLIFF, Director, Humane Society of Carroll County, Inc.,
In her individual capacity; G. MICHAEL KEINER, Officer,
Humane Society of Carroll County, Inc., In his individual
capacity; BRIAN RUPP, Chief of Officers, Humane Society of
Carroll County, Inc., In his individual capacity; MARK
MILLER, Officer, Humane Society of Carroll County, Inc., In
his individual capacity; KAREN BAKER, Officer, Humane
Society of Carroll County, Inc., In her individual
capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District
Judge. (1:11-cv-00108-WMN)
Submitted: February 16, 2012 Decided: March 1, 2012
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven L. Tiedemann, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants. Kevin
Karpinski, E.I. Cornbrooks, IV, KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP,
P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Dawn K. Clark and Elizabeth Tiedemann appeal the
district court’s order granting Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) civil
rights action. Appellants argue on appeal that the court erred
in dismissing their claims for violations of the Fourth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments resulting from the assessment against
them of fines in notices of violations issued pursuant to
section 81-16(B) of the Code of Carroll County, Maryland. We
affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, “focus[ing] only on the legal sufficiency of the
complaint.” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.
2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state
“a plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based upon
“its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
Upon review of Appellants’ briefs, we conclude that
they fail to present their arguments that the district court
erred in dismissing their claims alleging violations of the
Fourth and Sixth Amendments in accordance with Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he [appellant’s] argument . . . must
contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them,
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with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which the appellant relies.”). Accordingly, we deem these
arguments waived. Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc.,
562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009).
Appellants also argue that the district court erred in
dismissing their challenge on Fourteenth Amendment grounds to
the propriety of the process afforded to them to challenge the
fines assessed in the notices of violation. We conclude after
review of the record that this claim was properly dismissed
because Appellants lack standing to raise it. See Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984); Star Scientific, Inc. v.
Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 358 (4th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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