Laura Martin v. Jack Wood

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2283
LAURA LYNN MARTIN,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JACK LEE WOOD; MILAGROS ALCALA JONES,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES;
EASTERN STATE HOSPITAL,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen,
District Judge. (4:13-cv-00018-AWA-LRL)
Argued: September 17, 2014 Decided: November 18, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion.
Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and
Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Sydney Edmund Rab, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Raymond Lee
Hogge, Jr., HOGGE LAW, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Kenneth Thomas Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Earle
Duncan Getchall, Jr., Solicitor General, Wesley Glenn Russell,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Kenneth Michael
Golski, HOGGE LAW, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Laura Martin, a registered nurse formerly employed by a
state-operated hospital in Williamsburg, Virginia, commenced
this damages action against two supervisors at the hospital,
alleging that the supervisors improperly refused to authorize
overtime pay for the hours that she worked in excess of 40 hours
per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. The supervisors filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, claiming sovereign immunity. They
contend that their conduct, as alleged, involved their official
duties on behalf of the hospital, such that the complaint was,
in reality, directed against the hospital, which has sovereign
immunity. The district court, however, denied the motion,
relying on Martin’s assertion in her complaint that she was
suing the supervisors in their individual capacities.
Because the actions of Martin’s supervisors, as alleged in
the complaint, were inextricably tied to their official duties,
we conclude that the Commonwealth of Virginia is the real party
in interest in this action. Since the Eleventh Amendment has
withdrawn jurisdiction over suits of this nature against the
States, effectively giving the Commonwealth immunity, we reverse
and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
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I
In her complaint, Martin alleges that from November 2010
until January 2012 she was employed as a registered nurse by
Eastern State Hospital and that the Hospital paid her wages on
an hourly basis. Because of transitional duties during shift
changes at the Hospital, Martin claims that she often began
performing her duties 20 minutes or more before her shift
started and continued working 30 to 90 minutes after her shift
ended. She also alleges that she often worked through her 30-
minute lunch break. Even though this often resulted in her
working more than 40 hours per week, Martin alleges that she was
compensated for only 40 hours, in violation of the overtime
provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
Martin further alleges that, when she complained to
Milagros Jones, the registered nurse coordinator for the unit in
which Martin worked, about not being paid overtime, Jones
refused to take action, attributing Martin’s extra time to
“inefficiency.” Martin also asserts that Jack Wood, the chief
executive officer and director of the Hospital, “willfully and
deliberately refused to correct” the failure to pay her
overtime. The complaint notes, however, that this allegation
was “[b]ased upon circumstantial evidence including but not
necessarily limited to the job duties and responsibilities of
Wood.” The complaint, which named only Wood and Jones as
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defendants, asserts that in failing to authorize overtime pay to
Martin, Wood and Jones “acted directly and indirectly in the
interest of Eastern State Hospital in relation to the hours of
work and payment of wages to Eastern State Hospital employees
including Martin.” It demands damages from them in their
individual capacities in the form of “overtime compensation,”
“liquidated damages in an equal amount,” and interest.
Wood and Jones filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
asserting that they are entitled to the same sovereign immunity
enjoyed by Eastern State Hospital as an agency of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. They noted that the complaint centers
on their official authority to direct and control employees,
such as Martin, with respect to their hours and wages and that
it fails to allege that they acted in an ultra vires manner
against Martin or that they acted to serve any personal
interest. Thus, they claimed that, because their conduct was
“tied inextricably to their official duties,” they had the same
sovereign immunity as did the Hospital, relying on Lizzi v.
Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 136 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled in part
on other grounds by Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
The district court denied Wood and Jones’ motion,
explaining:
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[T]he Complaint alleges significant intentional
misconduct committed by Mr. Wood and Ms. Jones. The
FLSA claims are unquestionably directed against
Mr. Wood and Ms. Jones in their individual capacities.
In sum, Ms. Martin’s Complaint, on its face,
states FLSA claims against Mr. Wood and Ms. Jones in
their individual capacities. Sovereign immunity is
inapplicable to such claims. See Hafer [v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 31 (1999)].
Wood and Jones filed this interlocutory appeal, contending
that the district court erred in denying them sovereign
immunity. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (authorizing interlocutory
appeals from orders denying Eleventh Amendment immunity).
II
The FLSA provides that “no employer shall employ any of his
employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess
of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The term “employer” is defined to include
“any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee and includes a public
agency.” Id. § 203(d).
Martin concedes that Eastern State Hospital, as an agency
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, has sovereign immunity from
damages claims brought under the FLSA by reason of the Eleventh
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Amendment. * In addition, she concedes that sovereign immunity
from such claims also extends to “state officers acting in their
official capacity.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 n.10 (2001)
(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)). And while a
State may, by an unequivocal expression, waive its sovereign
immunity, Martin acknowledges that Virginia has not done so.
See Commonwealth v. Luzik, 524 S.E.2d 871, 878 (Va. 2000). She
also acknowledges that while Congress can abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, it did not do so in the FLSA. See Abril
v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 189-91 (4th Cir. 1998). Rather, she
justifies the court’s jurisdiction over her complaint on the
fact that sovereign immunity does not extend to suits against
state officials who are sued in their individual capacities.
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Suarez Corp. v.
McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Hafer, 502
U.S. at 31). As Martin candidly states, “[i]t is for this exact
∗
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. And
the Amendment has been construed to withdraw jurisdiction over
any suit brought against an unconsenting State in federal court
by its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-
63 (1974); Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1997).
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reason that [she] took care in drafting the Complaint,
identifying and setting forth sufficient factual allegations to
assert the claims against Appellants Wood and Jones only in
their individual capacity.” Thus, to avoid sovereign immunity,
Martin did not sue Eastern State Hospital but rather only Wood
and Jones, naming them only in their individual capacities.
Wood and Jones argue that Martin cannot circumvent the
Eleventh Amendment by naming them as defendants in their
individual capacities if, in reality, she is suing them for
actions taken by them in their official capacities on behalf of
Eastern State Hospital.
We begin the analysis by noting that “[w]hen [a] suit is
brought only against state officials, a question arises as to
whether that suit is a suit against the State itself.”
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101
(1984). And in addressing this question, the Supreme Court has
cautioned that allowing an action to proceed simply because the
complaint names a state official in his or her individual
capacity “would be to adhere to an empty formalism and to
undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh Amendment immunity
represents a real limitation on a federal court’s federal-
question jurisdiction.” Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543 (1986); Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 137
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(“[T]he mere incantation of the term ‘individual capacity’ is
not enough to transform an official capacity action into an
individual capacity action”).
Thus, the question presented in this case is whether
Martin’s complaint, which names Wood and Jones in their
individual capacities, nonetheless effectively states a claim
against the Commonwealth itself. Resolution of this issue
requires us to look beyond the form of the complaint and the
conclusory allegations against Wood and Jones to determine who
is the “real, substantial party in interest.” Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials
when they are merely the nominal defendants and ‘the state is
the real, substantial party in interest’” (quoting Ford, 323
U.S. at 464)).
To identify the real, substantial party in interest, we
thus examine the substance of the claims stated in the
complaint, positing inquiries such as: (1) were the allegedly
unlawful actions of the state officials “tied inextricably to
their official duties,” Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 136; (2) if the state
officials had authorized the desired relief at the outset, would
the burden have been borne by the State, cf. Pennhurst, 465 U.S.
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at 109 n.7; (3) would a judgment against the state officials be
“institutional and official in character,” such that it would
operate against the State, id. at 108; (4) were the actions of
the state officials taken to further personal interests distinct
from the State’s interests, id.; and (5) were the state
officials’ actions ultra vires, id. at 111; Lizzi, 255 F.3d
at 136.
Here, Martin’s complaint alleges that Eastern State
Hospital, as Martin’s employer, failed to compensate her for
overtime because Wood and Jones refused to approve such
compensation. It alleges further that Wood and Jones, Martin’s
supervisors, “exercised authority to establish and control [her]
hours of work” at the Hospital and that, in the exercise of that
authority, they “failed and refused to include [overtime hours]
in the computation of Martin’s weekly wages,” in violation of
the FLSA. Finally, it alleges that, in doing so, Wood and Jones
“acted directly and indirectly in the interest of Eastern State
Hospital.” The complaint includes no allegation that, in so
acting, Wood and Jones acted in an ultra vires manner or
attempted to serve personal interests distinct from the
Hospital’s interests.
Examining Martin’s complaint in light of the stated
factors, we conclude that virtually every factor indicates that
Wood and Jones are being sued in their official capabilities.
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Martin’s complaint alleges that Wood and Jones had authority to
authorize overtime pay and refused to do so and that, if they
had authorized overtime pay, it would have been funded by
Eastern State Hospital. The inevitable conclusion follows that
Wood and Jones’ actions were “inextricably tied” to their
official duties at the Hospital. In these circumstances, we
hold that Virginia is the real party in interest, see Pennhurst
465 U.S. at 101; Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 136, and that sovereign
immunity -- grounded in the Eleventh Amendment -- requires
dismissal of the suit, Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 138; Booth, 112 F.3d
at 142.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order denying
Wood and Jones’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity
and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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