United States v. Armond Wright

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4928
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARMOND RASHAWN WRIGHT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:04-cr-00618-PMD-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2014 Decided: November 26, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Joseph Condon, Jr., North Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Sean
Kittrell, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Armond Rashawn Wright pleaded guilty to possession
with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(D) (2012), and use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012), but
reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress the evidence seized during a traffic stop and
his career offender designation. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Wright first argues that the officers
lacked probable cause to stop the vehicle in which he was
traveling. This court reviews factual findings underlying a
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634
F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). Because the district court
denied the motion, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below, United
States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013), and we
“defer to the district court’s credibility findings.” United
States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 n.1 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The “decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when
police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810
(1996). Observation of any traffic violation, no matter how
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minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop the vehicle.
United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993).
The district court here credited the officer’s testimony that
the driver of the vehicle failed to signal a turn; thus the
traffic stop was based on probable cause. See United States v.
Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 136 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f an officer has
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle,
there is no intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment.”).
Wright next argues that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous to justify the
protective frisk of his person. During a traffic stop, the
passenger may be required to exit the vehicle without any
indication that the passenger poses a risk to officer safety.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1997). Additionally,
if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a passenger is
armed or is engaged in criminal activity, the officer may pat
down the passenger for weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968); see United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 168-69 (4th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309, 312 (4th
Cir. 1998).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that the district court properly found the officer
justified in conducting the frisk. When Wright exited the
vehicle, the officer immediately noticed that his pockets were
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bulging. Observing in a suspect’s clothing a bulge that could
be a weapon “reasonably warrants a belief that the suspect is
potentially dangerous.” United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135,
137 (4th Cir. 1996). Here, in addition to the bulge, the
officer had noticed heavy tint on the windows of the vehicle
preventing the officer from seeing into the backseat, and had
information, provided by an officer working in the narcotics
division, that Wright was a known drug dealer. Accordingly, we
conclude that the officer reasonably suspected that Wright could
be armed and dangerous and thus the protective frisk was
justified.
Finally, Wright argues that his two prior convictions
do not qualify as predicate felonies for career offender
purposes because he did not serve any active prison sentence.
Because Wright failed to challenge his career offender
designation in the district court, this Court reviews this claim
for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32
(1993); see United States v. Henderson, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126
(2013).
We find no error, much less plain error, in Wright’s
career offender designation. There is no requirement that an
offender have served time for a prior felony conviction in order
for it to qualify under the career offender Guideline. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2007). Because
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Wright’s prior offenses were punishable by more than a year of
imprisonment, they were properly counted as predicate offenses.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We deny Wright’s motions to supplement the record and for leave
to file pro se briefs. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
material before this court and argument will not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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