Samuel Jackson v. Joseph Lightsey

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7291
SAMUEL JUNIOR JACKSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DR. JOSEPH LIGHTSEY; DR. SHER GULERIA,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
N.C. D.O.C. MEDICAL STAFF,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-ct-03221-F)
Argued: October 28, 2014 Decided: December 18, 2014
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by published
opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz
and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Daniel Scott Harawa, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Kelly Street Brown, YOUNG
MOORE AND HENDERSON, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Elliott Schulder, COVINGTON & BURLING
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Elizabeth P. McCullough,
YOUNG MOORE AND HENDERSON, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
2
PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
Samuel Junior Jackson (“Jackson”) is an inmate in the care
of the North Carolina Department of Corrections. Since his
incarceration, Jackson alleges, his chronic heart condition has
deteriorated, and he has suffered both a heart attack and a host
of other maladies that severely compromise his quality of life.
Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and naming as defendants two prison doctors,
Joseph Lightsey (“Lightsey”) and Sher Guleria (“Guleria”), and
the medical staff of the Department of Corrections (the
“Staff”). The district court dismissed all of Jackson’s claims
at the pleading stage, ruling first that the Staff should be
dismissed as a party and then, in a subsequent order, that
Jackson had failed to state a claim against the doctors under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The principal question before us is whether Jackson’s
complaint sets forth plausible claims of deliberate indifference
that should survive a motion to dismiss. But before we can
reach that issue, we must consider whether this appeal is
properly before us, in whole or in part, in light of certain
omissions in Jackson’s notice of appeal.
We conclude that Jackson did not appeal from the district
court order dismissing the Staff as a party to this case,
3
depriving us of jurisdiction to review that order. We do,
however, have jurisdiction over the dismissal of Jackson’s
claims against the doctors, and we hold that while the claim
against Lightsey was properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6),
Jackson has alleged facts supporting a plausible claim of
deliberate indifference against Guleria. We therefore vacate
the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s claim against
Guleria and remand for further proceedings.
I.
A.
Because Jackson appeals from an order granting a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we recount the facts as alleged by
Jackson, accepting them as true for purposes of this appeal.
See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 327–28
(4th Cir. 2014).
Jackson has been an inmate in North Carolina’s state prison
system since 2008. In 2003, before he was incarcerated, Jackson
was diagnosed with congestive heart failure by Dr. Lindsey White
(“White”), a cardiologist. White prescribed Jackson a set of
six medications that proved effective in managing Jackson’s
heart condition.
Upon his incarceration at Central Prison in Raleigh in
2008, Jackson met with Lightsey, who is not a cardiologist, for
4
a screening appointment. During this session, Jackson either
presented Lightsey with medical records documenting his
cardiologist’s diagnosis of congestive heart failure and his
prescriptions, or notified Lightsey that White would be sending
the records to him separately. 1 Lightsey proceeded to diagnose
Jackson with a heart arrhythmia, a comparatively less serious
condition, and to alter Jackson’s medication regimen.
Jackson alleges that his health went into a tailspin
following Lightsey’s intervention. He began to experience a
number of unpleasant and alarming symptoms, including chest
pains and burning sensations in several parts of his body.
Fearing that the changes to his medication were to blame,
Jackson made multiple requests to the Staff to be seen by a
cardiologist, all of which were denied. This deterioration
culminated in Jackson suffering a heart attack, for which he
received treatment at Rex Hospital in Raleigh.
Jackson was later transferred to Nash Correctional
Institution in Nashville, North Carolina. There, he saw
Guleria, who told Jackson that he would order additional tests
and treatments, including an electrocardiogram, heart rate
monitoring, and a special diet. Several months after this
visit, having never received any of the tests or treatments and
1
Jackson’s complaint, informal brief, and counseled briefs
are inconsistent on this point.
5
having made numerous sick call requests, Jackson was informed by
members of the Staff that they had no record of Guleria entering
any orders. As a result of substandard care provided by the
defendants, Jackson suffers from chronic and extreme pain, and
is unable even to walk to the prison dining hall to eat.
B.
On November 2, 2011, Jackson filed his § 1983 complaint in
the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
naming Lightsey, Guleria, and the Staff as defendants and
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. J.A. at 6. In response to
an order from the district court identifying an omission in his
original complaint, Jackson filed an amended complaint on April
27, 2012. J.A. at 19.
The district court reviewed that complaint for frivolity
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Finding that the complaint’s
allegations pertained only to Lightsey and Guleria, in an order
dated July 6, 2012 (the “2012 Order”) the district court
dismissed all claims against the Staff and dismissed the Staff
as a party to the case. Jackson v. Lightsey,
No. 5:11-ct-03221-F (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2012), ECF No. 9.
The remaining defendants, Lightsey and Guleria, then moved
to dismiss Jackson’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The
district court granted their motion in a July 31, 2013 order
6
(the “2013 Order”), holding that Jackson’s allegations described
only a medical disagreement over proper diagnosis and care and
thus failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference.
Jackson v. Lightsey, No. 5:11-ct-03221-F (E.D.N.C.
July 31, 2013), ECF No. 41. On the same day, the clerk of the
district court entered a final judgment in the case, dismissing
Jackson’s action in its entirety. Jackson v. Lightsey,
No. 5:11-ct-03221-F (E.D.N.C. July 31, 2013), ECF No. 42.
On August 12, 2013, Jackson filed a handwritten document
with the clerk of the district court stating his intention to
“[a]ppeal the Order of the United States District Court [for
the] Eastern District of North Carolina [] on this the 31st day
of July, 2013 by James C. Foxx [sic], Senior United States
District Judge.” J.A. at 62. The document did not name the
court to which Jackson intended to appeal. However, the clerk
for the Fourth Circuit, following standard procedure for pro se
appeals, promptly issued an informal briefing order to Jackson
as well as to the lawyers who had represented Lightsey and
Guleria in the district court. Jackson v. Lightsey, No. 13-7291
(4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2013), ECF No. 5. After Jackson and
appellees Lightsey and Guleria filed their informal briefs, the
clerk appointed appellate counsel for Jackson to facilitate this
appeal. Jackson v. Lightsey, No. 13-7291 (4th Cir. Apr. 28,
2014), ECF No. 25.
7
II.
Before reaching Jackson’s deliberate indifference claims,
we must address whether Jackson has brought those claims before
us consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c).
Because “Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional in nature, and
their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate review,” Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992), this analysis determines
whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal, and if so,
whether it extends to all of Jackson’s claims.
A.
Appellees contend that we are without jurisdiction to
decide this case because Jackson failed to name the Fourth
Circuit as the court to which he intended to appeal an order of
a federal district court within that circuit. Pointing to
Rule 3(c)(1)(C)’s requirement that a notice of appeal “name the
court to which the appeal is taken,” they argue that although
there is no court other than the Fourth Circuit to which Jackson
could have appealed, this defect in Jackson’s notice is fatal to
our jurisdiction.
We disagree. Our approach to Rule 3 is not so formalistic.
Instead, following the instruction of the Supreme Court, we
construe Rule 3 liberally, and measure compliance by asking
whether “the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of
what the rule requires.” Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (quoting Torres
8
v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988)); see In re
Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 2008). Where a challenged
notice of appeal has provided adequate notice and caused the
complaining party no prejudice, there is no reason to allow a
“technical impediment[]” to foreclose appellate review. In re
Spence, 541 F.3d at 543 (quoting Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d
548, 555 (4th Cir. 2005)); see Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (notice
afforded by a document determines the document’s sufficiency as
a notice of appeal); Canady v. Crestar Mortg. Corp., 109 F.3d
969, 974–75 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding compliance with Rule 3 in
light of adequate notice and lack of prejudice to the appellee).
Applying those principles, we have no difficulty concluding
that Jackson’s failure to add the words “Fourth Circuit” to his
notice of appeal did not bring him out of compliance with Rule
3. Where, as in this case, there is only one possible appellate
forum, the filing of an otherwise proper notice of appeal may
itself be the “functional equivalent” of naming that court under
Rule 3(c)(1)(C). See United States v. Treto-Haro,
287 F.3d 1000, 1002 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002) (Rule 3(c)(1)(C)
satisfied despite failure to name appellate forum); Dillon v.
United States, 184 F.3d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(same). The facts of this case illustrate the point:
Notwithstanding omission of the words “Fourth Circuit,”
Jackson’s intent to appeal to this court was sufficiently clear
9
that the district court clerk immediately transferred Jackson’s
notice to our clerk, who in turn issued an informal briefing
order to Jackson and to the appellees the very next day.
Appellees concede, as they must, that they received prompt
notice of Jackson’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit and suffered no
prejudice as a result of the claimed deficiency in Jackson’s
notice. Under these circumstances, we hold, Jackson has
complied with Rule 3(c)(1)(C), and we may proceed to consider
his appeal. 2
B.
Though we have confirmed our jurisdiction over Jackson’s
appeal as a whole, we must also consider whether that
jurisdiction extends to the 2012 Order dismissing Jackson’s
claim against the Staff. In his notice of appeal, Jackson
specified that he sought review of one order: “the Order of the
[district court] on this the 31st day of July, 2013 by James C.
Foxx [sic], Senior United States District Judge,” considering
and granting the motions to dismiss of doctors Lightsey and
Guleria. Consistent with his notice, Jackson then filed an
2
Jackson’s pro se status, of course, also favors a liberal
construction of his notice of appeal. See United States v.
Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1995). But our holding, like
those of the other circuits to address the question, is not
restricted to pro se litigants. See Treto-Haro, 287 F.3d at
1002 n.1 (omission by the federal government); Dillon, 184 F.3d
at 558.
10
informal brief addressing only the dismissal of his claims
against Lightsey and Guleria. In his counseled briefs and at
oral argument, however, Jackson renewed his claim against the
Staff, so we must now decide whether we may review the district
court’s 2012 dismissal of that claim. We conclude that we may
not.
Rule 3(c)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal
“designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). Again, we construe the rule
liberally and take a functional approach to compliance, asking
whether the putative appellant has manifested the intent to
appeal a specific judgment or order and whether the affected
party had notice and an opportunity fully to brief the issue.
See In re Spence, 541 F.3d at 543; Bogart, 396 F.3d at 555.
Here, we answer both those questions in the negative, leading to
the conclusion that Jackson did not properly designate the 2012
Order for appeal.
First, there is no indication that Jackson intended to
appeal the 2012 Order when he filed his notice of appeal. This
is not a simple problem of omission, as with Jackson’s failure
to name the Fourth Circuit as the forum for his appeal. The
problem here is that Jackson did name the order he wished to
appeal, and that order was the 2013 Order dismissing his claims
against the prison doctors. Given Jackson’s express designation
11
of one particular order, the fairest inference is that Jackson
did not intend to appeal the other. See Smith v. Barry,
985 F.2d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 1993) (where “all issues triable by
Jury” are designated for appeal, court may not hear appeal as to
issues that are not triable by jury); see also Osterneck v. E.T.
Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987)
(“[W]here some portions of a judgment and some orders are
expressly made a part of the appeal, we must infer that the
appellant did not intend to appeal other unmentioned orders or
judgments.”); Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir.
1992) (same). 3
That inference is confirmed by the informal brief Jackson
subsequently filed with this court, which fails even to mention
the Staff and is instead addressed exclusively to Jackson’s
allegations against Lightsey and Guleria. The informal brief is
an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is
limited to issues preserved in that brief. See 4th Cir. R.
34(b). Jackson’s decision to confine his brief to his claims
3
At oral argument, Jackson’s counsel suggested that the
2012 Order was incorporated by reference into the designated
2013 Order, and hence properly before us. That is incorrect.
It is a separate document – the final judgment issued by the
district court clerk dismissing Jackson’s action in its entirety
– that includes a reference to the 2012 Order. J.A. at 61.
Whether designation of that final judgment in the notice of
appeal might have evinced the requisite intent to appeal the
2012 Order is not relevant here, because Jackson’s notice
designates only the 2013 Order.
12
against doctors Lightsey and Guleria mirrors his specific
designation for appeal of the 2013 Order dismissing those
claims. Taken together, the plainest inference is that Jackson
intended to appeal only the dismissal of his claims against his
treating physicians.
Second, and relatedly, there is a very substantial notice
problem in this case. Precisely because there was no indication
that Jackson intended to appeal the 2012 Order, the Staff,
having been dismissed as a party to the action for more than a
year, was never notified of Jackson’s appeal or asked to file an
informal brief. As a result, the Staff was not represented in
this appeal, on briefs or at oral argument, and has had no
opportunity to defend the 2012 Order. This is a far cry from
cases in which we have found compliance with Rule 3(c)(1)(B)
despite an ambiguous designation because no harm was done – the
affected parties were before the court and fully briefed the
relevant issues, nobody was taken by surprise, and no prejudice
resulted. See, e.g., Canady, 109 F.3d at 974–75; In re Spence,
541 F.3d at 543.
Jackson urges us to look past his omission because he was
appearing pro se when he filed his notice of appeal and informal
brief. Although we do liberally construe pro se pleadings, we
cannot excuse defects that, as here, deprive other parties of
the fair notice to which they are entitled. Because Jackson’s
13
notice of appeal did not evince an intent to appeal the 2012
Order and because of the resulting failure of notice to the
Staff, we hold that under Rule 3(c)(1)(B), we lack jurisdiction
to review the 2012 Order dismissing the Staff as a party to this
case. 4
III.
We now consider whether Jackson’s amended complaint raises
plausible claims of deliberate indifference against Lightsey and
Guleria. 5 Our review of the district court’s order granting
appellees’ motion to dismiss is de novo. Summers, 740 F.3d at
328. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present
factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). In applying that standard, we liberally construe
Jackson’s pro se complaint, see Smith v. Smith,
4
In light of our holding that Jackson’s failure to
designate the 2012 Order for appeal deprives us of jurisdiction,
we need not reach questions regarding the timeliness of a
putative appeal from the 2012 Order, nor whether Jackson’s
failure to address the 2012 Order in his informal brief would
have precluded our review under Fourth Circuit Rule 34(b).
5
Jackson originally sought injunctive relief against
Lightsey and Guleria as well as damages. On appeal, however,
Jackson’s counsel conceded that those claims for injunctive
relief are moot, and only the damages claims are before us now.
14
589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009), take all facts pleaded as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in Jackson’s favor.
Summers, 740 F.3d at 328.
A.
A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976). A deliberate indifference claim consists of two
components, objective and subjective. Objectively, the inmate’s
medical condition must be “serious” – “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Iko v. Shreve,
535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Appellees do not dispute
that Jackson’s chronic heart condition qualifies as objectively
serious.
Where the parties differ is over the subjective component.
An official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious
medical needs only when he or she subjectively “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). That is a higher
standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil
recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that
would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level
15
of deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. To
show an Eighth Amendment violation, it is not enough that an
official should have known of a risk; he or she must have had
actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate’s serious medical
condition and the excessive risk posed by the official’s action
or inaction. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–39; Iko, 535 F.3d at 241.
It is that exacting standard, appellees argue, that Jackson’s
allegations fail to meet.
B.
We agree that Jackson’s allegations against Lightsey,
though describing behavior that might support a medical
malpractice claim, do not make out a case of deliberate
indifference. Jackson contends that during a screening
appointment, Lightsey, who is not a heart specialist, diagnosed
Jackson with a heart arrhythmia, even though Jackson had
produced or offered to produce medical records showing that a
cardiologist had diagnosed and treated him for a more serious
condition. Lightsey also substantially modified the medication
regimen prescribed by Jackson’s cardiologist. Though hindsight
suggests that Lightsey’s treatment decisions may have been
mistaken, even gravely so, we agree with the district court that
Jackson’s claim against Lightsey is essentially a
“[d]isagreement[] between an inmate and a physician over the
inmate’s proper medical care,” and we consistently have found
16
such disagreements to fall short of showing deliberate
indifference. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.
1985); see United States v. Clawson, 650 F.3d 530, 538 (4th Cir.
2011). While a non-cardiologist’s erroneous diagnosis of a
serious heart condition, as alleged by Jackson, may well
represent a deviation from the accepted standard of care,
standing alone it is insufficient to clear the “high bar” of a
constitutional claim. Iko, 535 F.3d at 241.
Jackson’s case against Guleria is of a different order.
Jackson has no quarrel with Guleria’s medical judgment or
recommendations. On the contrary, what Jackson wanted was
exactly the testing and treatment that Guleria prescribed.
Jackson’s objection is that Guleria failed to enter the orders
necessary to provide Jackson with the promised care, which
resulted in Jackson going months without the testing and
treatment for his serious heart condition that Guleria thought
appropriate.
We have held already that a “[f]ailure to provide the level
of care that a treating physician himself believes is necessary”
may constitute deliberate indifference. Miltier v. Beorn,
896 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1990). In Miltier, we considered
allegations against prison doctors very similar to those at
issue here: One doctor recommended that a patient, who
ultimately died in prison of a heart attack, be transferred to a
17
cardiac unit but failed to follow up on this recommendation; and
another doctor approved the referral but also failed to follow
up and confirm that the transfer had occurred. Id. Those
allegations, we concluded, clearly presented a triable claim of
deliberate indifference. Id.
The same reasoning applies here. Miltier predates the
Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer, which established the
requisite subjective mental state for a deliberate indifference
claim. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852 (reciting a test for civil
recklessness). But the substantive principle we borrow from
Miltier – that a doctor’s failure to provide care that he
himself deems necessary to treat an inmate’s serious medical
condition may constitute deliberate indifference – survives
Farmer. At the 12(b)(6) stage, it is fair to infer that when
Guleria prescribed a set of tests and treatments for Jackson’s
unquestionably serious heart condition, he did so because he
subjectively believed they were necessary, and therefore must
have known that failing to provide them would pose an excessive
risk to Jackson’s health. That is all that Farmer requires, see
511 U.S. at 842 (subjective prong may be met by showing that
risk is sufficiently obvious that official “must have known” of
it), and under Miltier, it is enough to state a claim of
deliberate indifference, 896 F.2d at 853. See also Hudson v.
McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 863–64 (7th Cir. 1998) (Farmer satisfied
18
by allegation that prison officials knew of serious medical
condition and need for treatment but nevertheless failed to
provide treatment); Miller v. Schoenen, 75 F.3d 1305, 1310–11
(8th Cir. 1996) (same).
Our decision today does not address the ultimate merits of
Jackson’s claim against Guleria, nor express any view about the
likelihood that Jackson will prevail. We hold only that given
the liberal construction we afford pro se complaints and the
favorable light in which we review them under Rule 12(b)(6),
Jackson’s allegations state a plausible claim of deliberate
indifference as to Guleria. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court’s dismissal of Jackson’s claim against Guleria and remand
for further proceedings.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of
the district court in part and vacate and remand in part.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
19