United States v. Antwaine McCoy

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6864
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTWAINE LAMAR MCCOY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (3:03-cr-00064-RLV-1; 3:09-cv-00461-RLV)
Submitted: December 31, 2014 Decided: January 8, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael L. Rosenthal, David D. Metcalf, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United
States Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antwaine McCoy appeals the district court’s order
denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We
granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether
McCoy’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
argue that two of McCoy’s prior controlled substance
convictions, used to enhance his federal sentence, were obtained
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Having reviewed the
parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment
below.
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a § 2255
motion, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 47 (2014). Where, as here, the district court considered
materials outside the pleadings but denied relief without
holding an evidentiary hearing, the court could not “make
findings of fact on disputed matters,” and “its ruling was in
the nature of a summary judgment award to the Government.”
United States v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2007).
Under these circumstances, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the § 2255 movant. United States v. Poindexter,
492 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2007).
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To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, McCoy must demonstrate both that his “counsel’s
performance was deficient” and that counsel’s “deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In establishing deficient
performance, McCoy must show “that counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688.
McCoy establishes prejudice by demonstrating “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Dyess, 730
F.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from
being “twice put in jeopardy” for an offense, prohibiting
multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same offense.
United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 290 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We have recognized that the
North Carolina drug tax, as it existed at the time of McCoy’s
1992 and 1993 North Carolina drug convictions, see N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 105-113.105 to 105-113.113 (1992), is a criminal
penalty for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Lynn v.
West, 134 F.3d 582, 588-93 (4th Cir. 1998). McCoy argues that,
because he was assessed drug taxes at his 1992 and 1993 arrests
for cocaine possession and partially paid those taxes with funds
seized by law enforcement immediately after his arrests, his
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subsequent convictions for those offenses violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause. McCoy asserts that his trial counsel could
have argued under Lynn that these drug convictions therefore
were not proper predicates for either the career offender or
Armed Career Criminal enhancements imposed during his federal
sentencing, notwithstanding the fact that those state
convictions have not been vacated.
The district court rejected McCoy’s claim based on its
finding that McCoy’s convictions did not violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy because the tax warrants McCoy provided
with his § 2255 motion established that McCoy was convicted on
the drug offenses years before he was assessed the drug taxes.
Assuming, without deciding, that this conclusion is debatable,
we affirm the district court’s rejection of McCoy’s claim on an
alternative basis. See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516,
519 (4th Cir. 2005) (“We are not limited to evaluation of the
grounds offered by the district court to support its decision,
but may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record.”).
Specifically, we conclude that McCoy has failed to demonstrate
that his counsel was ineffective in declining to collaterally
challenge his state drug convictions on double jeopardy grounds
during the federal sentencing hearing, in light of precedent
generally barring such collateral challenges, and due to the
absence of precedent clearly authorizing the specific collateral
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challenge McCoy advocates under Lynn. See Daniels v. United
States, 532 U.S. 374, 382-84 (2001); Custis v. United States,
511 U.S. 485, 494-95 (1994); United States v. Hondo, 366 F.3d
363, 365 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Brandon, 363 F.3d
341, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2004); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.6, 4B1.2(c) & cmt. n.3 (2003). Further, we
conclude that remand for an evidentiary hearing is unwarranted.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
denying § 2255 relief. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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