United States v. Collin Hawkins

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4576
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COLLIN HAWKINS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre M. Davis, District Judge. (1:06-
cr-00583-AMD-1)
Argued: September 25, 2009 Decided: December 18, 2009
Amended: January 13, 2015
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and Mark S. DAVIS, United
States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Davis
joined. Judge Motz wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.
ARGUED: Sicilia Englert, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Solette Allison Magnelli, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Michael E. Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Jason Weinstein, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
2
AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Collin Hawkins was indicted on separate counts related to a
carjacking and a subsequent arrest as a felon in possession of a
firearm. Prior to trial, Hawkins timely moved the court to
sever the carjacking counts from the felon in possession charge
on the grounds of improper joinder. The district court denied
the motion and Hawkins was found guilty by a jury on all counts.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
district court, in part, and vacate the judgment, in part.
I.
Reuben King (“King”) testified that on the evening of
November 22, 2006, he was employed as a driver for Sedan Service
in Baltimore, Maryland. That night, King received a phone call
from a regular customer he knew as Warren, asking to be picked
up at an apartment complex parking lot. When King arrived three
persons entered his cab: Warren, the appellant Hawkins, and an
unidentified female. At trial, King testified that he instantly
recognized Hawkins, who sat next to him on the cab’s front seat,
from casual contact in the neighborhood over many years.
Warren instructed King that he needed to make three stops
that night. During the first two stops, King explained that
Warren got out of the car, talked to unidentified individuals
for roughly ten to fifteen minutes, returned to the car, and
3
then told King the intersection for the next stop. During the
last stop, both Warren and Hawkins got out of the car for about
ten or fifteen minutes, and then returned. Warren then
instructed King to return to the apartment complex parking lot.
Once back in the parking lot King turned on the overhead
dome light to calculate the fare and saw Hawkins holding a .357
caliber revolver only a few inches from his head, while Warren
held a shotgun positioned to the back of King’s head. According
to King, Warren stated that if King moved, Warren would shoot
him. King claimed that Hawkins then took two cell phones and
roughly $400 in cash from him, and pushed King out of the
driver’s side door. Hawkins then pushed King in the direction
of the trunk, during which time Hawkins emptied the remainder of
King’s pockets while Warren kept the shotgun pointed at King.
Once they reached the trunk area, King testified that Hawkins
told King to kneel down and keep his hands up. According to
King, after he complied with the instruction, Hawkins then
stated, "I’m not going to shoot you ‘cause I know you." J.A.
108.
King claimed he then heard footsteps going toward the car,
the car doors closing, and the car pulling off. King testified
that he then ran until he found police officers to whom he
reported the carjacking.
4
Shortly thereafter, King gave information about the
carjacking to detectives and told them that Hawkins was
involved. When shown a photo array King identified Hawkins as
one of the perpetrators.
On December 9, 2006, Baltimore City police officers were
investigating an unrelated incident in the same area of
Baltimore, which they had reason to believe involved Hawkins.
Acting on information that Hawkins would be arriving at a
convenience store officers watched Hawkins approach the entrance
of the store and tug at his waistband, indicating that he might
be armed.
Officers entered the store and ordered Hawkins to the
ground, but he refused to comply and started to slide his right
hand up under his waistband. This caused officers to order
Hawkins to keep his hands where they could be seen, but Hawkins
refused to comply until he was physically subdued. A .9
millimeter pistol was retrieved from Hawkins’ waistband when he
was arrested.
On March 7, 2007, a federal grand jury in the District of
Maryland indicted Hawkins on four counts. Count I alleged a
carjacking based on the robbery of King’s vehicle, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000). Count II alleged that Hawkins "did
knowingly possess and brandish a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence," the carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
5
924(c)(1)(A)(ii). J.A. 7. Count III alleged that Hawkins,
"having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year, did knowingly and unlawfully possess
a loaded firearm, to wit: a Bersa model Thunder 9 mm pistol" in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the gun seized when he was
arrested. J.A. 8. Count IV alleged another felon in possession
of a firearm charge, relating to a shotgun seized during a
search of Hawkins’ residence.
Prior to trial, Hawkins moved to sever Counts I and II
(collectively the “carjacking counts”) from Counts III and IV.
Hawkins contended that Counts III and IV were improperly joined
to Counts I and II under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
8(a). J.A. 10. In the alternative, Hawkins argued severance
was appropriate under Rule 14 because he “would be significantly
prejudiced by a single trial” because “the jury may well
conclude that Hawkins is guilty of one firearm count and then
find him guilty of the others because of his criminal
disposition.” J.A. 13. The district court denied Hawkins’
motion because it could “discern no reason why a jury will not
be able fairly and objectively to evaluate the evidence.” 1 J.A.
58.
1
Hawkins renewed his motion to sever Counts I and II from
Count III at trial upon the conclusion of the Government’s
evidence and again at the conclusion of the trial. The motions
were denied.
6
The Government elected not to proceed on Count IV and trial
was held only on Counts I, II, and III. Hawkins pled not guilty
to all three counts. However, as to Count III, Hawkins conceded
his prior felony conviction and his possession of the .9
millimeter handgun at the time of his arrest both to the court
prior to opening statements and again to the jury during opening
statements. 2
During the trial, the Government introduced portions of a
transcript and tape recording from Hawkins’ post arrest
interview for possession of the .9 millimeter pistol at issue in
Count III. However, the transcript and tape recording also
contained two additional admissions Hawkins asked be redacted
before publication to the jury.
First, Hawkins admitted during the interview that he
supported himself by gambling and selling drugs. Hawkins
objected to the admission of this statement based on lack of
relevance to any contested issue in the case because he had, in
effect, conceded his guilt as to Count III. Hawkins also argued
that the statement constituted evidence of other crimes under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and that the prejudice of the
2
The government later introduced an exhibit with Hawkins’
stipulations as to Count III. In it, he stipulated to his prior
felony conviction, to the fact that he had not been pardoned for
that felony nor had his civil rights restored, and finally, to
the fact that the parties agreed to admit the stipulation into
evidence to be read to the jury.
7
statement significantly outweighed the probative value, if any,
the statement might have. The district court denied Hawkins’s
motion to suppress the statement:
COURT: It makes it more likely, assuming Warren is
selling drugs, assuming that somebody known to Mr.
King as Warren was actually in that vehicle on
November 22nd and went to east Baltimore and made
these three stops that have been described, assuming
all of that, then as you yourself have suggested to
the jury, it tends to suggest that Warren is a drug
dealer.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But Your Honor –
COURT: Just let me finish. And so if, in fact, some
guy with Warren on November 22, 2006, got in Mr.
King’s vehicle and went to these three stops and came
back to the parking lot, then that makes it more
likely that the person who did that was also a drug
dealer. I mean it ties it up. It’s not irrelevant.
It’s not irrelevant. The question of whether Mr.
Hawkins was in that vehicle on November 22nd, 2006, is
made more likely true, his presence in the vehicle is
more likely true if he’s a drug dealer.
J.A. 223. The district court then stated, "The fact that Mr.
Hawkins is willing to admit that he sells drugs is clearly
relevant to the charges in Counts One and Two. Clearly.
Unmistakably." J.A. 224. Furthermore, the district court
determined that the probative value of Hawkins’ statement
substantially outweighed any undue prejudice:
COURT: I don’t see any prejudice in having the jury
know from Mr. Hawkins’s interview that he sells drugs
in east Baltimore. The relevance of that admission is
extraordinary. . . . Its relevance is manifest, and
its probative value is significant because, as I just
said, Mr. Hawkins, even by his not guilty plea,
actually denies being in the car on November 22nd.
8
And his admission that he’s a drug dealer, coupled
with the evidence that whoever was in the car probably
was or certainly could have been a drug dealer, really
ties him to the car in a way that no other evidence in
this case does.
J.A. 225. Additionally, the court found that even under Rule
404(b), the statement was admissible because it was evidence of
Hawkins’ identity as one of the persons in the car with Warren.
Second, Hawkins objected to the admission of his separate
statement during the interview that he stole the .9 millimeter
pistol found on him when arrested from his cousin: "If this is
about the gun, it’s not my gun, it’s my buddy’s gun. He doesn’t
know I have it and the bullets that are in it are mine. I took
my buddy’s bullets out." J.A. 219. Hawkins argued that the
statement was irrelevant because he had conceded that he
possessed the gun. Additionally, Hawkins contended that the
statement was unduly prejudicial and evidence of other crimes to
prove Hawkins’s conformity therewith in violation of Rule
404(b). The district court disagreed:
COURT: This is very interesting because it clearly
suggests that if he’s willing to steal his cousin’s
gun, he’s willing to steal anything from anybody. If
he’s willing to steal his cousin’s gun, why wouldn’t
he be willing to steal money? His cousin’s gun, why
wouldn’t be he be willing [to] steal a car or cash or
cell phones from some guy he just knows casually from
the neighborhood?
J.A. 229–30. In response, Hawkins’s attorney stated:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s exactly why we think it’s not
admissible, Your Honor. You’re sort of making my
9
point. If he’s willing to steal from his cousin,
you’re telling the jury, look, what a bad guy he is.
J.A. 230. The district court denied Hawkins’ motion to redact
the statement from the interview transcript or withhold that
part of the recording from the jury.
Hawkins’ counsel actively cross-examined King and elicited
various inconsistencies from his testimony on direct
examination.
During closing argument, counsel for the Government
mentioned that the carjacking was not the first time Hawkins had
committed a crime against a person he knew, stating, "You heard
yesterday the defendant admitted to police that he stole the 9
millimeter he was caught with on December 9th from his cousin."
J.A. 272. While the Government acknowledged that Hawkins had
conceded his guilt to the felon-in-possession charge, it argued
to the jury that it was a tactical admission:
U.S. ATTORNEY: Now, why would the defendant rob
someone he knew? Well, as I indicated, this was not
the first time he did that. He robbed, stole a gun
from [his] cousin around December 9th.
J.A. 273. These statements prompted Hawkins to move for a
mistrial maintaining that the Government was attempting to
persuade the jury to conclude Hawkins committed the carjacking
based on the fact that he robbed his own cousin. The district
court denied the motion.
10
During the Government’s rebuttal closing argument, counsel
again mentioned that Hawkins had admitted to stealing the gun
from his cousin. Hawkins again moved for a mistrial, contending
that the statement violated Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on the use
of propensity evidence. The district court denied the motion
and the case was submitted to the jury.
The jury found Hawkins guilty on all three counts. The
district court sentenced Hawkins to 180 months for Count I, 120
months for Count II, and 120 months for Count III, for an
aggregate term of incarceration of 360 months followed by three
years of supervised release. Hawkins noted a timely appeal, and
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
II.
Hawkins raises two primary issues on appeal. First, he
contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to
sever Counts I and II from Count III because Count III was
improperly joined with Counts I and II under Rule 8. 3
3
Hawkins does not argue on brief that he was harmed by the
joinder as to Count III. Moreover, at oral argument he conceded
that he was not contesting his conviction on Count III.
Therefore, we will consider the issue abandoned and will affirm
the conviction on Count III. See 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc.
v. Prince George’s County, Md., 58 F.3d 988, 993 n. 7 (4th Cir.
1995) (en banc). Hawkins does contend he is entitled to
resentencing on Count III because his sentence on that count was
calculated in conjunction with and in reliance on the
convictions for Counts I and II.
11
Alternatively, Hawkins argues that if all three counts were
properly joined for a single trial, the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion to sever under Rule 14
because the joinder of Count III with Counts I and II was unduly
prejudicial. Hawkins separately argues that the district court
erred in admitting into evidence the two statements he made
during his post-arrest interview.
III.
Whether charges are properly joined in an indictment is a
question of law that we review de novo. See United States v.
Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 384–85 (4th Cir. 2005). “If the initial
joinder was not proper, however, we review this
nonconstitutional error for harmlessness, and reverse unless the
misjoinder resulted in no ‘actual prejudice’ to the defendant[]
‘because it had [no] substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” United States v.
Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 412 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). If misjoinder is
found, the Government bears the burden of demonstrating that any
error resulting from the misjoinder was harmless. Mackins, 315
F.3d at 412.
12
A.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) provides:
Joinder of Offenses. The indictment or information
may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or
more offenses if the offenses charged—whether felonies
or misdemeanors or both—are of the same or similar
character, or are based on the same act or
transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts
of a common scheme or plan.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). Rule 8(a) permits “very broad joinder,”
Mackins, 315 F.3d at 412 (quoting 1A Charles Alan Wright,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 141 (3d ed. 1999)), “because the
prospect of duplicating witness testimony, impaneling additional
jurors, and wasting limited judicial resources suggests that
related offenses should be tried in a single proceeding.”
United States v. Mir, 525 F.3d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus,
joinder is the “rule rather than the exception,” United States
v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoted
favorably in United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir.
1995)), “because of the efficiency in trying the defendant on
related counts in the same trial.” Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 385.
The requirements of Rule 8(a), however, “‘are not
infinitely elastic,’” Mackins, 315 F.3d at 412 (quoting United
States v. Randazzo, 80 F.3d 623, 627 (1st Cir. 1996)), “and so
‘cannot be stretched to cover offenses . . . which are discrete
and dissimilar.’” Id. at 412 (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Joinder of
13
unrelated charges “create[s] the possibility that a defendant
will be convicted based on considerations other than the facts
of the charged offense.” Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 385; see also
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968) (“An
important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only
relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or
innocence.”).
In this case, the Government contends that the carjacking
counts and possession of a firearm by a felon (Count III) are
all offenses of the “same or similar character.” The Government
did not argue on brief, nor provide a rationale at oral
argument, that joinder was proper either because the counts “are
based on the same act” or “constitute parts of a common scheme
or plan.” Our review of the record substantiates the lack of a
nexus between the carjacking counts and Count III which would
reflect the charges to be the “same act” or a “common scheme or
plan.” Thus joinder rises and falls on whether Counts I and II
are of a “same or similar character” to Count III.
Joinder of offenses that “are based on the same act or
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan”
presents the opportunity to submit evidence of one offense that
ordinarily would be admissible at a separate trial for the
other. United States v. Foutz, 540 F.3d 733, 737 (4th Cir.
14
1976); see also United States v. Carmichael, 685 F.2d 903, 910
(4th Cir. 1982) (determining that evidence of charges joined
because they were part of the same series of acts or
transactions would have been mutually admissible had defendants
enjoyed separate trials on the charges). However, when offenses
are joined based on their same or similar character,
"admissibility at separate trials is not so clear." Foutz, 540
F.3d at 737.
Hawkins admits that Counts I and II are properly joined
because “they both related to the same carjacking that occurred
on November 22, 200[6].” However, Hawkins argues that Count III
“was entirely unrelated” to Counts I and II, in part because the
felon-in-possession count “arose out of a distinct incident
unrelated to the carjacking” and occurred seventeen days later.
Hawkins emphasizes that there is no link between the carjacking
counts and Count III because the handgun the police recovered
from Hawkins’ person on December 9 was not the same gun used in
the carjacking. The fact that the carjacking and felon in
possession counts involve different firearms is not contested by
the Government.
The Government contends that all three counts were properly
joined as offenses of the “same or similar character” for two
reasons: first, because “all three were firearms offenses” and
second, because “all these events occurred within a three-week
15
period.” Br. of Appellee at 12. In support of its argument,
the government cites, inter alia, United States v. Cole, 857
F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Rousseau, 257
F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2001). These decisions, however, provide no
help to the Government in this case.
In Cole, we held proper the joinder of various drug charges
stemming from a large-scale cocaine distribution ring with the
defendant’s alien smuggling charges where the aliens smuggled
into the country began to sell cocaine for his distribution ring
after their arrival. Cole, 857 F.2d at 973. We stated in Cole
that “both the allegations in the indictment and the proof at
trial were more than adequate to establish the connection
between the drug conspiracy and the alien smuggling charges.
Unquestionably, the smuggling counts were ‘related to, and . . .
logically and intimately connected together with’ the drug
conspiracy.” Id. at 973 (quoting United States v. Jamar, 561
F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir. 1977)). The Government alleges that
this “analogous” case supports its argument because in Cole, we
found “some connection” between the counts, and in balancing the
possible prejudice in trying the counts together against the
possible prejudice to the defendants, we found that the balance
“tilted in favor of a joint trial.” Br. of Appellee at 13.
However, the Government’s argument fails to appreciate the
extent of the connection we found in Cole. In Cole, the
16
smuggled aliens worked in the drug distribution ring once they
arrived in America. In effect, drug profits subsidized the
illegal smuggling of aliens who, in turn, went to work in the
drug conspiracy to generate further drug profits for the
defendants. Indeed, there existed a logical and intimate
connection between the offenses which made joinder proper.
There was not just “some connection” between the counts in
Cole; instead, it was a strong connection. However, in the case
at bar, the Government has proffered no evidence demonstrating a
logical and close connection between the alleged carjacking and
possession of a .357 caliber revolver on November 22, and
Hawkins’ possession of a .9 millimeter pistol on December 9.
Similarly, the Government’s reliance on Rousseau is
misplaced. In Rousseau, the defendant was charged with two
counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, although
each arrest related to a different firearm. Rousseau, 257 F.3d
at 929. Prior to trial, Rousseau moved to sever the two felon-
in-possession counts, but the court denied the motion. Id.Based only upon its review of the face of the indictment, 4 the
4
As we stated in Cardwell, "[w]hen the Government does not
proffer evidence tending to show a relationship between the
charged crimes at a pre-trial hearing on a motion to sever,
. . . we examine compliance with Rule 8(a) by looking to the
allegations in the indictment and the evidence produced at
trial." Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 385. This view is in tension
with cases from other circuits holding that the propriety of
joinder is to be based on the indictment alone. For example, in
17
Ninth Circuit found that both “incidents involved firearms
charges,” specifically felon-in-possession charges. Id. at 932.
Thus, the two offenses were of a “same or similar character.”
Id.
The circumstances in Rousseau are easily distinguishable
from the circumstances in the present case. In Rousseau, the
defendant was charged with two counts of violating the same
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), although the offenses occurred
nearly six and a half months apart and the guns were different.
But it is an unremarkable example of offenses of the “same or
similar character” when the defendant is charged only with
multiple violations of the same statute. See Acker, 52 F.3d at
514 (“Trial courts routinely allow joinder of different bank
robbery counts against a single defendant in the same
indictment.”).
In the present case, however, Hawkins was charged with
three different offenses: carjacking and possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and, about three
the Ninth Circuit, district courts examine only those
allegations in the indictment to determine the propriety of
joinder. See United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th
Cir. 1995). However, we believe that "[o]ur rule has the
benefit of a built-in type of harmlessness review; if the
indictment does not allege a sufficient relationship for Rule
8(a) purposes, but the evidence at trial reveals that such a
relationship exists, it is difficult to see how the defendant
could ever be prejudiced by the technical misjoinder."
Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 386 n.1.
18
weeks later, being a felon in possession of a different firearm.
We perceive no similarity in the connection between these three
different counts and the counts on the same offense found
appropriate for joinder by the Ninth Circuit in Rousseau.
In contrast to Cole and Rousseau, we do find persuasive the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Holloway, 1 F.3d
307, 310–11 (5th Cir. 1993), which held joinder improper on a
factual scenario very similar to that in the case at bar. In
Holloway, the defendant was tried on separate counts for robbery
and being a felon in possession of a firearm although the arrest
on the later charge came two months after the alleged robbery.
The Government argued joinder was proper because the offenses
were of the “same or similar character.” However, the Fifth
Circuit noted
that on the face of the indictment there is no
indication that a connection exists between his
possession of the weapon and the alleged robbery
conspiracy. Furthermore, there is no allegation that
he had planned to use the weapon in a robbery, had
used the weapon in a robbery, or that the weapon was
in any way connected to the charged robberies or to
any robbery.
Holloway, 1 F.3d at 310.
The Court then held that joinder of the robbery and
unrelated felon-in-possession charge was improper under Rule 8:
Plainly speaking, we can see no basis for the United
States Attorney to have included this weapons charge
in the indictment in the first place unless he was
seeking to get before the jury evidence that likely
19
would be otherwise inadmissible, i.e., that Holloway
was a convicted felon and that he had a weapon on his
person when arrested. . . . Even the government does
not contend that the weapon found in Holloway’s
possession when he was arrested was the weapon used in
the robberies. Furthermore, Holloway’s arrest took
place almost two months after the most recent robbery.
Thus, we can see no basis for the conclusion that this
count of Holloway’s indictment was the same as the
robbery counts . . . .
Id. at 310-11.
We find the case against Hawkins no more convincing than
that the Fifth Circuit rejected in Holloway. In this case, the
only connection we discern between Count III and the carjacking
counts is the appellant, Hawkins. We have held previously such
a connection is not sufficient to sustain joinder. See
Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 387 (requiring “additional facts" beyond
the defendant as a basis for joinder of charges for defendant’s
participation in a murder-for-hire plot and for defendant’s
possession of a handgun when arrested for the murder-for-hire
plot). Certainly, the indictment does not allege any explicit
connection between the carjacking charges on November 26, 2006,
and the felon-in-possession charge that stemmed from Hawkins’
unrelated arrest on December 9, 2006. Nor do we find that the
testimony at trial provides a basis by which to join the three
counts as offenses of the “same or similar character.”
Thus we do not find that Counts I and II are offenses of
the “same or similar character” as Count III. While the
20
offenses all involved firearms, albeit different firearms,
nothing ties them together except the defendant. There are no
additional factors which indicate the offenses were “identical
or strikingly similar.”
Moreover, the Government’s reliance on the fact that all
three offenses occurred during a three-week period will not
sustain joinder, as we have held consistently that a mere
temporal relationship is not sufficient to establish the
propriety of joinder. See Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 386 (“[W]e do
not believe that a mere temporal relationship is sufficient to
show that the two crimes at issue here were logically
related.”). 5
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in
allowing joinder of Counts I and II with Count III because the
charges are not of a same or similar character. We therefore
turn to the question of whether this error requires reversal.
B.
An error involving misjoinder “‘affects substantial rights’
and requires reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual
prejudice because it ‘had substantial and injurious effect or
5
As we stated in Cardwell, allowing joinder based merely on
a temporal relationship “would effectively read Rule 8(a) to
allow limitless joinder whenever the charge resulted from the
fruits of a single investigation.” Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 386.
21
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” United States v.
Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)) (emphasis added); see also
Mackins, 315 F.3d at 414. In assessing whether a misjoinder
error results in actual prejudice, we are guided by the Lane
Court’s indicia of harmlessness:
(1) whether the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and
the concomitant effect of any improperly admitted
evidence on the jury’s verdict; (2) the steps taken to
mitigate the effects of the error; and (3) the extent
to which the improperly admitted evidence as to the
misjoined counts would have been admissible at trial
on the other counts.
Mackins, 315 F.3d at 414 (citing Lane, 474 U.S. at 450).
Hawkins argues that if there had been separate trials, no
evidence presented during a trial on Count III would have been
admissible in the trial on Counts I and II, and vice versa. In
particular, Hawkins avers that the Government’s ability to
present evidence on the unrelated charge of being a felon in
possession to the same jury hearing the carjacking case
“increase[d] the likelihood that . . . Hawkins would be
convicted” of all three charges. Br. of Appellant at 17.
Hawkins asserts that a jury hearing only Counts I and II would
not hear evidence that Hawkins possessed a gun on December 9,
2006, that he had a prior felony conviction, 6 that he sold drugs
6
Although we have held previously that a defendant’s
stipulation to the existence of a prior felony “diffuse[s] any
22
to support himself, and finally, that he had stolen the .9
millimeter gun from his cousin. Br. of Appellant at 18.
The Government responds that Hawkins suffered no undue
prejudice from misjoinder because there was overwhelming
evidence of Hawkins’s guilt on each count, and because the
evidence relating to Count III and the carjacking counts would
have been mutually admissible under Rule 404(b). Furthermore,
the Government contends “the district court took steps to
eliminate any spillover effect as a result of the joinder.” Br.
of Appellee at 17.
The district court did provide a limiting instruction to
the jury in its attempt to mitigate the effects of the joinder
of all three counts. 7 However, we conclude that, based on the
passions that would be aroused by specific evidence of the
defendant’s felonious past,” Cardwell, 433 F.3d at 388, in this
case, the government presented further prejudicial evidence
related only to Count III by introduction of the statements on
Hawkins’ drug dealing and theft of his cousin’s gun.
7
The district court gave the following instruction to the
jury:
The superseding indictment, which I will refer to
simply as the indictment, contains a total of three
counts. You must, as a matter of law, consider each
of the three counts of the indictment that are before
you and you must return a separate verdict as to each
of the three counts. Your verdict on any count should
not control your decision as to any other count, with
one exception which I will note for you later.
S.J.A. 456.
23
other two indicia of harmlessness provided in Lane, the error in
misjoinder affected Hawkins’s substantial rights, and,
furthermore, “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Lane, 474 U.S. at 449(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S. Ct. 1239).
Although the Government argues to the contrary, we do not
find that all of the evidence on Count III and that on Counts I
and II would have been mutually admissible under Rule 404(b) if
Hawkins had enjoyed the benefit of separate trials. Much of the
evidence presented to the jury on Count III would have been only
marginally relevant, if relevant at all, to Counts I and II.
There was simply nothing about Hawkins being in possession of a
different firearm in December that was related to any of the
elements of the carjacking counts.
Additionally, under a proper balancing analysis pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b), the probative value of
the evidence would have been substantially outweighed by the
I instruct you in this connection that the prior
conviction that is an element of the charge in Count
Three and is not disputed is only to be considered by
you for the fact that it exists, and for nothing else.
You are not to consider it for any other purpose. You
are not to speculate as to what it was for. You may
not consider the prior conviction in deciding whether
it is more likely than not that the defendant was in
knowing possession of the firearm that is charged,
which is the disputed element of the offense.
S.J.A. 481.
24
danger of unfair prejudice to Hawkins. See Foutz, 540 F.2d at
736 (“[E]vidence of ‘other crimes’ which is relevant only to
prove a criminal disposition is universally acknowledged to be
inadmissible.”); Holloway, 1 F.3d at 311 (concluding that had
the felon-in-possession count been severed from the unrelated
robbery counts, “the fact that [the defendant] was a felon would
not have been repeated and repeated to the jury, nor is it
likely that his possession of the gun would have been
admissible” in a separate trial on the robbery counts). As in
Holloway, had Count III been tried separately from Counts I and
II, “the fact that [Hawkins] was a felon would not have been
repeated and repeated to the jury, nor is it likely that his
possession of the [9mm] gun would have been admissible” in the
carjacking trial. Furthermore, the fact that Hawkins had stolen
the 9mm gun from his cousin, a fact the Government repeatedly
highlighted during closing argument, would not have come into
evidence in a separate carjacking trial. 8
Our point is illustrated by the district court’s statement
from the bench denying Hawkins’s motion to exclude his admission
that he had stolen the .9 millimeter pistol from his cousin:
COURT: This is very interesting because it clearly
suggests that if he’s willing to steal his cousin’s
gun, he’s willing to steal anything from anybody. If
8
We do not mean to suggest that the mere possession of a
gun at the time of an arrest is so prejudicial that it could
never be admissible.
25
he’s willing to steal his cousin’s gun, why wouldn’t
he be willing to steal money? His cousin’s gun, why
wouldn’t be he be willing [to] steal a car or cash or
cell phones from some guy he just knows casually from
the neighborhood?
J.A. 229–30. In response, Hawkins’s attorney stated:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s exactly why we think it’s not
admissible, Your Honor. You’re sort of making my
point. If he’s willing to steal from his cousin,
you’re telling the jury, look, what a bad guy he is.
J.A. 230.
This exchange reflects how unrelated bad conduct (the
felon-in-possession of a gun) offered in evidence on another
charge (carjacking) to prove the defendant’s general propensity
to commit crimes can have a “‘substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict’,” as with Counts
I and II in the case at bar. Lane, 474 U.S. at 449 (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); see also Holloway, 1 F.3d at 312(finding that by failing to sever the defendant’s felon-in-
possession count from the unrelated robbery counts, “the jury
emphatically was told that [the defendant] was a bad and
dangerous person ‘by his very nature,’ and that a felon who
carried a gun was just the sort of character who was most likely
to have committed the robberies charged in the indictment”).
Additionally, in contrast to the circumstances of Lane or
Mackins, we are not persuaded that the evidence against Hawkins
related to the carjacking counts was overwhelming. In other
26
cases in which we have analyzed error resulting from misjoinder,
we have determined that there was overwhelming evidence
supporting guilty verdicts on all of the misjoined counts. See
Mir, 525 F.3d at 358 n.1 (finding that even if there was error
in joining charges against the defendant, that error was
harmless because “the evidence of labor certification fraud was
overwhelming, and it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have returned a guilty verdict on the various counts
absent the challenged testimony”); Mackins, 315 F.3d at 414(“Most importantly, . . . this was [not] a close case . . . .
The evidence supporting the guilty verdicts for [the defendants]
on the drug and money laundering counts was simply overwhelming.
Similarly, the evidence of Willie Mackins’[s] guilt on the
counterfeit check counts was also overwhelming.”).
The only evidence against Hawkins at trial on the
carjacking counts was the testimony of the lone witness to the
carjacking, King. Throughout the trial, counsel for Hawkins
brought out multiple inconsistencies prevalent in King’s story
about the carjacking. For example, the number of years King
claimed that he knew Hawkins, King’s description of Hawkins’
clothing and his statements during the carjacking, and the
location of the stops made during the carjacking varied between
his statement to prosecutors, testimony in front of the grand
jury, and testimony at trial. Although the Government offered
27
the testimony of the two police officers King ran to after the
alleged carjacking occurred, they simply repeated the story King
told them. The Government produced no further corroborating
evidence of Hawkins’ guilt on that charge. The .357 caliber
revolver and shotgun allegedly used in the carjacking were never
found. Hawkins’ accomplices, Warren and the unidentified
female, were also never found.
Essentially, the case against Hawkins on Count I and II
boiled down to King’s testimony that Hawkins carjacked King and
Hawkins’ denial that he was involved in that crime. While the
evidence against Hawkins as to Count III was overwhelming, the
Government’s case against Hawkins on Counts I and II was not
overwhelming and “it is possible that the jury found him guilty
of that crime under the rationale that with so much smoke there
must be fire.” Foutz, 540 F.2d at 739; see also Holloway, 1
F.3d at 312 (finding that misjoinder of a felon-in-possession
charge with unrelated robbery charges led to the defendant being
“unjustifiably tried, at least in part, on the basis of who he
was, and not on the basis of the material evidence presented
against him”). Had the three offenses not been joined for
trial, Count III’s prejudicial evidence would not have reached
the jury, and Hawkins might well have been acquitted of Counts I
and II.
28
We therefore conclude that the misjoinder of Counts I and
II with Count III affected Hawkins’s substantial rights because
the misjoinder “had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Kotteakos, 328
U.S. at 776. The district court’s error in misjoinder of the
counts against Hawkins thus requires reversal. Therefore we
vacate Hawkins’ convictions on Counts I and II. 9
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hawkins’ conviction on
Count III as a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, but
vacate his sentence on that count as it was determined, in part,
based on his convictions under Counts I and II. We vacate
Hawkins’ convictions under Counts I and II. We remand this case
9
Hawkins also argued on brief that the district court erred
when it denied his request at trial that the court define the
concept of reasonable doubt in its instructions to the jury. To
the extent this claim applies to Count III, we reject Hawkins’
argument. This Court has, on several occasions, held that a
trial court should not define the concept of reasonable doubt
for a jury unless the jury specifically requests that the court
do so because of the “belief that efforts to define reasonable
doubt are likely to confuse rather than clarify the concept.”
United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998);
see also United States v. Walton, 207 F.3d 694, 696-99 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc); United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 45 (4th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir.
1991). The jury in the case at bar did not make such a request;
therefore clear precedent establishes that denial of the
instruction was proper.
29
to the district court for retrial on Counts I and II and for
resentencing on Count III.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
30
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the court’s judgment that joinder error
requires us to vacate Hawkins’s convictions on Counts I and II.
I write separately simply to note that this circuit’s approach
to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 may well have
precipitated the error in this case.
We have used two interrelated theories in construing these
rules to permit admission of evidence of prior bad acts,
notwithstanding the potential of this evidence to prove criminal
propensity. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-
76 (1948). On the one hand, we have construed Rule 404(b) to
permit admission of “all evidence of other crimes or acts except
that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United
States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1464 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, we have construed
Rule 403 to require exclusion of evidence as prejudicial “only
in those instances where the trial judge believes that there is
a genuine risk that the emotions of the jury will be excited to
irrational behavior, and that this risk is disproportionate to
the probative value of the offered evidence.” Id. at 1467(internal quotation marks omitted). Together, these theories
require exclusion of prior bad act evidence only in rare and
egregious circumstances.
31
Indeed, we have consistently held that the admission of
even highly prejudicial bad act evidence does not violate either
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341-42
(4th Cir. 2008) (affirming admission of evidence of prior
unrelated arrest and conviction for possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base in trial for the same crime); United
States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 710 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming
admission of evidence of defendant’s teenage attempts to make
pipe bombs in trial of defendant -- now an adult -- for
manufacture of a pipe bomb); United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d
305, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming admission of evidence of
prior unrelated drug transactions in trial for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute); United States v. Van Metre,
150 F.3d 339, 350–52 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming admission of
evidence of a prior conviction for kidnapping and sexual assault
in trial for separate act of unrelated kidnapping).
In the face of this precedent, it is not at all surprising
that a busy district judge, concerned with both justice and
judicial economy, might find joinder permissible if evidence as
to one count demonstrated likelihood to commit a crime charged
in another count. Of course, as the majority explains, the law
does not permit such joinder any more than it permits admission
of propensity evidence.
32