United States v. Grant Hines

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4548
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GRANT MASCHIL HINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00373-CCE-1)
Submitted: March 25, 2014 Decided: March 27, 2014
Before GREGORY, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Grant Maschil
Hines pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012).
The district court sentenced Hines to fifty months’
imprisonment, which was in the middle of his advisory Guidelines
range. Counsel for Hines has filed this appeal pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Although advised of his
right to do so, Hines has declined to file a pro se supplemental
brief. The Government has not filed a response brief. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
We have reviewed the transcript of Hines’ Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 hearing and conclude that Hines’ guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary and supported by an independent basis in
fact. We thus affirm Hines’ conviction.
We next consider the reasonableness of Hines’
sentence. When determining a sentence, the district court must
calculate the appropriate advisory Guidelines range and consider
it in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50
(2007). Appellate review of a district court’s imposition of a
sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly
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outside the Guidelines range,” is for abuse of discretion. Id.
at 41.
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Hines, appropriately treating the Sentencing
Guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and considering the
applicable Guidelines range, and weighing the relevant § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. The court provided sufficient reasoning for
the sentence. Furthermore, the within-Guidelines sentence is
presumptively substantively reasonable. See United States v.
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 168-69 (4th Cir. 2010). Neither counsel
nor Hines offer any ground upon which to question the
substantive reasonableness of Hines’ sentence, and we discern
none. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Hines, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Hines requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hines. We dispense with oral argument because the
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facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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