United States v. Clifton Campbell

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4451
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CLIFTON DERON CAMPBELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, District
Judge. (7:15-cr-00042-MFU-1)
Submitted: January 25, 2017 Decided: February 2, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Randy V. Cargill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant. John P. Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney,
Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Clifton Deron Campbell was charged with possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). He moved to suppress evidence seized from a
residence pursuant to a search warrant, claiming that the
affidavit offered in support of the warrant was insufficient to
establish probable cause. The district court denied the motion
upon the determination that, even if probable cause was lacking,
the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applied.
Campbell then pled guilty and was sentenced to 180 months in
prison. He appeals, arguing that the district court erred when
it denied the motion to suppress. We affirm.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
generally is inadmissible at trial. United States v. Andrews,
577 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “[u]nder the good
faith exception to the warrant requirement, evidence obtained
from an invalidated search warrant will be suppressed only if
the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their
affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable
belief in the existence of probable cause.” United States v.
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Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1583 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Ordinarily, “a warrant issued by a magistrate . . .
suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted
in good faith in conducting the search.” United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, if “the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” the good faith
exception does not apply, and evidence gathered pursuant to the
deficient warrant must be excluded from trial. United States v.
Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995).
The good faith analysis “is confined to the objectively
ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer
would have known that the search was illegal” in light of “all
of the circumstances.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. In this
regard, courts may consider information in the warrant affidavit
and any “uncontroverted facts known to officers but
inadvertently not disclosed to the magistrate.” United
States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir. 2011).
We review “factual findings regarding [a] motion to
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United
States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014). When the
district court has denied a motion to suppress, we view the
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evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). In cases
where a defendant challenges both the existence of probable
cause and the applicability of the good faith exception, we may
proceed directly to the good faith analysis without first
deciding whether the warrant was supported by probable cause.
United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994).
We agree with the district court that, even if the
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient because it did
not sufficiently tie Campbell to the residence, the good faith
exception to the warrant requirement applied. After arresting
Campbell just outside the residence pursuant to an arrest
warrant, officers discovered on his person a quantity of
marijuana, empty baggies, and digital scales-all suggesting drug
dealing. This information was included in the affidavit.
Additionally, officers possessed but apparently did not divulge
to the magistrate the following information strongly suggesting
that Campbell resided at the home: they had been surveilling
the residence for some time; they had seen Campbell’s car parked
there on a regular basis; they knew Campbell’s girlfriend rented
the residence; and they had concluded that this was also his
residence. In light of all the circumstances, a reasonably
well-trained law enforcement officer objectively would have
believed that search was lawful.
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Because the good faith exception applied, the district
court properly denied the motion to suppress. We accordingly
affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal arguments are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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