United States v. Truman Lewis

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4241
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRUMAN LEVI LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4242
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NORMAN DEVI LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4648
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRUMAN LEVI LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (2:12-cr-00507-RMG-1; 2:12-cr-00507-RMG-3)
Submitted: April 30, 2015 Decided: May 12, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina; Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, James Hunter May, Winston Holliday,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Truman Levi Lewis (“Truman”) and Norman Devi Lewis
(“Norman”) appeal their convictions for conspiracy to commit
health-care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1347, 1349
(2012), four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343, 1349, 2 (2012), and conspiracy to commit money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1957(a), 2,
(2012), based on their company’s overbilling of Medicaid.
Truman also appeals his 120-month sentence. Truman argues that
the district court erred by excluding a certain audio recording,
by finding the evidence sufficient to support his convictions,
by denying his motions for a new trial based on these issues,
and by enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice based
on his trial testimony. * Norman argues that the district court
∗
Counsel also purports to raise the following issues
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967):
(1) whether the district court reversibly erred by denying
Truman’s motion to sever; (2) whether the district court erred
by denying Truman’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions because no
witness made an in-court identification of him; (3) whether the
district court erred by denying Truman’s motions for a new trial
based on the denial of the motion to sever, the denial of a
motion to suppress, a lack of adequate time to review the jury
panel, and ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) whether the
district court reversibly erred by overruling Truman’s
objections to the facts presented at sentencing, the loss
amount, and the leadership-role enhancement, and by ordering
restitution in the amount it did; (5) whether trial counsel was
ineffective; and (6) whether the district court reversibly erred
by denying Truman’s motion to stay forfeiture pending appeal.
(Continued)
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erred by failing to order a second competency evaluation and by
refusing to allow him to represent himself. We affirm.
I.
Truman first argues that the district court erred by
refusing to admit an audio recording of a meeting at which he
reached an administrative settlement with certain officials.
“We review a trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an
evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.” United
States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). To the extent Truman challenges the
district court’s ruling that the recording would not be admitted
in its entirety, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion because the recording contained numerous
Anders applies only when “counsel finds his case to be
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it.” 386
U.S. at 744 (emphasis added). Because Truman’s attorney is able
to raise nonfrivolous issues on appeal, Anders does not permit
her to brief frivolous issues simply because her client so
requests. Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1983)
(holding that Anders does not mean that “appellate counsel must
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client”). While
a defendant “has the ultimate authority to make certain
fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take
an appeal,” the decision regarding which issues to raise on
appeal lies solely with the professional judgment of counsel.
Id. at 751. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we have
reviewed each of the issues purportedly submitted pursuant to
Anders and conclude that they are without merit.
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inadmissible hearsay statements by Truman. Moreover, the
district court allowed Truman to request permission to present
specific facts and statements from the recording. The only such
fact that Truman cites on appeal as having been improperly
excluded is the fact of the administrative settlement. We
conclude that the district court did not act arbitrarily or
irrationally in excluding evidence of this settlement,
especially in light of the court’s decision to allow Truman to
testify regarding the general nature of the meeting.
Accordingly, Truman is entitled to no relief on his evidentiary
claim.
Next, Truman argues that the district court erred by
denying his Rule 29 motions because there was insufficient
evidence that he possessed the requisite criminal intent for his
offenses. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
Rule 29 motion. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th
Cir. 2015). Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of
insufficient evidence, we will sustain the jury’s verdict “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see Reed, 780 F.3d at 269-70 (defining
substantial evidence).
The only element of the charged offenses that Truman
contests on appeal is the intent requirement. See United States
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v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 547, 550 (5th Cir.) (discussing
elements of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2318 (2014); United States v. McLean, 715
F.3d 129, 137-38 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating elements of
substantive offense of health-care fraud); United States v.
Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 477-78 (4th Cir. 2012) (setting forth
elements of wire fraud); United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
371 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing elements of conspiracy to commit
money laundering). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that
the ample testimony that Truman instructed his employees to
provide Medicaid with information he knew was false was
sufficient for the jury to infer that he intended to deceive
Medicaid and knew that these actions were criminal. See United
States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1997)
(discussing resolution of conflicting evidence). Accordingly,
the district court did not err in denying Truman’s Rule 29
motions.
Truman also argues that the district court erred by denying
his motions for a new trial based on the exclusion of the
aforementioned audio recording and the sufficiency of the
evidence. Because the district court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the recording and the evidence was
sufficient to convict Truman of the charged offenses, the
district court did not err in denying Truman’s motions for a new
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trial on these bases. See United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d
327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that appellate court reviews
denial of motion for new trial for abuse of discretion), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1043 (2014).
Finally, Truman argues that the district court erred by
applying an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2012), based on his
testimony at trial. We review the imposition of this
enhancement for clear error. United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d
540, 560 (4th Cir. 2005). This enhancement is appropriate if
the defendant gave “false testimony concerning a material matter
with the willful intent to provide false testimony.” United
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v.
Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing “degree
of specificity Dunnigan requires”).
The district court found that Truman testified falsely that
he was unaware that his employees signed notes falsely stating
that they worked on weekends. On appeal, Truman argues that his
testimony was not false because he admitted on cross-examination
that he was in charge of the company’s billing. However, this
general admission does not remedy his prior testimony that he
was unaware of the deceptive notes. Truman does not challenge
on appeal the district court’s findings that this testimony was
false, material, and made with the intent to provide false
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testimony. Accordingly, we discern no clear error in the
application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.
II.
Norman first challenges the district court’s refusal to
order a second competency evaluation based on his behavior
during jury selection. In determining whether there is
reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a trial court
must consider “evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s
demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning the
defendant’s competence.” United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d
583, 592-93 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013). The fact that an individual
possesses questionable beliefs about the law or makes frivolous
or nonsensical legal arguments does not mean that he lacks
competence to stand trial. United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d
733, 743 (4th Cir. 2007).
Norman’s psychological report indicated that, although he
had personality disorders and below-average intelligence, he was
competent to stand trial. See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d
1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Medical opinions are usually
persuasive evidence on the question of whether a sufficient
doubt exists as to the defendant’s competence.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). After observing Norman’s behavior,
the district court concluded that he was not delusional but was
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deliberately behaving obstructively. Because this finding was
consistent with Norman Lewis’s behavior and psychological
report, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to conduct a second competency
evaluation. See Bernard, 708 F.3d at 589-90 (stating standard
of review).
Norman also argues that the district court erred by finding
him incompetent to represent himself. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees not only the right to be represented by counsel but
also the right to self-representation. Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). Where, as here, the district court
finds the defendant competent to stand trial, the court may
nevertheless find him incompetent to represent himself at trial
if a mental illness renders him “unable to carry out the basic
tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of
counsel.” Bernard, 708 F.3d at 589-90; accord Indiana v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008).
The district court found that, although Norman was
competent to stand trial, his disordered thinking prevented him
from personally managing the large amount of documentary
evidence in this case. This finding was adequately supported by
Norman’s refusal to review the documents presented by the
Government or even acknowledge that they formed the evidence in
this case, by the psychological report indicating that he had a
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low intelligence, and by his demeanor as observed by the
district court. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in terminating Norman’s self-representation under
Edwards. United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 233 (4th
Cir.) (stating standard of review), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 502
(2014).
III.
Because the claims raised on appeal do not warrant relief,
we affirm the judgments of the district court. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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