United States v. Eric Riley

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4761
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC RILEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00072-5)
Submitted: April 20, 2015 Decided: May 18, 2015
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Debra Kilgore, BURTON KILGORE & BALDWIN, Princeton, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Miller A. Bushong, III, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Riley appeals the district court’s amended order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 14 months
of imprisonment and 12 months of supervised release. Counsel
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
but questioning whether the district court plainly erred in
revoking Riley’s term of supervised release and whether the
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable. Riley was advised
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not
filed one. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
During the pendency of this appeal, Riley’s prison term
ended, and he began serving his new term of supervised release.
We may address sua sponte “whether we are presented with a live
case or controversy . . . since mootness goes to the heart of
the Article III jurisdiction of the courts.” Friedman’s,
Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because Riley has already served his
term of imprisonment, there is no longer a live controversy
regarding the length of his confinement. Accordingly, counsel’s
challenge to the reasonableness of Riley’s term of imprisonment
is moot. See United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283-85 (4th
Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant’s release from prison moots
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appeal of revocation sentence). However, because Riley is
currently serving the 12-month term of supervised release, we
retain jurisdiction to review the district court’s decisions to
revoke Riley’s supervised release and to impose a new term of
supervised release.
Counsel questions whether the district court plainly erred
by failing to explicitly inquire whether Riley’s plea of no
contest to the supervised release violation was knowing and
voluntary. Because Riley did not raise this issue in the
district court, our review is for plain error. See Henderson v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013) (explaining plain
error review). “A defendant's supervised release cannot be
revoked without a full hearing unless the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily admits to the allegations against [him] and
waives [his] rights under Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498,
500 (4th Cir. 2005). A knowing and voluntary waiver of the
right to a full revocation hearing may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances and without a formal colloquy with
the defendant. Id.; see United States v. Stehl, 665 F.2d 58,
59-60 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 “has no application to [supervised release]
revocation proceedings”).
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After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the
totality of the circumstances indicate that Riley’s plea of no
contest to the revocation violation was knowing and voluntary.
The court, therefore, did not err — plainly or otherwise — by
failing to explicitly inquire into the voluntariness of the
plea. We also conclude that Riley’s 12-month term of supervised
release is not plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (“We will affirm a revocation
sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not
plainly unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal as moot to the extent
Riley seeks to challenge his 14-month term of imprisonment and
affirm the remainder of the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Riley, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Riley requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Riley. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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