United States v. Robert Mays

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4612
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT EARL MAYS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-4694
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PARIS CORDAVA WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:15-cr-00059-F-1; 5:15-cr-00059-F-2)
Submitted: January 5, 2017 Decided: February 10, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., RUDOLF WIDENHOUSE, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina; Joshua B. Howard, GAMMON, HOWARD, ZESZOTARSKI, PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. John Stuart Bruce, United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, First Assistant United
States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In November 2014, Paris Cordava Williams and a coconspirator
robbed a bank and then fled to a car driven by Robert Earl Mays.
Police tracked the robbers to Mays’ car and found Williams and the
coconspirator in the trunk with the stolen money and a handgun. A
grand jury then indicted Williams and Mays for bank robbery and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2
(2012), and for being felons in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012).
Mays moved to sever his trial from Williams’ trial, but the
district court denied the motion. At the joint trial, both
defendants moved for judgments of acquittal. The court granted
Mays’ motion for acquittal for the felon in possession count, but
denied the motions as to all other counts.
The jury then convicted Mays and Williams of bank robbery and
aiding and abetting and convicted Williams of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court
enhanced Mays’ sentence based on Williams’ possession of a firearm
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B),
2B3.1(b)(2)(C) (2014).
On appeal, Mays and Williams challenge the denial of their
motions for judgment of acquittal, and Mays separately challenges
the denial of his motion to sever and his sentence. We reject
each challenge and affirm.
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We review de novo a denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal. United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 228 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1833 (2016). “The question is
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Under this standard, Mays challenges his conviction for
aiding and abetting bank robbery, while Williams challenges his
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The
evidence supports both convictions, and therefore, these claims
fail.
Turning to Mays’ separate arguments, we reject Mays’ claim
that the district court erred when it denied his motion to sever.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse
of discretion, “recognizing that there is a presumption in favor
of joint trials in cases in which defendants have been indicted
together.” United States v. Medford, 661 F.3d 746, 753 (4th Cir.
2011). A district court may sever codefendants’ trials when the
joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant or the government.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 14(a). Even where a defendant shows the possibility
of prejudice, “less drastic measures, such as limiting
instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.”
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). Mays failed to
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show that joinder prejudiced him or that the district court’s
limiting instruction did not suffice. Thus, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mays’
motion to sever.
Finally, we also reject Mays’ objection to the factual
findings supporting his sentence. We review a sentencing court’s
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Flores-
Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2015). “Clear error occurs
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 336-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the alleged error concerns the district court’s finding
that a firearm was possessed during the robbery, thereby triggering
the five-level enhancement in USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). Related to
that section, USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) provides that a district court
may hold a defendant accountable for his codefendant’s acts if
those acts occurred within the scope of joint criminal activity,
furthered the criminal activity, and were reasonably foreseeable.
Our review of the record shows that the district court did not
clearly err in making factual findings to support the application
of USSG §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), 2B3.1(b)(2)(C).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments against
Mays and Williams. We dispense with oral argument because the
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facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court, and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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