United States v. Terrance Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4182
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE ANTWAN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:08-cr-00160-D-1)
Submitted: August 30, 2012 Decided: September 17, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance Antwan Williams pled guilty without a plea
agreement to possession with intent to distribute more than
fifty grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (count one), possession of
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2006) (count two), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (count three). The district court
sentenced Williams as a career offender to 262 months’
imprisonment on count one, a consecutive sentence of sixty
months’ imprisonment on count two, and a concurrent sentence of
120 months’ imprisonment on count three, for a total sentence of
322 months’ imprisonment. This court ultimately reversed
Williams’ conviction on count three, vacated his sentence, and
remanded for resentencing under United States v. Simmons,
649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). United States v.
Williams, 449 F. App’x 246 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09–4065).
On remand, the district court sentenced Williams to
204 months’ imprisonment on count one, a sentence resulting from
an upward variance from his advisory Guidelines range of 140 to
175 months’ imprisonment on that count, and a consecutive
sentence of sixty months’ imprisonment on count two. On appeal,
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Williams challenges his sentence on count one, arguing that it
is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
As we have explained, “no matter what provides the
basis for a deviation from the Guidelines range[,] we review the
resulting sentence only for reasonableness.” United States v.
Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir. 2008). In doing so, we apply
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In assessing a sentencing court’s
decision to vary from a defendant’s Guidelines range, this court
“we consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both
with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). We will find a sentence to be unreasonable
“[i]f [the sentencing] court provides an inadequate statement of
reasons or relies on improper factors in imposing a sentence
outside the properly calculated advisory sentencing range.” Id.
Williams argues that the district court abused its
discretion in finding that such an extensive variance was
warranted in this case. However, we conclude after review of
the record that the court’s sentencing decision is reasonable in
light of Williams’ long history of recidivism, which reflects
his disrespect for the law, and the need for the sentence to
protect the public and to deter Williams. The court’s
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consideration of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
and articulation of its reasons for varying from the Guidelines
range support our decision to defer to the district court’s
determination as to the extent of the variance. See United
States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366-67 (4th Cir.)
(affirming substantive reasonableness of variance sentence six
years greater than Guidelines range because sentence was based
on the district court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a)
factors), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011); see also United
States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 2010) (“All that
matters is that the sentence imposed be reasonable in relation
to the ‘package’ of reasons given by the court.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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