United States v. Andrew Sheradin

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6333
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
ANDREW D. SHERADIN,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:07-hc-02139-D-JG)
Submitted: December 7, 2012 Decided: December 17, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
R. Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM, PC, Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, W. Ellis Boyle, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Sheradin appeals the district court’s order
committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (“Adam Walsh
Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006). We have reviewed the record
and affirm.
The Adam Walsh Act allows for the civil commitment of
a “sexually dangerous person” following the expiration of his or
her federal prison sentence. In order to civilly commit an
individual as sexually dangerous, the Government must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the individual: (1) has
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or
child molestation; (2) currently suffers from a serious mental
illness, abnormality, or disorder; and (3) as a result of the
illness, abnormality or disorder, would have serious difficulty
in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation
if released. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(a), 4248(d) (2006).
A determination of sexual dangerousness “is for the
factfinder to decide among reasonable interpretations of the
evidence and determine the weight accorded to expert witnesses.”
United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Francis, 686 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating
that “whether an individual is mentally ill to this degree turns
on the significance of the factual information as viewed by the
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expert psychiatrists and psychologists.”). The serious
difficulty prong of sexual dangerousness refers to the degree of
an individual’s “volitional impairment, which impacts the
person’s ability to refrain from acting upon his deviant sexual
interests.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 463 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Sheradin asserts three constitutional challenges to
his commitment: (1) the civil commitment statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248 violates equal protection principles by limiting its
application only to prisoners; (2) the length of the delay
between certifying Sheradin as a sexually dangerous person and
conducting the civil commitment hearing violated his right to
due process; and (3) § 4248 levies an unconstitutional criminal
punishment. As Sheradin concedes, however, each of these
arguments is foreclosed by our decision in United States v.
Timms, 664 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
189 (2012).
Sheradin next contends that the district court
committed clear error in finding that he meets the requirements
for civil commitment. Sheradin asserts that the district court
improperly weighed exhibits presented by the Government,
alleging that the documents were inaccurate and unverified.
Additionally, Sheradin asserts that the district court erred in
assigning credibility to the Government’s expert witnesses. As
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to these assertions, the district court’s factual findings are
reviewed for clear error, while its legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo. Hall, 664 F.3d at 462. Where the district
court’s factual findings are based on its evaluation of
conflicting expert testimony, we are especially reluctant to set
aside its determinations. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Given Sheradin’s concession that he previously engaged
in child molestation, the Government was required to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Sheradin suffers from a
serious mental disorder and that, as a result, he would have
serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct
or child molestation if released. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6).
Because “[e]valuating the credibility of experts and the value
of their opinions is a function best committed to the district
courts,” it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to
accept the opinion of the Government’s expert witnesses that
Sheradin suffers from pedophilia and that he is at a high risk
for recidivism upon release. Hall, 664 F.3d at 464. Further,
as we have previously explained, the determination of a
particular individual’s risk of recidivism may rely not only on
actuarial tests, but also on factors such as his participation
in treatment, his ability to control his impulses, and his
commitment to controlling his behavior. Id. Because these are
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precisely the factors the district court considered in
Sheradin’s case, we find no clear error in its conclusions.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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