Samira Jadoo v. Loretta Lynch

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1822
SAMIRA YOUSSEF JADOO JADOO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: May 7, 2015 Decided: June 9, 2015
Amended: September 10, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hassan M. Ahmad, THE HMA LAW FIRM, PLLC, Herndon, Virginia, for
Petitioner. Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Edward Wiggers, Senior Litigation Counsel, Channah F. Norman,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Samira Youssef Jadoo Jadoo, a native of Israel and a
citizen of Palestine, petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”), dismissing her appeal
from the immigration judge’s order finding her removable because
her conditional lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status was
terminated and she was not eligible for a waiver under
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H) (2012), known as the “fraud waiver.” We deny
the petition for review.
Whether Jadoo was eligible for the fraud waiver is a
question of law we review de novo. Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d
243, 251 (4th Cir. 2008). The Board held that, even assuming
that Jadoo’s adjustment of status qualified as an “admission,”
she was not eligible for the fraud waiver because she was
removable, not for fraud, but for failing to file the petition
to remove the conditional basis of her LPR status. We need not
make such an assumption, because this Court has held that “the
statutory definition of ‘admission’ does not include adjustment
of status.” Aremu v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 450 F.3d 578, 581
(4th Cir. 2006); see Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 386
(4th Cir. 2012). However, even if we were to assume that
Jadoo’s adjustment of status was an “admission,” we agree with
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the Board that Jadoo was not ordered removed because she engaged
in fraud or misrepresentation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
The Board’s recent opinion in Matter of Agour, 26 I. & N. Dec.
566 (B.I.A. 2015), does not alter the fact that Jadoo is
ineligible for the fraud waiver.
Further, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to remand. Obioha v. Gonzales,
431 F.3d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 2005). The Board opinion on which
Jadoo relies is both unpublished and arises from another
circuit, and as such does not compel the Board to grant the
requested relief.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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