United States v. Adam Womack

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4124
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ADAM WOMACK, a/k/a Ace,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:07-cr-00205-JAG-1)
Submitted: August 19, 2014 Decided: August 29, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Appellate Attorney, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Jessica D. Aber, Richard D.
Cooke, Assistant United States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Adam Womack appeals the thirty-six-month sentence
imposed upon the revocation of supervised release. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.
at 438. In making this initial inquiry, we take a more
deferential posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise
of discretion than when conducting reasonableness review for
Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find a sentence unreasonable
must we decide if it is plainly so. Id. at 657; see also United
States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012). While a
district court must explain a revocation sentence, the court
“need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation
sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction
sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010).
We reject Womack’s claim that the district court did
not meaningfully consider the advisory revocation range of
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eight-fourteen months. At the revocation hearing, the court
heard arguments of counsel as to what an appropriate sentence
would be and was well aware that the sentence proposed by the
United States was more than three times the maximum of the
policy range.
The court, in its discretion, determined that a
sentence within that range would be too low in light of both
relevant 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2012) factors, which it
thoroughly discussed, and, especially, Womack’s breach of the
court’s trust. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt.
A, § 3(b) (2012); United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d at 641. We
find no merit to Womack’s claim that his sentence is
disproportionately high when compared with offenders who
committed Class A release violations and received revocation
sentences that were lower than the sentence he received for
Class C violations. Such a comparison is simply not meaningful.
See United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 342 (4th Cir. 2012).
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the material before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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