United States v. James Wintons

Filed: March 14, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4543
(3:08-cr-00215-FDW-1)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES DARNELL WINTONS,
Defendant - Appellant.
O R D E R
The Court amends its opinion filed March 8, 2012, as
follows:
On page 3, first full paragraph, line 5 -- “factual
innocence” is corrected to read “factual guilt.”
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4543
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES DARNELL WINTONS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00215-FDW-1)
Submitted: February 24, 2012 Decided: March 8, 2012
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Heather H. Martin, Matthew Segal,
Assistant Federal Defenders, Asheville, North Carolina; Peter S.
Adolf, Assistant Federal Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney,
Melissa L. Rikard, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Darnell Wintons pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to 184 months’
imprisonment. He appeals his conviction, asserting that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea based on his contention that his prior
attorney failed to discuss a possible defense with him and
failed to move to suppress the weapons. We find no abuse of
discretion and therefore affirm Wintons’ conviction.
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea.” United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, once the
district court has accepted a guilty plea, it is within the
district court’s discretion whether to grant a motion to
withdraw it based on the defendant’s showing of a “fair and just
reason.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Battle,
499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007).
When considering whether to allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea, the trial court must conduct a six-
factor analysis:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible
evidence that his plea was not knowing or not
voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has
been a delay between the entering of the plea and the
filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant has had
close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether
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withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and
(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste
judicial resources.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991)
Although all of the Moore factors should be considered, the key
one is whether the Rule 11 hearing was properly conducted.
Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414. Thus, this court closely scrutinizes
the Rule 11 colloquy and attaches a strong presumption that the
plea is final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate.
United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
Addressing these factors, the district court
determined that Wintons made no claim that he did not understand
the plea hearing or that his participation in the Rule 11
hearing was other than voluntary. The district court found that
Wintons never denied his factual guilt. Rather, he claims that
he would have filed a motion to suppress evidence if he had been
properly advised. However, suppression of evidence does not
amount to legal innocence. See United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d
1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1995); Vasquez v. United States, 279 F.2d
34, 36-37 (9th Cir. 1960).
Addressing the next Moore factor, the district court
found that the “many, many months” between the plea and the
motion to withdraw amounted to a significant delay that
prejudiced the government’s ability to try the case. We find no
clear error in this determination. See United States v. Suter,
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755 F.2d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 1985) (reviewing factual findings in
support of denial of motion to withdraw plea for clear error).
Despite Wintons’ assertion that he did not have the
close assistance of competent counsel, the district court found
that, at the time of the entry of his plea, Wintons had the
close assistance of competent counsel. The court based this
finding on Wintons’ sworn statements during the Rule 11 hearing
as to his satisfaction with counsel and that he had discussed
possible defenses with counsel. Moreover, the record of the
plea withdrawal hearing shows that Wintons and his former
attorney discussed a suppression motion and made the strategic
decision not to file the motion to suppress, but rather to
cooperate in the hope of being granted a sentence below the
statutory minimum. We conclude that the district court’s
finding that Wintons had the close assistance of competent
counsel is not clearly erroneous. See Suter, 755 F.2d at 525;
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn
declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of
verity.”).
In conclusion, we have determined that the district
court properly weighed the Moore factors and did not abuse its
discretion in denying Wintons’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the
motion to withdraw the plea and affirm Wintons’ conviction. We
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dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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