Glenn Stephens, III v. United States

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1940
GLENN H. STEPHENS, III,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
TINA QUARLES,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:15-cv-00726-LMB-IDD)
Submitted: January 11, 2016 Decided: January 13, 2016
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Glenn H. Stephens, III, Appellant Pro Se. Ayana Niambi Free,
Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Glenn H. Stephens, III, appeals the district court’s order
granting the United States’ motion to dismiss and dismissing his
civil action. Stephens filed a warrant in debt against Tina
Quarles in Virginia state court, alleging a single count of
defamation per se. The Government removed the matter to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) (2012), and filed a
notice of substitution, substituting itself for Quarles as the
named defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2012).
The Government then moved to dismiss the action as barred
by sovereign immunity. Stephens opposed the motion and sought
remand to state court on the basis that the Government’s removal
certification was invalid. The district court denied Stephens’
request, concluded that the Government was the proper defendant,
and dismissed the action based on sovereign immunity. Stephens
appeals the district court’s order, arguing on appeal that the
case should have been remanded to state court because the
removal certification was “perjured.”
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and its scope-of-employment determination de novo.
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 111 F.3d 1148, 1152
n.3 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court correctly determined
that it could not remand the matter to state court. A removal
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certification is conclusive; “once certification and removal are
effected, exclusive competence to adjudicate the case resides in
the federal court, and that court may not remand the suit to the
state court.” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 231 (2007). This
is true even where the certification was unwarranted. Id. at
241. Moreover, no evidence establishes that the removal
certificate was perjured as Stephens alleges. To the contrary,
the record demonstrates that the United States Attorney had a
good faith basis for removing the matter to federal court.
Finally, we agree with the district court that Quarles was
acting within the scope of her employment at the time she made
the purportedly defamatory comment, and that suit against the
Government was barred by sovereign immunity.
Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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