Long Beach Mortgage Trust 2006-6 v. Dove

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1462
LONG BEACH MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-6; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST COMPANY,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
MARK EDWARD FRUTROVSKY; FISCHER LAW GROUP, PLLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
YVONNE DOVE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:08-cv-02064-PJM)
Submitted: July 16, 2009 Decided: August 14, 2009
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Yvonne Dove, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Daniel Cohen, BIERMAN
GEESING & WARD, LLC, Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yvonne Dove seeks to appeal the district court’s
orders remanding the case to state court and denying
reconsideration of that order. Parties are accorded thirty days
after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order
to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the
district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.”
Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)
(quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960));
accord Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, __, 127 S. Ct. 2360,
2363-66 (2007). The appeal period is stayed by a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), if filed no
later than ten days following entry of the judgment. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). An untimely Rule
59(e) motion, however, does not stay the appeal period.
Panhorst v. United States, 241 F.3d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 2001).
The district court’s order remanding the case was
entered on the docket on December 30, 2008. Dove did not file
her motion for reconsideration until January 15, 2009, one day
beyond the expiration of the ten-day period. That motion,
therefore, did not stay the appeal period. As the notice of
appeal was filed on April 20, 2009, almost three months beyond
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the expiration of the thirty-day appeal period, and Dove failed
to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we do
not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order
remanding the case to state court. We therefore dismiss this
portion of the appeal.
Turning to the district court’s order denying
reconsideration, Dove has failed to challenge on appeal the
court’s basis for denying reconsideration. We therefore find
that Dove has forfeited appellate review of that order. See 4th
Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order denying reconsideration of the remand order.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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