In Re: Mitrano v.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-9525
IN THE MATTER OF PETER PAUL MITRANO,
Respondent.
On Order to Show Cause Before the Fourth Circuit Standing Panel
on Attorney Discipline: MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
No. 08-2030
_______________
In Re: PETER PAUL MITRANO,
Appellant.
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MICHAEL LEWIS RIGSBY,
Amicus Curiae.
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:07-mc-00008-JRS)
Argued: May 15, 2009 Decided: June 4, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
No. 07-9525 disbarment ordered; No. 08-2030 affirmed by
unpublished per curiam opinion.
Peter Paul Mitrano, Merrifield, Virginia, Respondent/Appellant
Pro Se. Michael Lewis Rigsby, CARRELL, RICE & RIGSBY, Richmond,
Virginia, Amicus Curiae.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
On July 17, 2008, the District of Columbia revoked Peter
Paul Mitrano’s license to practice law. On August 15, 2008,
this court’s Standing Panel on Attorney Discipline issued
Mitrano a Notice to Show Cause why we should not impose
reciprocal discipline and disbar him from practice before us.
On September 8, 2008, Mitrano noted an appeal from an order of
the Eastern District of Virginia imposing such discipline and
revoking Mitrano’s license to practice before it. We
consolidated the two cases, which have been fully briefed and
argued. For the reasons explained below, we disbar Mitrano from
practice before this court, and affirm the district court’s
decision to impose reciprocal disbarment.
I.
On July 27, 2005, District of Columbia Bar Counsel filed a
Specification of Charges, informing Mitrano of several serious
allegations of professional misconduct. In re Mitrano, 952 A.2d
901, 907 (D.C. 2008). The gravamen of the charges was that
Mitrano, having received a $241,336.59 check made payable to his
client in January 1998, fraudulently endorsed this check over to
himself, deposited the funds in his personal bank account, and
spent the money for his own purposes, knowing that the major
portion of the funds did not belong to him. Id. at 904–05.
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In June 2006, following investigation and discovery, a
Hearing Committee in the District of Columbia held a three-day
evidentiary hearing on the matter. Id. at 908. At the hearing,
Mitrano did not deny taking and using the funds, but claimed
entitlement to the entire check as a reasonable legal fee. Id.
at 915. On February 9, 2007, the Committee issued a written
report, recommending that Mitrano be disbarred from practice.
The Committee found that Mitrano had committed numerous ethical
violations, including theft, misappropriation, and commingling
of client funds. Id. at 922–28. Because Mitrano presented
evidence tending to show that he did not forge the endorsement,
the Committee did not rely on that theory. Id. at 906.
Instead, the Committee found that regardless of any forgery,
Mitrano committed theft because he took the entire $241,336.59,
even though he knew that he did not have a legitimate claim to
anywhere near that amount. Id. at 923.
Mitrano appealed the Committee’s decision to the District
of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility. Following
argument, the Board adopted all of the findings of the Committee
and recommended disbarment. Id. at 928. On July 17, 2008, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals accepted the
recommendation of the Board and disbarred Mitrano. Id. at 907.
On August 15, 2008, pursuant to Local Rule 46(g)(4), this
court’s Standing Panel on Attorney Discipline issued Mitrano a
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Notice to Show Cause why we should not disbar him from practice.
On September 8, 2008, Mitrano noted an appeal from an order of
the Eastern District of Virginia revoking Mitrano’s license to
practice law before it. We consolidated the two cases, received
briefs and heard oral argument from Mitrano and prosecuting
counsel.
II.
Mitrano’s admission to practice law before this court is
premised in part on his status as a member of the District of
Columbia Bar. See Fed. R. App. P. 46(a)(1) (“An attorney is
eligible for admission to the bar of a court of appeals if that
attorney is of good moral and professional character and is
admitted to practice before . . . the highest court of a state .
. . .”). Because Mitrano has been disbarred by the District of
Columbia, he is subject to reciprocal disbarment from this
court. See Fed. R. App. P. 46(b)(1)(A).
Under our Local Rules, we presume the sanction imposed by
the District of Columbia’s highest court to be appropriate, see
4th Cir. R. 46(g)(2), and will impose such discipline provided
that the three conditions established by the Supreme Court in
Selling v. Redford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917) are met. This requires
that “(1) the state must have given the attorney notice of the
charges and an opportunity to be heard; (2) the evidence must
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support the findings made; and (3) there must be no other ‘grave
reason’ for ignoring the actions taken.” In re Fallin, 255 F.3d
195, 197 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Selling, 243 U.S. at 51).
Based on a careful and through consideration of the record,
and the written and oral submissions of Mitrano and prosecuting
counsel, we conclude that the three Selling requirements have
been fully satisfied.
First, it is undisputed that Mitrano received notice of the
charges in the July 27, 2005 Specification of Charges, and had
an extended opportunity to be heard at the three-day evidentiary
hearing. Mitrano argues that prosecuting counsel switched the
basis of the charges against him from forgery to theft without
notice. This claim has no merit. As the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals found, the Specification included allegations
of theft, misappropriation of client funds, and commingling;
Mitrano plainly had notice of these charges. See Mitrano, 952
A.2d at 906.
Second, although Mitrano disputes the factual findings of
the Committee, the evidence clearly supports them. Mitrano
devotes much of his brief to his assertion that he had a good
faith claim to the $241,336.59 as a reasonable legal fee. It is
not our place to re-adjudicate such factual matters. The
Committee directly addressed Mitrano’s contention and found that
Mitrano “knew that the amount of the check greatly exceeded the
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fees to which [he was] entitled.” Id. at 923. The evidence
supports this finding; indeed, a contemporaneous letter by
Mitrano expressed his belief that his client owed him only
$15,247.50 in legal fees.
Finally, Mitrano does not allege any “grave” reason why we
should not honor the District of Columbia’s considered decision
to disbar Mitrano from practice.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we defer to the sanction imposed
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and disbar Mitrano
from practice before this court. For the same reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the district court, which disbarred
Mitrano from practice before it.
No. 07-9525 DISBARMENT ORDERED
No. 08-2030 AFFIRMED
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