United States v. Hall

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4231
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
EDWARD HALL,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:08-cr-00406-AW-1)
Submitted: August 12, 2009 Decided: September 18, 2009
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hughie D. Hunt, II, KEMET & HUNT, PLLC, College Park, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following his arrest by Metro Transit police on a
warrant issued by the United States Park Police, Edward Hall was
transferred into Park Police custody. Park Police Officer Gary
Hatch was charged with verifying Hall’s identity, and to that
end, Hatch asked Hall various questions regarding his identity,
which Hall refused to answer. Ultimately, Hall was charged with
violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) (2008) for intentionally
interfering with Hatch’s duties. Hall proceeded to trial before
a magistrate judge and was found guilty and sentenced to two
months’ imprisonment. The district court affirmed the
conviction and sentence, and Hall timely noted an appeal.
On appeal, Hall argues that his actions did not rise
to the level of “intentionally interfering” with Hatch’s duties.
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following a
conviction, this court views the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the Government.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705
(4th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
863 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted)). This court
“can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye,
454 F.3d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Rather, a verdict will be sustained if “any rational trier of
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fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Lomax, 293 F.3d at 705 (quoting United
States v. Meyers, 280 F.3d 407, 415 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotations omitted)). “Thus, the appellate function is not to
determine whether the reviewing court is convinced of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but, viewing the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Government, whether the evidence adduced at
trial could support any rational determination of guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863 (quoting United
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984) (internal quotations
omitted)).
According to 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1), it is unlawful to
“threaten[], resist[], intimidat[e], or intentionally
interfer[e] with a government employee or agent engaged in an
official duty.” 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1). A defendant interferes
with a government agent if the defendant opposes, intervenes,
hinders or prevents the agent from carrying out his or her
official duties. United States v. Bucher, 375 F.3d 929, 932
(9th Cir. 2004).
Here, the evidence established that Hall interfered
with Hatch in the performance of his duties. Hatch testified
that it was his responsibility to take routine booking
information from arrested persons so as to confirm their
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identity. That responsibility was particularly important
because Hall insisted that there were no open warrants for his
arrest. Additionally, Hall had no Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to answer Hatch’s questions as they were asked for the
purpose of obtaining or verifying routine booking information.
See United States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608 (4th Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, Hall
argues that his use of profanity in response to Hatch’s
questions was protected by the First Amendment, and therefore,
the district court erred in basing his conviction on his profane
responses. The district court did not convict Hall based on his
use of profanity but merely determined that the profanity
confirmed Hall’s intent to interfere.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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