United States v. Charles Ashe, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4498
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES ANTHONY ASHE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:11-cr-00659-DKC-1)
Submitted: March 28, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Timothy J. Sullivan, BRENNAN SULLIVAN & MCKENNA LLP, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Sandra Wilkinson, Assistant United
States Attorney, Paul Nitze, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Charles Anthony Ashe, Jr., appeals his conviction
following his conditional guilty plea, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to possession with intent to distribute
controlled dangerous substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006). On appeal, Ashe’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the drugs found during a warrantless search of his
vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm.
In considering the district court’s denial of the
motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal
determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear
error. United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 553 (4th Cir.
2007). “Since the district court denied the defendant’s motion
below, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the [G]overnment.” See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328,
337 (4th Cir. 2008).
“[W]e treat a traffic stop, whether based on probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, under the standard set forth in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 . . . (1968).” United States v.
Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). The Terry
analysis involves first determining “whether the police
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officer’s action was justified at its inception.” Id. We
conclude that the officers’ stop of Ashe was justified by their
observance of him driving a vehicle without wearing a seatbelt.
The second prong of Terry requires “analyz[ing]
whether the police officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.”
Id. We conclude that the district court did not err in finding
that the police officer’s observance of marijuana residue on the
floorboard of the vehicle was reasonable. Under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
once the police officer observed the marijuana residue, the
officers had probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained contraband and could search the vehicle without a
warrant. See United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th
Cir. 2010) (finding, post-Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009),
that “if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to
believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus
permits police to search the vehicle without more”) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). To the extent Ashe
challenges the officers’ credibility, “[w]e . . . defer to a
district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role
of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their
credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United
States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Thus, we conclude that the district
court did not err in denying Ashe’s motion to suppress the drugs
and other physical evidence recovered during the search.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Ashe, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Ashe requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Ashe.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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