Charles Smalley v. Shapiro & Burson, LLP

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1266
CHARLES SMALLEY; PAMELA BALL, On behalf of themselves and
as a class,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
SHAPIRO & BURSON, LLP; JOHN S. BURSON, Esq.; WILLIAM M.
SAVAGE, Esq.; JASON MURPHY, Esq.,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
KRISTINE D. BROWN, Esq.; ERIK W. YODER, Esq.; GREGORY N.
BRITTO, Esq.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-00906-JFM)
Argued: March 22, 2013 Decided: April 16, 2013
Before WILKINSON and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L.
KISER, Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Kiser
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Davis
joined.
ARGUED: Ian Stumpf, JR HOWELL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellants. Robert A. Scott, BALLARD SPAHR, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland; William Joseph Carter, CARR MALONEY, PC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Glenn A. Cline, BALLARD SPAHR,
LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Bizhan Beiramee, BIZHAN BEIRAMEE,
ESQ., P.C., McLean, Virginia, for Appellees Shapiro & Burson,
LLP, John S. Burson, Esq., and William M. Savage, Esq.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
KISER, Senior District Judge:
Appellants ask us to hold that their federal causes of
action are not barred under Maryland claim preclusion law
because the claims could not have been asserted in the state
foreclosure proceedings. Because we decide that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we do not need to resolve that
question. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment
and remand the case with instructions to dismiss Appellants’
actions without prejudice.
I.
Charles Smalley and Pamela Ball (collectively
“Appellants”), are African-American residents of Maryland.
Appellee Shapiro & Burson, LLP, is a Maryland law firm. In
2009, Appellee foreclosed on Appellants’ homes on behalf of
Appellants’ mortgage lenders.
Appellee Shapiro & Burson conducts a large number of
foreclosures in Maryland and other jurisdictions. Appellees
John Burson, William Savage, and Jason Murphy were all attorneys
for Appellee Shapiro & Burson. 1 Burson, Savage, and Murphy were
1
“Appellees” refers to Shapiro & Burson, LLP, John Burson,
William Savage, and Jason Murphy collectively, all of whom were
parties to the action in the district court.
3
all appointed as substitute trustees for the purpose of
conducting the foreclosures at issue. (J.A. 150.)
Pamela Ball
The foreclosure proceeding against Appellant Pamela Ball
was instituted in November of 2007. Appellant Ball “never
sought an injunction to stop the sale, nor did she file any
exceptions to the sale, as she could have done pursuant to Md.
Rule 14-305[,] to challenge the conduct of the foreclosure
auction.” (Br. for Appellees pg. 5.) When Shapiro & Burson
employees (not the substitute trustees) filed the Order to
Docket Foreclosure against Appellant Ball, the signing affiant
swore that Appellees were the note holders and that they had the
right to foreclose on the property. Additionally, the affiant
swore that a copy of the note was attached to the Order to
Docket and that the note was a true and accurate copy of the
original. Appellants maintain that none of those statements
were true. (See J.A. 152.) Appellants allege that Appellees
were never in possession of the note. (Id.)
The same month that the Order to Docket was filed,
Appellees sold Appellant Ball’s property, allegedly without ever
seeing or possessing the promissory note as represented. (Id.)
In December of 2007, Appellees sent Appellant Ball an eviction
notice, ordering her to vacate her property within three days;
she complied. (Id.) Several months after insisting Appellant
4
Ball vacate the property, Appellees informed the state court
that the Order to Docket was defective, and they filed a “Motion
to Accept Lost Note Affidavit” at that time. (See id.)
Appellant Ball did not oppose the motion. (See J.A. 235-41.)
Despite the defective Order and original affidavit, the state
court ratified the foreclosure. (J.A. 152.)
On December 23, 2008, over a year after Appellees sold
Appellant Ball’s home, the state court auditor filed the
auditor’s report pursuant to Md. Rule 14-305. (J.A. 236, 245-
46.) The report set forth, among other things, the distribution
of the proceeds from the sale, including the fees charged by
Appellee Shapiro & Burson. (J.A. 245-46.) Appellant Ball filed
an exception to this report by way of a “Motion for Exception to
the Audit.” (J.A. 247-48.) On January 12, 2009, the state
court issued a final order of ratification of the audit and
closed the case. (J.A. 249.)
Appellant Ball subsequently appealed the order of the state
court ratifying the auditor’s report. (See J.A. 251.) The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that Appellant Ball’s
appeal was procedurally premature because her January 21, 2009,
Motion to Nullify the Judgment operated as a motion to alter or
amend that judgment and, because that motion had not been ruled
upon, the appeal was premature. (See J.A. 255.) The Court of
Special Appeals additionally held, however, that the principles
5
of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Appellant Ball’s
allegations of wrongdoing related to the report of sale because
that judgment became final when the appellate court issued its
mandate dismissing the appeal. (Id.)
On remand, following a March 4, 2011, hearing on
Appellant’s Ball’s outstanding motions, the state court denied
the audit motion and ratified the audit. (See J.A. 258.) No
appeal was filed. (J.A. 234-41.) Appellant Ball did file a
“Motion for Emergency Hearing,” claiming that the state court
should not have ratified the audit because it never ruled on
several motions. She sought to re-open the case and filed an
“Amendment to the Open Motion Dated January 21, 2009.” (J.A.
259-62.) In that motion, Appellant Ball re-asserted allegations
related to the Lost Note Affidavit. (See id.) Following a
hearing, the state court denied the motion. (See J.A. 240.)
Appellant Ball appealed, but the state court was affirmed. (See
Br. of Appellee Addendum 1.)
Charles Smalley
On May 21, 2009, Appellees filed an Order to Docket
Foreclosure against Appellant Charles Smalley. (J.A. 159.)
Appellee Jason Murphy allegedly signed the Order, but Shapiro &
Burson employees had prepared the affidavit. The Order included
an affidavit that asserted that the substitute trustee had
verified that the party ordering the foreclosure was “the owner
6
of the Note that is the subject of this foreclosure action and
that the copy of the Note filed in this foreclosure case is a
true and accurate copy of said Note.” (J.A. 159-60.) Although
the affidavit certified that Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc.,
(“Barclays”) was the noteholder, the Note itself indicated on
its face that it was payable to Fremont Investment & Loan.
(J.A. 160.) Appellees did not produce any record of a transfer
of ownership of the mortgage prior to the filing of the Order to
Docket Foreclosure. (See id.) Appellant Smalley alleges that
Appellees did not take any steps to confirm that Barclays was
actually the noteholder. (See id.)
The substitute trustees ultimately sold Appellant Smalley’s
property at a foreclosure sale in April 2010. (Id.) Prior to
the sale, Appellant Smalley did not seek an injunction to stop
the sale, nor did he move to dismiss the foreclosure action
pursuant to the applicable state rules. (See J.A. 263-64.) The
state court ratified the sale on October 21, 2010. Just as in
Appellant Ball’s case, Appellees received a commission on the
sale. In addition, the legal fees Appellees charged were passed
on to Appellants from their respective foreclosures.
On June 25, 2010, Appellant Smalley filed a “Memorandum of
Law—Bank Fraud,” in which he challenged the foreclosure. (See
J.A. 264.) The substitute trustees filed a Motion to Strike,
arguing that the time for filing exceptions has lapsed. (See
7
id.) The state court granted the Motion to Strike on October
20, 2010. (Id.) The next day, the state court ratified the
foreclosure sale. (See J.A. 264-65.) On January 14, 2011, the
state court ratified the audit, which included the distribution
from the sale, as well as all fees charged by Appellee Shapiro &
Burson. (See J.A. 269-70.) Appellant Smalley never appealed
the ratification of the sale or the ratification of the
auditor’s report. (See J.A. 263-66.)
On January 24, 2011, Appellant Smalley filed a 15-count
declaratory judgment complaint in the state court against his
mortgage lender, Barclays, and the purchaser, 50 by 50 REO, LLC.
(See J.A. 271-89.) In that lawsuit, Appellant Smalley alleged,
among other things, that Barclays was not the holder of
Appellant Smalley’s promissory note and that the Smalley
foreclosure action was brought by entities that had no interest
in the Smalley property, the note, or the mortgage. (See J.A.
274.) Appellant Smalley further alleged that Barclay’s
representation of an ownership interest as a basis for
instituting the foreclosure, the foreclosure action itself, and
“all of the representations and activities undertaken to
commence, execute, and finalize the sale” constituted unfair and
deceptive trade practices under the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act. (See J.A. 276-77.) The state court dismissed the action
8
on res judicata grounds, and the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals affirmed. (See J.A. 268; Appellee’s Rule 28(j) filing.)
In March of 2011, state prosecutors launched an
investigation into the alleged “robo-signing” practices of
Appellee Shapiro & Burson. (J.A. 156.) In cooperation with the
criminal investigation, José Portillo, a paralegal who worked at
Shapiro & Burson from April 2008 until February 2011, came
forward with details regarding practices Appellees allegedly
directed him to undertake. (See J.A. 44-47, 153.) Portillo
detailed how he and other paralegals were directed to prepare
deeds and affidavits for Appellee William Savage to sign. A
different attorney who did not work for Shapiro & Burson,
however, routinely signed Appellee Savage’s names to trustee’s
deeds that “transferr[ed] the foreclosed property back to the
lender who purchased the property at auction.” (J.A. 44.) In
an affidavit, Portillo included several deeds that were
purportedly signed by Appellee Savage but were not, in fact,
signed by him, as well as several deeds which actually were
signed by Appellee Savage. (See J.A. 45, 48-102.) Notaries,
such as Portillo, were then instructed to notarize the deeds.
None of the allegedly fraudulent documents included with the
Portillo affidavit, however, concerned any Appellant’s
foreclosure.
9
On April 7, 2011, shortly after Appellees’ “robo-signing”
practices came to light, Appellants sought to bring a class
action in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland. (See J.A. 147-182.) In the federal complaint,
Appellants contended that the fees imposed were “excessive,
unreasonable, and inappropriate in light of the lack of due
diligence and the pattern of unlawful, fraudulent conduct
[Appellees] undertook in reporting that those fees were actually
earned.” (J.A. 157.) Although they did not claim any aspect of
the affidavits submitted to the state court were “false,” they
alleged that Appellants’ lack of diligence in confirming the
facts to which they attested was “unfair and unconscionable” and
that the signatures on the affidavits were the result of
“rampant forgery.” (J.A. 173-74.) They contended that the
imposition of excessive and unearned fees, as well as the
submission of false affidavits to the state court, violated
their federal rights. (See, e.g., J.A. 167.) Appellants
asserted claims for fraud, violations of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act, and violations of the federal RICO statute, Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Housing Act, and Civil
Rights Act. (See J.A. 166-180.) Appellees filed a motion to
dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6), arguing that Appellants’ claims were barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion. The District Court granted the
10
motion and dismissed the action. Appellants then instituted
this appeal.
II.
The dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is reviewed under the de novo standard
of review. See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993). In its review, the Court “construes the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant,”
E.E.O.C. v. Seafarers Int’l Union, 394 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir.
2005), and “should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations
and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff,” Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134. Additionally, although
Appellants bring this action on behalf of a purported class, “if
none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class
establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the
defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any
other member of the class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493-95 (1974).
Although the district court dismissed this action on claim
preclusion grounds, Appellees have raised a jurisdictional issue
that we are required to address before reaching the merits. See
Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir.
1999). Appellees argue that this case is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which precludes a federal court from deciding
11
what is, in essence, an appeal of a state court judgment. See
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994).
III.
This Court has consistently treated the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine as jurisdictional, and “[b]ecause the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is jurisdictional, we are obliged to address it before
proceeding further in our analysis.” Friedman’s, Inc. v.
Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Am.
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir.
2003); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 198-99
(4th Cir. 2000); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d
192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a
“party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court.” Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06.
This is so because Congress has vested the power to entertain an
appeal of a state court judgment only with the Supreme Court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198-99.
“A litigant may not circumvent these jurisdictional mandates by
instituting a federal action which, although not styled as an
appeal, ‘amounts to nothing more than an attempt to seek review
of [the state court’s] decision by a lower federal court.’”
Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 316 (quoting Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d
728, 733 (4th Cir. 1997)). “The controlling question in the
12
Rooker-Feldman analysis is whether a party seeks the federal
district court to review a state court decision and pass upon
the merits of that state court decision, not whether the state
court judgment is presently subject to reversal or modification.
Put another way, if ‘in order to grant the federal plaintiff the
relief sought, the federal court must determine that the [state]
court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that
would render the judgment ineffectual,’ Rooker-Feldman is
implicated.” Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 202 (quoting Ernst v. Child &
Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997)). The doctrine
applies not only to matters directly addressed by the state
court, but also to “claims which are ‘inextricably intertwined’
with state court decisions.” Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at
198 (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983)).
Although Appellants do not seek to “undo” the state court
judgment foreclosing on their homes, permitting their case to go
forward would, in essence, hold that the state court judgments
which affirmed the legal fees and commissions and held the
allegedly false affidavits sufficient to warrant foreclosure was
in error. This is not proper under Rooker-Feldman because their
federal causes of action are “inextricably intertwined” with the
state court foreclosure actions. This prong of the doctrine
“bars a claim that was not actually decided by the state court
13
but where ‘success on the federal claim depends upon a
determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues
before it.’” Brown & Root, Inc., 211 F.3d at 198 (quoting
Plyler, 129 F.3d at 731). If Appellants are not seeking a
review of the state court’s judgment, their success on the
merits would necessitate a finding that the state court “wrongly
decided the issues before it.” Id. Accord Harper v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 138 F. App’x 130, 133 (11th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished) (“Harper’s claims under the . . . FDCPA [Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act] . . . were inextricably intertwined
with the foreclosure proceeding in state court . . . .”). Here,
the alleged source of Appellants’ harm is shielded by state
court judgments that necessarily rested on a decision about
which Appellants now complain; therefore, Appellants are limited
to whatever relief they are afforded in the state court system.
Other courts have relied on Rooker-Feldman to bar the same
or similar causes of action Appellants asserted below. See
Harper, 138 F. App’x at 132-33 (dismissing Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act claims); Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766 F. Supp.
2d 1305, 1316 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (dismissing a RICO claim under
Rooker-Feldman); Distant v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 09-
61460-CIV, 2010 WL 1249129, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010)
(unpublished)(“Although plead as conspiracy claims . . . ,
Plaintiff is clearly asking this Court to invalidate the state
14
court action by ruling that the state court foreclosure judgment
is somehow void. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, . . . this
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, as Plaintiff seeks a de
facto appeal of a previously litigated state court matter.”);
Simpson v. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank of Carmel, 20 F. Supp. 2d
630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a foreclosure judgment
was not subject to federal review under Rooker-Feldman, and
noting that “the fact that plaintiff alleges that the . . .
foreclosure judgment was procured by fraud and conspiracy [does
not] change that result.”); Smith v. Wayne Weinberger, P.C., 994
F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting a plaintiff’s
“thinly-veiled effort to invalidate the State Court’s
foreclosure judgment, in contravention of Rooker-Feldman,” by
alleging fraud).
Moreover, Appellants admit that the state court decision is
the source of their harm. In their brief, Appellants state: “In
the present case, Plaintiffs’ causes of action under the FDCPA
[Fair Debt Collection Practices Act], MCPA [Maryland Consumer
Protection Act], FHA [Fair Housing Act], and CRA [Civil Rights
Act] did not accrue until the foreclosure actions were
completed.” (Br. for Appellants pg. 15.) If Appellants allege
they did not possess a cognizable legal injury until the state
court entered its judgment, it follows that they allege that the
state court judgment was the source of their harm, as no
15
relevant conduct occurred after the judgments were entered.
Thus, because Appellants allege that the state court’s judgment
caused their injury, 2 their actions are clearly barred under
Rooker-Feldman. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1005-06 (“[A] party
losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance
would be an appellate review of the state judgment in a United
States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that
the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”
(emphasis added)).
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., the
Supreme Court sought to refocus lower courts that had extended
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “far beyond the contours of the
Rooker and Feldman cases . . . .” 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).
The Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to
cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:
2
We recognize that Appellants are placed in a precarious
position. They argue their claims did not exist until the state
court action was finalized, which they contend precludes a
finding that their claims could have been raised in the state
court proceedings. See Anyanwutaku v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc.,
85 F. Supp. 2d 566, 570 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that the doctrine
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies to “relitigation
of matters previously litigated between the parties and their
privies, as well as those claims that could have been asserted
and litigated in the original suits.”). In an effort to avoid a
ruling that their claims were precluded by res judicata because
they did not exist at the time of the state foreclosure action,
however, they have essentially admitted that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars their actions.
16
cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284. That is exactly
what Appellants seek here. Their primary complaints are: the
imposition of attorneys’ fees; the award of a commission; and
the allegedly fraudulent, but not false, affidavits. By
affirming the foreclosures, the Maryland state court necessarily
passed judgment on the amount of the attorneys’ fees and
commissions and the content of the affidavits. Permitting this
action to proceed would necessarily invite the District Court to
“review and reject[] those judgments.” Id. Because Rooker-
Feldman prohibits this, the District Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.
At oral argument, Appellants pointed us to two Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals cases which they maintain establish
that their actions are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. We are not
swayed by the facts or conclusions of Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg
& Reis Co., LPA, 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006), or Brown v. First
Nationwide Mortgage Corporation, 206 F. App’x 436, 437 (6th Cir.
2006) (unpublished).
We are, however, persuaded by the logic espoused by the
Southern District of Florida in Figueroa v. Merscorp, Inc., 766
F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fl. 2011), a post-Exxon Mobil decision
17
addressing a foreclosed party’s attempt to hold their lender
accountable under the federal RICO statute. Like Appellants
here, Figueroa filed a purported class action months after the
defendants foreclosed on his home. Id. at 1310. The defendants
moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),
arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under
Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 1315. After a lengthy discussion of the
doctrine and Exxon Mobil, see id. at 1315-20, the district court
concluded that the plaintiff’s action was barred because it was
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court foreclosure
judgment. Id. at 1321-22. The district court held that the
suit was barred “because Plaintiff’s claims can only succeed if
the Court implicitly or explicitly determines the Florida state
court wrongly decided the foreclosure issue. . . . The only way
Plaintiff (and putative class members) could have been ‘damaged’
by the loss . . . of their homes is if those foreclosures were
wrongful. In fact, Figueroa concedes as much in his Opposition,
acknowledging he suffered no damages until the Florida state
court entered foreclosure judgment.” Id. at 1323-24. The same
is true here; Appellants explicitly argue that they were not
damaged until the state court entered its foreclosure judgments
and the Orders adopting the auditors’ reports. Moreover, like
Appellants, “Figeuroa’s federal claims can only succeed to the
extent the [state] court erred, and the Court cannot grant
18
Figueroa his requested relief without disturbing the [state]
foreclosure judgment. It is for the state appeals court and the
U.S. Supreme Court to tell the state court it was wrong. This
Court has no such role.” Id. at 1324.
Examining Appellants’ contentions, it is clear that the
injuries they complain of, regardless of when they accrued, stem
from the state court judgments. The “unfair” but truthful
affidavits only have relevance or effect once adopted by the
state court; the fees and commissions were only imposed on
Appellants when the state court adopted the auditors’ reports
that accepted them. “The injur[ies] alleged by [Appellants] in
all of these allegations [are] a direct result of the judicial
order and fail[] to assert an ‘independent claim’ that would
bring the case outside the ambit of Rooker-Feldman.” Reguli v.
Guffee, 371 F. App’x 590, 596 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)
(citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293).
Because we conclude that the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction, we are compelled to conclude that
the judgment of the district court must be vacated. The court
below held Appellants’ actions were barred by res judicata.
Such a decision amounts to a dismissal on the merits. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69, 80 (4th
Cir. 1967). The district court did not have jurisdiction to
enter a judgment on the merits, so the matter must be vacated
19
and remanded to the district court with instructions that it be
dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction. Accord
Durbin v. Dubuque, 348 F. App’x 294, 295 (9th Cir. 2009)
(unpublished); Beth-El All Nations Church v. City of Chicago,
486 F.3d 286, 294 (7th Cir. 2007).
IV.
Appellants seek to re-litigate matters that are
“inextricably intertwined” with judgments entered by the state
court in the foreclosure actions. Such actions are barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For this reason, the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’
actions, and thus lacked the authority to reach the merits of
the case and dismiss the action with prejudice. We therefore
vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case
with instructions that it be dismissed without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
20