United States v. Stefon Robinson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4829
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEFON DONTA ROBINSON, a/k/a Twin,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:11-cr-00007-FL-1)
Submitted: April 19, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013
Before KING, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lynne Louise Reid, L.L. REID LAW, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stefon Donta Robinson appeals the ninety-month
sentence imposed by the district court following this court’s
remand for resentencing in light of Dorsey v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012). On appeal, Robinson contends that the
district court violated Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382(2011), by considering his need for drug treatment in imposing
his sentence and that the court’s error violated his substantial
rights. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In reviewing a sentence, we must ensure that the
district court did not commit any “significant procedural
error,” such as failing to consider the sentencing factors of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). “[A] court’s consideration of an improper § 3553(a)
factor is likewise erroneous.” United States v. Bennett, 698
F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506(2013).
“[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting . . . rehabilitation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006);
see Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388-91. The district court “may not
impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to
complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote
rehabilitation.” Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2393. However, “[a]
court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for
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rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific
treatment or training programs.” Id. at 2392.
We review for plain error Robinson’s contention that
the district court improperly based his sentence on an
impermissible factor. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
577 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review). To
demonstrate plain error, Robinson must show that: (1) there was
an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected
his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732 (1993). In the sentencing context, an error affects
substantial rights if the defendant demonstrates “that he would
have received a lower sentence had the error not occurred.”
United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010); see
United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (stating that plain error affects substantial rights if
defendant was subjected to sentence “longer than that to which
he would otherwise [have been] subject”).
Upon review, we conclude that, while the district
court erred in noting Robinson’s need for drug treatment in
imposing the upward variance, Robinson failed to demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a
lesser sentence had it not considered that factor. See United
States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2011) (requiring
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defendant to demonstrate “reasonable probability” that error
affected outcome of proceeding).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s amended
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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