United States v. Areena Myers

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4909
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AREENA MYERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia,
at Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:16-cr-00068-1)
Submitted: August 20, 2019 Decided: August 22, 2019
Before FLOYD and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Timothy J. LaFon, CICCARELLO, DEL GIUDICE & LAFON, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Philip Henry Wright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Areena Myers pleaded guilty in 2016 to one count of aiding and abetting the
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2012), and was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised
release. In March 2017, after Myers admitted to five violations of her supervised release
conditions, the district court revoked her supervision and sentenced her to eight months in
prison followed by three years of supervised release.
Myers subsequently again admitted to violating the conditions of her supervised
release and the district court revoked her supervision and sentenced her to 16 months in
prison. Myers appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal,
but questioning whether Myers’ sentence is unreasonable because it exceeded the policy
statement range. Myers was advised of her right to file a pro se supplemental brief but
has not done so. We affirm.
Counsel questions whether the district court imposed an unreasonably long
sentence, citing Myers’ drug dependency, her treating physician’s opinion that
incarceration would worsen Myers’ post-traumatic stress disorder, and the fact that the
policy statement range already reflected Myers’ failure to follow conditions of her
supervised release. We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release
deferentially and will affirm the revocation sentence if it is within the statutory range and
not plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 206-07 (4th Cir.
2017). In this case, the district court’s revocation sentence was within the statutory range
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and not unreasonable. The district court considered Myers’ arguments for a shorter
sentence and noted that its 16-month sentence was above the policy statement range but
adequately explained its decision, citing Myers’ repeated violations of the court’s trust
and observing that its previous, less-severe punishments had not deterred Myers from
violating her release conditions. See Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207-08 & n.1.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court. This court requires that counsel inform Myers, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Myers requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Myers.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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