Carolyn Austin v. Investors Title Insurance

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1032
CAROLYN SONGER AUSTIN, f/k/a Carolyn Bair,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
INVESTORS TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Richard M. Gergel, District Judge.
(9:09-cv-01702-RMG)
Submitted: October 19, 2011 Decided: November 8, 2011
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert E. Austin, Jr., ROBERT E. AUSTIN, JR. LAW OFFICES,
Leesburg, Florida, for Appellant. Robert P. Wood, ROGERS
TOWNSEND & THOMAS, PC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carolyn Songer Austin appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to Investors Title Insurance
Company (“Investors”) in Austin’s civil action seeking damages
from Investors based on its failure to defend her title in an
action in South Carolina state court (“the state court
litigation”). Austin argues on appeal that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment to Investors. We affirm.
Investors argued below that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel should apply based on the district court’s prior
determination in Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Bair,
No. 9:05-cv-01434-PMD (D.S.C. Apr. 26, 2007) (“the Bair
action”), aff’d, 296 F. App’x 332 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1688),
that Austin had created a risk to her title such that Investors
was not obligated to defend her in the state court litigation.
Review of a district court’s decision on collateral estoppel
presents a legal issue we review de novo. Tuttle v. Arlington
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 703 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Further, federal law controls our assessment of the preclusive
effect of the earlier federal judgment in the Bair action.
Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1990).
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs
and conclude that the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Investors. The dispositive issue in the Bair action
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was whether Investors had a duty to defend Austin’s title in the
state court litigation. The district court determined in the
Bair action that Investors had no such duty because Austin knew
of risks to her title that did not appear in the public records
and of which Investors was understandably ignorant. Because the
issue on which Investors sought preclusion in the subject action
was conclusively determined in the Bair action, the district
court’s invocation of collateral estoppel was not error.
Austin also asserts that summary judgment was not
properly granted in Investors’ favor because the district court
“weighed evidence in contravention of this court’s admonitions.”
However, Austin fails to support this claim in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he [appellant’s] argument
. . . must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons
for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the
record on which the appellant relies.”). Accordingly, we deem
this claim waived. Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562
F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009).
Finally, Austin presents several arguments challenging
the correctness of the district court’s judgment in the Bair
action. These arguments are barred by principles of res
judicata because Austin could have but failed to raise them in
her appeal of the Bair action. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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