Strong v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1502
MARTHA S. STRONG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (0:09-cv-02101-RMG)
Submitted: December 28, 2011 Decided: January 19, 2012
Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Daniel Mayes, SMITH, MASSEY, BRODIE, GUYNN & MAYES, P.A.,
Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, Barbara M. Bowens, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina; Michael A. Thomas,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, John Jay Lee, Regional
Chief Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Martha S. Strong filed for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. The Social Security
Administration denied her claim, finding that Strong was not
disabled because she could perform past relevant work. Strong
appealed to the district court, and the district court remanded
the case after concluding that the Commissioner’s decision was
not supported by substantial evidence. The district court
denied Strong’s motion for fees and costs pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006), * and
Strong now appeals the denial of EAJA fees. We affirm.
We review the district court’s decision to deny
Strong’s request for EAJA fees for an abuse of discretion.
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559 (1988); Priestly v.
Astrue, 651 F.3d 410, 415 (4th Cir. 2011). Under the EAJA,
parties prevailing against the United States are entitled to
attorney’s fees “unless the [district] court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified.” 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Government bears “the burden of
proving that its litigation position was substantially
justified.” Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658
*
Subsequent amendments to the EAJA do not affect our
analysis in this case. See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No.
111-350, § 5(g)(9), 124 Stat. 3677, 3848.
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(4th Cir. 1991). The Government’s position is substantially
justified so long as “a reasonable person could think it
correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.”
Underwood, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2. In determining whether the
Government’s position was substantially justified, this court
“consider[s] the totality of the circumstances.” Hyatt v.
Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Strong argues that the Commissioner’s position below
was not substantially justified because the administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) failed in his responsibility to consider and weigh
all relevant evidence. Strong relies on a legislative report
stating that “[a]gency action found to be arbitrary or
capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence is virtually
certain not to have been substantially justified under the
[EAJA]” and that “[o]nly the most extraordinary special
circumstances could permit such an action to be found
substantially justified under the [EAJA].” H.R. Rep. No. 99-
120, pt. 1, at 9-10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
138.
We have rejected the argument that a claimant is
entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA simply because an
ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
Pullen v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
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reversal of an agency [decision] for lack of substantial
evidence does not raise a presumption that the agency was not
substantially justified.”), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in Lively v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 177, 180
(4th Cir. 1988); see also Underwood, 487 U.S. at 566-67(declining to follow other language of H.R. Rep. No. 99-120).
Here, the Commissioner’s position rested on an “arguably
defensible administrative record.” Crawford, 935 F.2d at 658
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although the ALJ failed to
adequately analyze the medical opinions of Dr. Sam Stone and Dr.
Tolulola Adeola, the medical record did contain meaningful
inconsistencies, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the Commissioner’s position was
substantially justified.
Next, Strong argues that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to provide a specific explanation for its
decision to deny her motion for attorney’s fees. We have
remanded EAJA fee cases to the district court on the ground “we
cannot properly review the district court’s decision without an
explanation of how it reached that decision.” Mann v. Astrue,
258 F. App’x 506, 508 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-1040); Morgan v.
Barnhart, 227 F. App’x 235, 237 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1283)
(same). In Cody v. Caterisano, 631 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 2011), we
distinguished Morgan and Mann, concluding that the district
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court’s explanation that reasonable arguments existed on both
sides of outcome determinative issues reflected adequate
consideration of whether the Government’s position would be
acceptable to a reasonable person. Id. at 145. We explained
that we could adequately review the district court’s decision,
despite an “overly concise explanation,” because “the record
contains not only the parties’ motions and supporting briefs but
also a transcript of a hearing where the district court inquired
extensively into both parties’ arguments.” Id. We also
observed that a remand would not yield any different result or
new information. Id.The record on appeal permits us to adequately review
the district court’s exercise of discretion in this case. A
district court is not required “to perform a certain kind of
analysis, recite certain magic words, or follow a particular
formula when denying motions for EAJA fees.” Id. The district
court need only consider whether the Government’s position had a
“reasonable basis in law and fact.” Underwood, 487 U.S. at 566
n.2. A principled review of the district court’s decision
requires an assessment of “the available ‘objective indicia’ of
the strength of the Government’s position” and an “independent
assessment of the merits of the Government’s position.” United
States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1166 (4th Cir. 1992).
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The record here includes the administrative
proceedings, the parties’ arguments below, and the district
court’s assessment that “[t]he position by the Government was
not without reason and was well-briefed and argued.” We are
able to “discern from the record what the district court meant.”
Cody, 631 F.3d at 145. The Commissioner relied on an arguably
defensible administrative record, and it is unclear how a remand
would yield additional information or a different outcome.
Finally, Strong argues that this court is unable to
evaluate whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying EAJA fees because, in light of the remand to the ALJ,
the court declined to rule on all the issues she raised. We
disagree. Evaluating whether the Government’s position was
substantially justified is not “an issue-by-issue analysis” but
an examination of “the totality of circumstances.” Roanoke
River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
adjudicate issues not adequately developed in the administrative
record. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (“A
request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major
litigation.”) (cited in Cody, 631 F.3d at 145); Hardisty v.
Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Nothing in [the
EAJA] extends fee-shifting to issues not adjudicated.”), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2443 (2011).
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
denial of fees and expenses under the EAJA. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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