United States v. Ketae Robbins

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4478
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KETAE JEMEL ROBBINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00339-CCE-2)
Submitted: December 17, 2012 Decided: January 3, 2013
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Milton Bays Shoaf, Jr., ADDISON & SHOAF, Salisbury, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ketae Jemel Robbins appeals his conviction and
sentence at the low end of his Guidelines range after pleading
guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine
hydrochloride. Robbins’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in his
opinion, that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
raising the issue of whether the district court “erred by
sentencing defendant to 188 months based upon all the
circumstances of the case, including his motion for a [four]
point reduction in sentencing level and departure, and whether
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 would operate to reduce his
sentence.” Robbins has filed a pro se supplemental brief
raising the issues of whether the district court erred or abused
its discretion in sentencing him as a career offender, and
whether his counsel was ineffective at sentencing. We affirm.
We review a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires us to ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or
failing to adequately explain the sentence. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is
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procedurally reasonable, we then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed, taking into account the
totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We
presume that a sentence within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In sentencing, the district court should first
calculate the Guidelines range and give the parties an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem
appropriate. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court should then consider
the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the
sentence requested by either party. Id. When rendering a
sentence, the district court must make and place on the record
an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of
the case. Carter, 564 F.3d at 328, 330.
In explaining the chosen sentence, the “sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
While a district court must consider the statutory factors and
explain its sentence, it need not discuss every factor on the
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record. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.
2006).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Robbins’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable,
and the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in
sentencing him. To the extent that he challenges the district
court’s denial of a downward departure, we lack authority to
review the denial. See United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367,
371 (4th Cir. 2008). Finally, because the record does not
conclusively show ineffective assistance of counsel, this issue
may not be raised on direct appeal. See United States v.
Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216-17 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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