Estelle Singletary v. Department of Health and Human Services

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2002
ESTELLE SINGLETARY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES/NC INFANT TODDLER
PROGRAM,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
DEBORAH CARROLL, Branch Head; PHILLIP R. DIXON, Hearing
Officer,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cv-00307-BO)
Submitted: December 6, 2012 Decided: January 3, 2013
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Estelle Singletary, Appellant Pro Se. Mabel Y. Bullock, Donna
Drake Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Estelle Singletary appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her civil complaint alleging violations of Part C
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. §§ 1431-1444 (2006). The district court dismissed
Singletary’s action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that
she failed to state a claim because she did not allege that her
daughter was denied a free appropriate public education under
the IDEA, and thus could not obtain relief on her claims that
the Defendants violated the IDEA’s procedural requirements.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Singletary first argues that the dismissal of her
complaint deprived her of an opportunity to be heard on her IDEA
claims. However, she received such an opportunity through the
adjudication of her complaint filed under 20 U.S.C. § 1439(2006). To the extent she contends that the traditional
pleading requirements and Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply
to her IDEA claims, Singletary misapprehends the procedural
posture of her case. See Kirkpatrick v. Lenoir Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 216 F.3d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that an IDEA
action under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) is not an appeal but an
“original civil action” to which the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure apply).
3
Liberally construed, Singletary’s brief also
challenges the dismissal of her claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
This court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal of a
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery
Cnty., Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). A pro se
complainant’s pleadings must be liberally construed. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare legal
conclusions, unwarranted inferences, and unjustified conclusions
are insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 664.
Part B of the IDEA ensures a free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) for children with disabilities aged three
through twenty-one, provided through an individualized education
program (“IEP”) focused on the child’s educational needs. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(d)(9)(B), 1412(a)(1)(A), 1414(d) (2006); JH ex
rel. JD v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 395 F.3d 185, 187 (4th Cir.
2005). In contrast, Part C ensures that states provide free and
appropriate “early intervention services” to children with
disabilities under the age of three through the implementation
of an “individualized family service plan” (“IFSP”). 20 U.S.C.
4
§§ 1431(b), 1432(4). IFSPs may, as appropriate, provide such
services as occupational and physical therapy, medical
diagnostic and evaluative services, and social work, to be
provided in the child’s “natural environment” by “qualified
personnel.” See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431(b), 1432(4) (2006); DP v.
Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 483 F.3d 725, 726-27 (11th Cir.
2007). “While IFSPs may include an educational component, they
do not necessarily include such a component.” DP, 483 F.3d at
727.
Both Part B and Part C provide procedural safeguards
to protect the child’s rights under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1415, 1439. As the district court noted, this court has held
that, while a State’s failure to comply with the procedural
requirements in Part B may be sufficient to establish the denial
of a FAPE, a procedural violation will not support a cognizable
claim under Part B unless the parent can show the procedural
violation actually interfered with the child’s FAPE. Gadsby by
Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 956 (4th Cir. 1997); see DiBuo
ex rel. DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ. of Worcester Cnty., 309 F.3d 184,
190-91 (4th Cir. 2002). However, because the state is not
required to provide a FAPE under Part C of the IDEA, Singletary
could not be required to allege that her daughter was denied a
FAPE in order to properly allege a procedural violation under
Part C. See, e.g., Andrew M. v. Del. Cnty. Office of Mental
5
Health & Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337, 348, 350 (3d Cir.
2007).
Nevertheless, on the available record, we find no
basis to conclude that a principle analogous to that in Gadsby
should not be applied under Part C. Applying Gadsby to
Singletary’s amended complaint, we conclude that Singletary did
not allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate that her
daughter was denied appropriate early intervention services
under Part C. Thus, we conclude that the district court
properly dismissed Singletary’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Defendants Dixon and Carroll have not been made parties to
this appeal. In any event, because we conclude that
Singletary’s amended complaint failed to state a cognizable IDEA
claim against any Defendant, dismissal of Singletary’s claims
against Dixon and Carroll ultimately was proper.
6