United States v. Van Savage, II

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4705
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VAN WILLIAM SAVAGE, II,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00484-CCE-1)
Submitted: February 18, 2015 Decided: March 9, 2015
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Helen Parsonage, ELLIOT MORGAN PARSONAGE, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Van William Savage, II, pled guilty to possession of
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A),
(b)(1) (2012). The district court calculated Savage’s
Sentencing Guidelines range at 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment,
and Savage requested a below-Guidelines sentence of sixty-three
to seventy-eight months. The district court sentenced Savage to
132 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Savage argues that his
sentence is greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of
sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2012). Finding no
procedural or substantive unreasonableness, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error,” such
as improper calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient
consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or inadequate
explanation of the sentence imposed. Id. at 51. In assessing
Guidelines calculations, we review factual findings for clear
error, legal conclusions de novo, and unpreserved arguments for
plain error. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th
Cir. 2012).
If we find no procedural error, we examine the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence under “the totality of
2
the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy
the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume on
appeal that a sentence within or below the Guidelines range is
substantively reasonable, and this presumption may be rebutted
only if the appellant establishes “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
We conclude that Savage’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The district court correctly
calculated Savage’s Guidelines range and considered that range
and the parties’ arguments in determining the sentence.
Contrary to Savage’s contention, the district court did not rely
on a clearly erroneous fact in characterizing Savage’s repeated
conduct as “essentially a second offense.” Rather, the
transcript reflects that the district court was highlighting the
particular circumstances that distinguished Savage from other
offenders in order to explain the degree of downward variance it
selected.
Savage also claims error because the court did not
address or comment on the weight it gave to Savage’s past and
his rehabilitative efforts. We find this argument unpersuasive.
Here, the district court reasonably determined that a sentence
3
of 132 months, a nineteen-month downward variance from the
bottom of the Guidelines range, was appropriate based on the
court’s thorough, individualized assessment of the facts of
Savage’s case, the arguments made at the sentencing hearing, and
the § 3553(a) factors. That the court did not articulate every
§ 3553(a) factor or accord the weight to specific factors that
Savage desired does not provide a basis for finding the sentence
unreasonable. Thus, Savage has not rebutted the presumption of
reasonableness accorded his sentence. Based on a totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the chosen sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4