United States v. Willie Pollard

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4698
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE SHAWNDALE POLLARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00456-JAB-1)
Submitted: February 19, 2015 Decided: March 4, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Eric D. Placke, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Steven N.
Baker, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Shawndale Pollard pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). The district court sentenced Pollard to ninety-two
months’ imprisonment, a sentence near the middle of the
Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months. On appeal, Pollard argues
that his sentence was greater than necessary to satisfy the
goals of sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2012). We
conclude that Pollard’s sentence is substantively reasonable,
and affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Where, as here, no claim of
procedural sentencing error is raised, we review the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In considering the
substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we “examine[] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
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“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when
determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.
2011). Therefore, we “must defer to the trial court and can
reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable.” United States
v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted).
We presume on appeal that a within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d
295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). The
defendant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption “by
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.The district court correctly calculated the applicable
Guidelines range and, after hearing Pollard’s arguments for a
sentence at the low end of the range, imposed a within-
Guidelines sentence of ninety-two months. Pollard argues that
the district court did not sufficiently consider his history of
military service, educational achievements, or non-violent
behavior at the time of his arrest. Pollard’s arguments are
unpersuasive. The district court reasonably determined that a
sentence of ninety-two months was appropriate based on its
individualized assessment of the facts of Pollard’s case, the
arguments made at the sentencing hearing, and the § 3553(a)
factors. That the court did not articulate every § 3553(a)
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factor or accord the weight that Pollard desired to the factors
and arguments is not a basis for finding the sentence
unreasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358
(2007). Based on a totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the chosen sentence, and that Pollard’s sentence is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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