United States v. Jose Cavazos

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4701
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSE CAVAZOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-4737
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WADE COATS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00333-WDQ-1; 1:09-cr-00333-WDQ-2)
Submitted: June 21, 2013 Decided: October 17, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael D. Montemarano, MICHAEL D. MONTEMARANO, PA, Columbia,
Maryland; Harry D. McKnett, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellants.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Peter M. Nothstein,
Assistant United States Attorney, James T. Wallner, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Jose Cavazos and Wade Coats appeal their convictions and
sentences arising out of a drug conspiracy in which they
participated. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
On April 27, 2009, Brian Shutt, Dave Clasing, E.T.
Williams, Mark Lunsford, and Derke Ostrow, agents and task force
officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), were
investigating Ronald “Truck” Brown in the Baltimore, Maryland,
area. A confidential informant (“C.I.”) told Shutt that Brown
was distributing large amounts of heroin, and Shutt observed the
C.I. call Brown and set up a meeting for a drug transaction. At
approximately 6:00 that evening, Shutt witnessed the meeting, at
which Brown told the C.I. that he did not have any drugs at that
time but was about to obtain a large quantity.
At approximately 10:30 that evening, Shutt and other
officers were surveilling Brown as he parked in the 1000 block
of Eastern Avenue. They saw a Lincoln Town Car park directly
behind Brown’s vehicle. The officers determined that the
Lincoln was a rental car, which they knew were often used by
drug dealers to avoid losing their vehicles due to government
seizure. A man later determined to be Wade Coats emerged from
the Lincoln and spoke briefly to Brown. Brown then got out of
his car, and the two men sat together for a few minutes on a
3
brick wall surrounding a tree adjacent to the Town Car. Officer
Clasing then saw Brown remove a bag from his waist area and drop
it into the Town Car through an open window. The officers
believed that the bag contained packaged money based on its size
and shape and the way that Brown held it. After Brown dropped
the bag into the Lincoln, the men both returned to their
respective cars and left.
Officers followed Coats, who proceeded to the Marriott
Waterfront Hotel. Once there, Coats removed several bags from
his vehicle, including the one that Brown had given him, and
Coats walked into the hotel. About 30 minutes later, Coats
emerged from the hotel, carrying nothing. Officer Clasing
followed Coats as he drove to a seafood restaurant called Mo’s
Seafood and then to a cell-phone store.
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 28, 2009, officers
observed Coats leave the store and walk toward the Lincoln,
carrying bags. The officers approached Coats’s car at that
time. Identifying himself as a task force officer, Shutt asked
Coats for identification, which Coats provided. Shutt also
asked Coats where he had been that evening, and Coats responded
that he had been at his girlfriend’s house and Mo’s Seafood.
When specifically asked whether he had been to the Waterfront
Marriott that evening, Coats denied that he had been. Although
Coats had been polite and professional during the exchange to
4
that point, after denying that he had been to the Marriott,
Coats began to stutter and avoid making eye contact with the
agents. Shutt then asked Coats if the Lincoln belonged to him.
Coats answered that he had rented it and that the rental
contract was in the glove compartment, but when the officers
looked there, they did not find it.
Shutt called for a K-9 officer. Fifteen minutes later,
Officer Jacob Corbitt arrived with his drug dog. Shutt saw the
dog bark and scratch at the vehicle, which he understood, based
on his prior experience with a K-9 unit, was a positive alert
for narcotics. 1 On that basis, the agents then proceeded to
search the car. They found a police scanner set to monitor the
DEA frequency, as well as two driver’s licenses bearing Coats’s
picture but other people’s names.
As the officers searched the vehicle, Shutt noticed that
Coats was turning away from officers in what appeared to be an
attempt to conceal a weapon. When Shutt asked Clasing if Coats
had been patted down, Coats turned his body further away from
the officers. Shutt promptly patted Coats down and found a .40
caliber handgun in a holster on Coats’s right hip. The officers
1
Officer Corbitt did not recall details about the call and
specifically did not remember whether his dog had alerted.
5
informed Coats of his Miranda rights and searched him incident
to an arrest. The search revealed $7,000 on Coats’s person,
including $5,000 in one of his socks. Coats told the officers
that the firearm was registered and that he was allowed to keep
it in his business.
Shutt and several other agents then traveled to the
Waterfront Marriott Hotel and proceeded to Room 943, the room
identified as Coats’s by hotel security.
Clasing heard a television on in the room as he approached.
Shutt knocked on the door, and appellant Cavazos answered and
put his hands up. Shutt pushed Cavazos aside, entered the room,
and conducted a protective sweep. The officers did not conduct
any further search of the room, however. While inside, Shutt
observed several heat-sealed wrapped packages in plain view.
Believing them to be drugs, he exclaimed, “We got kilos!” J.A.
243 (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon hearing that
exclamation, Cavazos blurted out “No, no, no. No drugs. No
drugs. I’m just the money man. I’m just the money man.” J.A.
243 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cavazos was arrested and given Miranda warnings. He told
officers that there was about $200,000 in the room, and “the
Jamaican[]” − which the officers understood to refer to Coats −
had the rest of the money. J.A. 244. Cavazos also stated that
the drugs “are not here yet, I count the money and make sure
6
that it is good.” J.A. 693 (internal quotation marks omitted).
After being read his Miranda rights, Cavazos produced a Texas
driver’s license, and Shutt instructed Lunsford to check for a
vehicle with Texas plates in the hotel’s parking garage.
Lunsford located a Dodge Caravan with Texas plates and
determined that it was registered to Crystal Cavazos. A drug
dog subsequently alerted to narcotics in the Caravan.
While Lunsford secured the hotel room, other officers
prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. The affidavit
described the telephone call and meeting between Brown and the
C.I. and recounted the basis for the informant’s knowledge that
Brown was selling heroin. It described the meeting between
Brown and Coats, as well as the agents’ surveillance of Coats’s
drive to the Marriott. The affidavit included Coats’s
representation that that he had not been to the Marriott that
day and mentioned the police scanner, fake licenses, firearm,
and currency. The affidavit also noted that Coats had rented
Room 943 and that Cavazos was in the room, and described the
statements Cavazos gave to the agents. The affiant stated that
Lunsford had found the Dodge Caravan registered to Crystal
Cavazos in the Marriott’s garage and a drug dog had alerted for
narcotics in the van. Shortly before noon on April 28, 2009, a
Maryland state-court judge signed a warrant authorizing searches
7
of Room 943, the cell phone store, the Dodge Caravan, and 1112
Harwall Road. 2
When they executed the warrants, the officers recovered:
(1) $274,000 in cash in heat-sealed plastic bags, a heat-sealer
machine and bags, a money counter, cell phones, and a tally
sheet from Room 943; (2) a suitcase with $337,482 in cash from
the Dodge Caravan; (3) $16,520 in cash, paperwork, heat-sealer
bags, and a gun magazine from the cell-phone store; and (4) 410
grams of cocaine, 238 grams of heroin, a bag of gel capsules, a
gel capper press, scales, a metal strainer and spoon, and a cell
phone from 1112 Harwall Road.
On February 17, 2010, Cavazos, Coats, Brown, and James
Bostic were charged in a five-count superseding indictment. All
of the defendants were charged in Count One with conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or
more of heroin, 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, and five
kilograms or more of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. Coats was
charged in Count Three with possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c). Brown and Bostic were charged in Counts Two, Four,
2
1112 Harwall Road was the address of a residence officers
observed Brown travel to shortly before he sold narcotics to the
C.I. in a controlled buy.
8
and Five with other crimes. Brown and Bostic pleaded guilty
prior to trial.
Also prior to trial, Coats and Cavazos moved to suppress
the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the
interaction Coats had with the officers outside the cell-phone
store and as a result of the searches of Coats’s vehicle and
Room 943. As is relevant here, Defendants specifically argued
that the interaction the officers had with Coats was an illegal
seizure and that the initial entry into Room 943 was a
warrantless entry not justified by exigent circumstances. They
further maintained that when the evidence obtained as a result
of the illegal searches and seizures is stripped from the
affidavit on which the search warrant was based, the remaining
facts do not establish probable cause. The district court held
a suppression hearing at which Shutt, Clasing, Ostrow, and
others testified. After the hearing, the district court denied
the defendants’ motions, concluding, as is relevant here, that
the seizure of Coats was a valid Terry stop and that exigent
circumstances justified the initial entry into Room 943. 3 See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3
Shutt testified at the suppression hearing that Coats was
arrested near an “open-air drug market,” people were in the
area, and he was concerned that someone on the street had seen
the arrest and alerted Coats’s co-conspirators so that they
could begin destroying evidence inside Room 943. J.A. 237.
(Continued)
9
A jury trial commenced that same day. Consistent with the
numbering in the indictment, the jury verdict form listed Count
One as the conspiracy charge. However, with Brown and Bostic
having pleaded guilty prior to trial, the form listed Count Two
as the firearm charge against Coats.
The jury found Cavazos and Coats guilty of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
noted on the special verdict form that five kilograms or more
were foreseeable to both Defendants. The jury also found Coats
guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime.
Two months after the trial, the government provided the
Defendants with FBI Forms 302 (“the 302s”), which the government
had not produced previously. The 302s reported on a series of
four pretrial interviews with prosecution witness Alex Mendoza-
Cano (“Cano”) that occurred from December 11, 2009, through
April 28, 2010. Cano had been charged in a different district
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and
he testified at Defendants’ trial pursuant to a cooperation
Clasing and Shutt also testified that Room 943 was located in a
narrow hallway, which created a “fatal funnel,” meaning there
was no cover or concealment if the officers tried to wait
outside the room while a search warrant was obtained. J.A. 101,
238, 239.
10
agreement. The government relied on testimony from Cano and
Brown to establish the existence of the drug conspiracy and its
scope. Cano testified that he was a member of the Gulf Cartel,
which was a Mexican drug trafficking organization, and that he
was charged with overseeing the cartel’s distribution operation
in Houston. He testified in detail that he provided drugs to
Cavazos, who in turn transported them to Baltimore for Coats and
co-defendant Bostic. Prosecutors had received the 302s from the
FBI only after the trial had ended and had produced them
promptly thereafter. Defendants moved unsuccessfully for a new
trial based on the government’s alleged untimely production of
the 302s. See United States v. Cavazos, 2011 WL 4596050 (D. Md.
2011).
The district court subsequently sentenced Cavazos and Coats
to 540 months each on the conspiracy count and sentenced Coats
to a consecutive term of 60 months on the firearm count.
II.
Defendants first argue that the district court erred in
denying their suppression motions. In reviewing the denial of a
motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo while reviewing its factual findings for
clear error. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996).
11
A.
Regarding the suppression motion, Defendants first contend
that the officers illegally seized Coats when they approached
him after he emerged from the cell-phone store. We disagree.
An officer is entitled to stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes when there is reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
Even assuming that the officers seized Coats as soon as they
approached him, that seizure constituted a valid Terry stop. As
the district court explained,
Officer Shutt observed the phone call and meeting
between the confidential informant and Brown, and
learned that Brown planned to make a large “move.”
Officers observed the exchange of packaged money
between Coats and Brown shortly after the informant’s
meeting, and learned that Coats was driving a rental
vehicle – a common practice of drug dealers. Officers
watched Coats bring the packaged money to the hotel
and go to the cell phone store after 10:30 p.m. He
left with bags at around 1:30 a.m. Under the totality
of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable
suspicion that Coats was engaged in drug trafficking.
J.A. 492-93. Defendants do not charge that the district court
clearly erred in making any of the factual findings on which the
district court’s decision was based. They do contend that some
of these facts are not suspicious when viewed in isolation. The
pertinent question, however, is whether the facts, “[t]aken
together, . . . sufficed to form a particularized and objective
basis” for stopping Coats, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
12266, 277-78 (2002) (emphasis added), and for the reasons
explained by the district court, they certainly did.
B.
The Defendants next maintain that the district court erred
in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
search of Room 943. Defendants contend that the officers’
initial warrantless entry into Room 943 was unjustified, that no
evidence obtained as the result of that entry could be used to
justify issuance of the search warrant, and that without such
evidence the application did not establish probable cause. We
disagree.
To authorize issuance of a warrant for search or seizure, a
supporting “affidavit must provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable
cause” in light of the totality of the circumstances. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). “[T]o establish probable
cause, the facts presented to the magistrate need only ‘warrant
a man of reasonable caution’ to believe that evidence of a crime
will be found.” United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480, 481
(4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion)); see Florida v. Harris, 133
S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013). In determining whether an application
establishes probable cause, a judicial officer must consider
“the facts and circumstances as a whole and make a common sense
13
determination of whether ‘there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.’” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). A warrant is
not invalidated by the inclusion in the application of
improperly obtained evidence so long as there is sufficient
untainted information to support a finding of probable cause.
See United States v. Wright, 991 F.2d 1182, 1186 (4th Cir.
1993).
Even assuming that the officers’ warrantless entry into
Room 943 was not authorized and thus that the evidence obtained
as a result of that entry could not be used in support of a
search-warrant application, the other facts in the affidavit
nonetheless supported a search of Room 943. The only
information derived from the warrantless entry that was included
in the application was Cavazos’s statement and the resulting
drug-dog scan of his family’s van in the parking garage. Even
if that information is not considered, the affidavit is
sufficient to establish probable cause.
The facts establishing probable cause include the
following. Brown sold heroin to a confidential source only days
prior to April 27, 2009. The source told Shutt on April 27 that
Brown had told the source that Brown would be receiving a large
14
amount of narcotics shortly. 4 Brown met with Coats that evening,
and the officers saw Brown give Coats what they believed to be
money. Coats then immediately drove to the Waterfront Marriott,
entered the hotel — in which he had rented Room 943 — and left,
all within 30 minutes. Coats then immediately drove to the
cell-phone store, which was closed, and left the store
approximately one hour later. Coats falsely denied to law
enforcement that he had not gone to the Marriott that night. A
drug dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in Coats’s
vehicle. Coats was carrying a loaded firearm on his person,
$7,000 cash, and two fake licenses. And finally, Coats had a
police scanner tuned to the frequencies of the Baltimore Police
and the DEA.
Clearly, this information would have justified a reasonable
belief that Brown had given Coats money as part of a drug
transaction. Considering that Coats had rented a room at the
Marriott and that he briefly visited the hotel after meeting
with Brown, the officers had reason to believe that Coats was
using the hotel room to further the transaction and that
4
The affidavit stated that the confidential informant had
passed on that Brown “had informed him/her that he had just
received a large amount of heroin and cocaine.” J.A. 689.
However, Shutt testified at the suppression hearing that his
confidential informant had told him that Brown would be
obtaining a large amount of narcotics later that evening.
15
evidence of the crime, whether it be the money Brown had given
Coats, the drugs Coats was to give Brown, or other evidence,
would be in the hotel room.
III.
Defendants next argue that the district court erred in its
handling of the verdict sheet presented to the jury. They note
that Count Two of the superseding indictment charged Brown with
distribution of a quantity of cocaine and that Count Three of
the superseding indictment charged Coats with possession of a
firearm in furtherance of the Count One conspiracy. They argue
that the district court asked the jury to return a verdict as to
Coats regarding only Counts One and Two and did not ask the jury
to return a verdict on Count Three. They contend that since the
jury returned guilty verdicts against Coats on Counts One and
Two but Coats was not charged in Count Two, the finding of guilt
on Count Two was a nullity, and because the jury was not asked
to return a verdict on Count Three, the discharge of the jury
without any finding of guilt on that charge operated as an
acquittal on the firearm charge.
Because neither Defendant objected to the verdict sheet
prior to the announcement of the jury’s verdict, we review their
objections for plain error only. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A
plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered
even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”).
16
Before we can consider reversing an error under plain-error
review, “(1) there must be an error; (2) the error must be
plain, meaning obvious or clear under current law; and (3) the
error must affect substantial rights.” United States v.
Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2008). Even if these
elements are established, however, “[t]he decision to correct
the error lies within our discretion, and we exercise that
discretion only if the error ‘seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
Here, the record makes clear that the district court
correctly interpreted the jury’s verdict. The court instructed
the jury that “Count 2 of the Indictment charges Defendant Wade
Coats with possessing a firearm during and in relation to a
drug-trafficking crime; specifically, conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.” J.A. 482. When
the jury returned with its verdict, the courtroom deputy asked
the jury foreman, “How do you find Defendant, Wade Coats, as to
Count 2, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking crime?” J.A. 483. The foreman responded, “Guilty.”
J.A. 483. The jury also recorded on its verdict form that it
found Coats guilty of Count Two, “possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.” J.A. 500. It is thus
17
apparent that, in light of Brown’s guilty plea, the district
court simply renumbered the charges from the superseding
indictment and the jury found Coats guilty of the very crimes of
which the district court adjudicated him guilty. Accordingly,
there was no error, and certainly no plain error.
IV.
Defendants also maintain that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant the Defendants a new trial based
on the late disclosure of the 302s. We disagree.
We review a district court’s denial of a new trial motion
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Moore, 709 F.3d
287, 292 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stokes, 261 F.3d 496,
502 (4th Cir. 2001). Applying this standard, we “may not
substitute [our] judgment for that of the district court;
rather, we must determine whether the court’s exercise of
discretion, considering the law and the facts, was arbitrary or
capricious.” United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th
Cir. 1995).
Defendants first maintain that a new trial was warranted
because the 302s constituted Jencks Act material. The Jencks
Act requires the government to disclose to a defendant
statements made by a witness relating to the subject matter of
the witness’s direct examination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). The
notes of a government agent who has interviewed a witness do not
18
constitute the witness’s “statements” in this context unless the
witness has adopted those notes or the notes recite the
witness’s oral statements substantially verbatim. See United
States v. Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1996). Mere
occasional inclusion by the agent of the witness’s verbatim
words do not make the agent’s notes the witness’s “statements”
in this context. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,
352-53 (1959).
Notwithstanding Defendants’ argument that the 302s
constituted Jencks material, the reports were not written or
adopted by Cano, nor did they purport to be a substantially
verbatim account of Cano’s statements. Rather, they were simply
agents’ summaries of the substance of Cano’s statements. Thus,
the district court correctly ruled that they were not required
to be produced under the Jencks Act.
Defendants also contend that the government was required to
produce the 302s under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Under Brady, the government is required by the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause to disclose material evidence favorable to
the defendant, including impeachment evidence. See United
States v. McLean, 715 F.3d 129, 142 (4th Cir. 2013). Evidence
is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Curtis,
19
931 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In this context, a reasonable probability “is one
that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding.” Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 145 (4th Cir.
2012).
Defendants argue that the 302s were material under the
theory that defense counsel could have much more effectively
cross-examined Cano had the 302s been disclosed. Defendants
maintain that Cano at least implied in his testimony that he was
not involved in violence as part of his job, and they contend
that the 302s would have contradicted this representation. For
this reason, they submit that the government’s failure to turn
these materials over in a timely manner undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial.
Not only did the denial of Defendants’ new-trial motion not
constitute an abuse of discretion, but its decision was clearly
correct. Defendants cite passages from Cano’s testimony that
they maintain contradict material contained in the 302s. The
302s did not directly contradict any part of Cano’s testimony,
however, and they certainly did not contradict any testimony
regarding the actions of the Defendants.
Defendants first argue that the 302s contradict testimony
by Cano that he never shot at police officers. The 302s were
quite consistent with Cano’s testimony on this point, however.
20
Cano admitted in his testimony before the jury that he was part
of a very violent business. Cano specifically admitted that he
was wanted by the Honduran police because “[w]e did the business
that turned out bad on us. There were dead people that came out
of that. . . . The cartel had an entire family eliminated.”
J.A. 444. He also indicated in his testimony that the cartel
had killed employees who had cooperated with the government and
killed their families as well. He further testified that he was
“involved in a shootout between [his] cartel and the police of
the country of Honduras” that left him injured. J.A. 445; see
also J.A. 446-47 (Cano’s testimony admitting he “ha[d] a
shootout with” the police). The 302s reference this shootout
but do nothing to contradict Cano’s testimony as to Cano’s role
in it.
Defendants also note that the 302s indicated that Cano had
extensive training and skills in violent activities and that he
had committed many violent acts in the past, including murdering
several people. In this respect, Defendants also point to
testimony from Cano that dealing drugs, rather than killing
people, was his business. If confronted with the 302s, however,
the government could have persuasively argued that there was no
significant tension between the 302s and Cano’s testimony
insofar as the context for the statement Defendants highlight
was that Cano was explaining why he fled Mexico to come to the
21
United States. Indeed, it appears he was merely explaining that
his primary business was selling drugs and noting that any
involvement in violence was only incidental. And even to the
extent that defense counsel were able to persuade the jury that
Cano was unfairly downplaying his role in the cartel’s violence,
there is no reason to believe that defense counsel could have
used the 302s to any material advantage.
This is especially true because defense counsel was quite
effective, without the 302s, in impeaching Cano. He testified
at length about how he had repeatedly engaged in illegal
activity for years and admitted his willingness to lie when it
served his interests. Although he testified that he would not
lie under oath, his testimony made clear that his foremost
concern was helping his family and that he was cooperating with
the government in hopes of obtaining a shorter sentence. Thus,
the jury had strong reason to conclude that he would testify
falsely if he believed it would accelerate his return to his
family. We find no reason to believe that the 302s would have
enabled defense counsel to cast any significant further doubt on
the truth of Cano’s testimony concerning the existence and scope
of the conspiracy. Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court was well within its discretion in concluding that the
government’s tardy production of the documents did not undermine
confidence in the jury verdicts.
22
V.
Finally, Cavazos and Coats both challenge the substantive
reasonableness of their sentences.
We review a sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires us to
consider both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence. See id. at 51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
575 (4th Cir. 2010). As part of our procedural review, we
consider whether the district court considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In this regard,
the district court “must place on the record an individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, the court is “not
required to provide a lengthy explanation or robotically tick
through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v.
Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 341 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, it need only “set forth enough to
satisfy” us that it “has considered the parties’ arguments and
has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007).
23
Here, Defendants do not cite any procedural error, and we
do not find one. The district court explicitly considered both
Defendants’ age, lack of criminal history, and personal
background. The court also found that over 1,500 kilograms of
cocaine was foreseeable in the context of the conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute. In light of
“the duration and extent of the criminal enterprise as measured
in time . . . as well as in drugs and money,” the district court
determined that the sentences imposed were sufficient but not
greater than necessary to accomplish the goals that § 3553(a)
sets out. J.A. 624. We find the court’s analysis to be sound
and certainly no abuse of discretion.
VI.
In sum, finding no error, we affirm Defendants’ convictions
and sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
24