Irma I. Donato Malave v. Hon. Karen Abrams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1950
IRMA I. DONATO MALAVE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HON. KAREN H. ABRAMS, St. Mary's County Judge; HON.
CHRISTOPHER B. KEHOE; HON. STUART BERGER; HON. JAMES P.
SALMON, Court of Special Appeals Judges; HON. ROBERT M.
BELL, Court of Appeals Chief Judge,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:13-cv-01985-DKC)
Submitted: November 27, 2013 Decided: December 6, 2013
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rickey Nelson Jones, LAW OFFICES OF REVEREND RICKEY NELSON
JONES, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Irma I. Donato Malave appeals the district court’s
orders dismissing her complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and denying reconsideration. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
It is well-established that the burden of proving
subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff, the party who
is asserting jurisdiction. Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v.
Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2010). We review the
district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234
(4th Cir. 2013). In addition, judges enjoy absolute judicial
immunity from damages liability for judicial acts unless done
“in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), Malave
argues on appeal that judicial immunity does not apply to claims
for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the
precedent established by that decision was abrogated by the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110
Stat. 3847, which amended § 1983 and provided that “injunctive
relief [against a judicial officer] shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
2
unavailable.” Id. § 309. Malave has not shown that either
condition was satisfied here. 1
Moreover, we conclude that the district court
correctly held that consideration of Malave’s claims was barred
by the Rooker-Feldman 2 doctrine. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.
Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (discussing doctrine). Because Malave
effectively sought to have the district court review the
Maryland state courts’ decisions, her action was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the district court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain her claims. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
1
Moreover, although the Supreme Court concluded in Pulliam
that attorney fees in § 1983 cases are a statutory exception to
the general rule, this holding was also abrogated by the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1996. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
2
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
3