United States v. Shawn Jones

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4253
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff ─ Appellee,
v.
SHAWN DWAYNE JONES,
Defendant ─ Appellant,
and
NED POLK; INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondents.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:09-cr-00197-CMC-1)
Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 5, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shawn Dwayne Jones pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of possession of a stolen firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924(a)(2) (2006). The
district court sentenced Jones to 120 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Jones’ counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that, in his opinion,
there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning
whether the district court adequately complied with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 in accepting Jones’ guilty plea and whether the
sentence imposed is reasonable. The Government declined to file
a response. We affirm.
Because Jones did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Jones] must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that the district court fully complied with
Rule 11 and that Jones’ guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and
supported by an independent factual basis.
We also conclude that Jones’ sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. We review a sentence
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for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires us to ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.
2008). In determining the procedural reasonableness of a
sentence, this court considers whether the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range,
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We then consider
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence
within the Guidelines range is accorded an appellate presumption
of reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346-56
(2007). We have reviewed the record and conclude that Jones’
within-Guidelines sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We further find no merit to the issue raised in Jones’ pro se
supplemental brief. We therefore affirm Jones’ conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
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United States for further review. If Jones requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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