United States v. Mark Landersman

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4066
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK STUART LANDERSMAN, a/k/a Mark Stuart,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 16-4067
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEE HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00419-LMB-1; 1:13-cr-
00419-LMB-2)
Argued: December 6, 2017 Decided: March 28, 2018
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge King
and Senior Judge Shedd joined.
ARGUED: Stuart A. Sears, SCHERTLER & ONORATOR, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant Lee Hall. Cary Citronberg, ZWERLING/CITRONBERG, PLLC, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant Mark Stuart Landersman. Morris Rudolph Parker, Jr., Patricia
Marie Haynes, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John Zwerling, ZWERLING/CITRONBERG, PLLC,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant Mark Landersman. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria Virginia, for
Appellee.
2
THACKER, Circuit Judge:
In this consolidated appeal, Lee Hall, former Director of Intelligence for the
Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy, and Mark Landersman, a machinist from California
(collectively, “Appellants”), appeal guilty verdicts for criminal conspiracy and, as to
Hall, unlawful conversion of government funds. Specifically, following a bench trial, the
district court found that Hall facilitated the purchase of hundreds of firearm suppressors
from Mark Landersman, Hall’s boss’s brother, for over $1.6 million in government funds.
The district court concluded that this transaction was illegal because, inter alia, Hall did
not use the proper channels for government funding approval; Mark Landersman was an
untested and unlicensed firearm manufacturer; and upon arrival, the suppressors did not
meet government performance standards.
Appellants raise a host of challenges to the manner in which their bench trials
were conducted and the sufficiency of the evidence against them. Because some of these
challenges relied on classified government records, the district court and this court
conducted proceedings pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”),
see 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1–16. For the reasons that follow, we find no reversible error in
the classified and unclassified proceedings below and therefore affirm Appellants’
convictions.
3
I.
A.
We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing
party at trial. See United States v. Garcia-Ochoa, 607 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 2010). In
late 2012 and early 2013, Hall facilitated the Navy’s purchase of 349 unattributable (i.e.,
unserialized and untraceable) firearm suppressors for approximately $1,657,750. At that
time, Hall worked directly for David Landersman, Senior Director of Intelligence for the
Navy’s Office of Plans, Policy, Oversight and Integration (“PPOI”). 1
As background, sometime during the summer of 2012, David Landersman and
Hall approached Robert Martinage, Deputy Undersecretary for PPOI and David’s
superior, to seek funds for “intelligence studies.” J.A. 373. 2 Martinage approved their
request to approach Carla Lucchino, Department of the Navy Assistant for
Administration (“DON/AA”), and ask for authorization to seek funding for this purpose.
On June 6, 2012, David sent an email to Lucchino, asking for a total of $3 million
from the PPOI Senior Director’s operational budget for the following: intelligence
studies, a program integration assessment, an anti-submarine warfare research project, an
1
Because David’s brother Mark Landersman is an appellant in this case, we
sometimes refer to them by their first names.
2
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
appeal.
4
assessment of the Navy’s participation in the Defense Clandestine Service program, 3 and
“an overall assessment of how well D[epartment] O[f] N[avy] intelligence requirements
are being satisfied.” J.A. 1185. Lucchino forwarded the request to David Nugent, the
Director of the Financial Management Division of DON/AA.
Nugent then began working with Hall on David Landersman’s budget request.
During the time that Hall and Nugent discussed the funding request, Hall emphasized to
Nugent that this was “an Under Secretary priority,” which “would move [it] up on the
[priority] list.” J.A. 439–40. On August 13, 2012, Nugent indicated to Lucchino that he
had been working with Hall and explained that the budget for the studies was reduced
from $3 million to $2.2 million. Lucchino authorized Nugent to disburse $2.2 million to
David Landersman. Notably, Lucchino testified that she could not authorize the purchase
of “weapons or small arms.” Id. at 349.
Also on August 13, 2012, David Landersman sent an email to his brother Mark,
the erstwhile owner of an automobile machinery company in California called
“Advanced Machining and Engineering,” or “AME.” J.A. 1191–92. Mark had been in
dire straits, as he “couldn’t keep up the overhead” at AME, id. at 723; he was forced to
3
The Defense Clandestine Service program was launched in 2012 to “enable[]
[the Department of Defense] to be more effective in the collection of national-level
clandestine human intelligence across a range of targets of paramount interest.” Karen
Parrish, DOD Aggressively Pursues Intel Innovation, Vickers Says, Am. Forces Press
Serv. (Oct. 11, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118181, attached as PDF document.
5
file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on July 9, 2012; and a 2011 tax return showed that another
of his businesses owed his brother David $50,000 in unpaid loans.
In that August 13 email, David asked Mark for the proper name of his company.
The next day, Mark responded to David with the name and phone number of his
company: “Advanced Machining and Engineering (951) 852 1653.” J.A. 1192. About
an hour later, David forwarded this information to Hall, noting, “Lee, Info a[s] follows
. . . .” Id. at 1193. Later that same day, David sent his brother Mark an email with the
subject line “300BLK Suppressor,” which included a link to a website entitled “How I
Built a 300 AAC Blackout Suppressor.” Id. at 1195, 1447. Under the link, David wrote,
“Look this over . . . Looks very much like what we’re going to send you.” Id. at 1195.
Mark responded, “Wow! [V]ery simple.” Id. at 1194.
Five weeks after Lucchino authorized Hall to spend $2.2 million for studies and
assessments, on September 17, 2012, Hall met with Tedd Shellenbarger, a counterdrug
director within PPOI; Sherri Donahue, the Navy Contracting Officer Representative; and
Gail Williams, a senior program manager at CACI International, Inc. (“CACI”), a
government contractor. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss what Hall wanted to
be done with the money. 4
4
Although $2.2 million was allocated, the evidence at trial demonstrated that only
$1,657,750 was expended for the suppressors, with an additional undetermined amount
paid to CACI.
6
During that meeting, Hall asked about procuring materials, as opposed to studies
as he previously represented to DON/AA. Donahue recalled that “the conversation ha[d]
to do with . . . alterations on guns.” J.A. 480. Williams also recalled that Hall was
seeking to procure equipment or materials. She did not recall Hall mentioning “anything
about using [the money] to support intelligence studies.” Id. at 499. During the meeting,
Hall and Williams “discuss[ed] . . . what was required for CACI to do a sole source
justification,” meaning that the contract would not have to be put out for bid, but rather,
CACI would award the contract to a preselected vendor. Id.
As a follow up to that meeting, on October 19, 2012, Hall emailed Williams,
providing her with the name of the vendor he proposed to use for the contract. He stated:
Gail,
We are finally ready to move. Here is the information you
need to get started:
Poc: Mark Stuart of Applied Engineering and Materials
Phone: 951-851-1653.
What else do you need? Also, if at all possible, we’d like this
rolling by the end of November. I understand you have
internal hurdles, but we have accelerated interest in delivering
the products.
J.A. 1208. Notably, Mark’s middle name is Stuart, but his full name is Mark Stuart
Landersman; the company name is actually Advanced Machining and Engineering; and
this phone number is one off from the actual number David Landersman forwarded to
Hall, which was 951-852-1653.
7
Williams responded by email the same day, stating, “[I] will need some
information in order to justify a ‘sole source’ purchase.” Id. For example, “Why is
Applied Engineering and Materials the vender [sic] of choice?” Id. (parentheses
omitted). Thereafter, Hall sent Williams an email stating in relevant part:
Other subcontractors were not considered due to the fact that
they do not possess the expertise required to do the job nor
posses [sic] the unique proprietary tooling systems created by
AME to produce the required enhancements needed. Their
proprietary system is wholly, and solely exclusive to AME
and therefore unavailable by any other subcontractor.
...
[] AME currently has sole proprietary expertise that is not
commercially offered by other companies or individuals. It is
the only responsible source for the engineering expertise
sought and no other services will satisfy requirements [sic].
Their product is the first that incorporate [sic] a unique design
that significantly reduces the decibel ratings to near
background noise levels. All technologies are developed and
owned exclusively by AME and no licensing agreements
currently exist, providing a unique opportunity for CACI and
the end customer to utilize proprietary engineering and
services not readily available elsewhere.
J.A. 1207. At CACI’s request, Hall then sent an Statement of Work, proposing that
CACI would pay AME 50% up front and 50% “upon delivery, inspection and acceptance
trials” of the product. Id. at 1206. In addition, each suppressor was to be billed at a cost
of around $5,000.
In finalizing the contract and performing the required due diligence, a CACI
officer asked Mark to “provide a detailed breakout of [his] costs, i.e., labor and
materials,” and also to “provide . . . a copy of an invoice and/or PO” demonstrating that
8
he “suppl[ied] this product . . . to [a] client of [his] within one year.” J.A. 1215. Mark
replied, “I am not be able [sic] to provide this information,” and told the CACI officer to
contact Hall. Id.; see also id. at 1247 (November 8, 2012 email from Mark Landersman
to CACI procurement director explaining, “[Hall] has instructed me to direct any and all
requests for information” to Hall). In turn, Hall claimed the information CACI requested
was confidential, citing “increased questioning on the[] vendor issues,” and explaining,
“[T]he sensitive nature of the product(s), past performance and service, and the
proprietary information involved . . . makes for potential problems later regarding
security and classification.” Id. at 1415 (Nov. 9, 2012 email). On November 12, 2012,
Mark finally quoted CACI a labor rate of $85 per hour for 29 hours per part, coming to
$2,465 per suppressor, which Hall said he and David “determined . . . to be fair,
reasonable, and accurate.” See id. at 1416. Hall also emailed CACI on December 3,
2012, and notified the project analyst that the items were to be shipped to Al Zalewski, a
Navy intelligence official, at a Chesapeake, Maryland address. He also advised the
analyst to use the notation “Hold for Al Zalewski,” rather than using Hall’s name. Id. at
1014 n.17.
On December 7, 2012, CACI approved a purchase order in the amount of
$1,657,750 for 349 “Signature Suppressor[s].” J.A. 1303–04. However, in November
2012, before the purchase order was approved, Mark gave $2,000 to Juan Carlos Robles,
a machinist and successor-owner of AME, to “cover the entire costs of the materials” for
the suppressor project. Id. at 726. Nonetheless, on December 12, Mark emailed CACI,
9
stating, “I can’t get started without the deposit check and wondered if you have an idea
when it might be sent.” Id. at 1306–07. Two days later, CACI cut a check for 50% of the
contract price, or $828,875, and sent it to Mark.
Using blueprints provided by Mark, Robles alone manufactured the suppressor
tubes and accompanying assembly parts for the suppressors. It took him four to five
weeks, working around five hours per day. Mark paid Robles under $10,000, 5 in contrast
to the labor charge of $2,465 per suppressor quoted by Mark (which comes to $860,285
in labor for 349 suppressors). 6
Meanwhile, in January 2013, Hall met with Zalewski and asked if he could have a
shipment sent to a Naval Intelligence warehouse in Chesapeake, Maryland, even though
he had already scheduled to have the shipment delivered there. Zalewski agreed, but
testified Hall “made it clear to me that I was not to know . . . what was in the boxes . . . I
was not cleared for that.” J.A. 746. Hall also asked Zalewski to remove the boxes’
labels, which contained Mark Landersman’s name, but Zalewski refused to do so.
On February 19, 2013, boxes containing the 349 Landersman suppressors arrived
at the warehouse. Despite the fact that the suppressors were delivered on February 19,
5
Throughout the record, evidence about the amount paid to Robles varies from
$6,000 to $8,000 or more. Because Robles was paid mostly in cash, the specific amount
is uncertain. It is clear, however, that Robles was not paid more than $10,000.
6
The record reveals that Mark himself likely assembled and painted the
suppressors after Robles manufactured the parts. Nonetheless, the district court found
that based on Robles’s testimony, the “estimate of 29 hours per item appears to be a
complete fabrication.” J.A. 1012–13 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants
have not demonstrated that this finding is clearly erroneous.
10
Hall certified on a Form DD-250 (Material Inspection and Receiving Report) that he
accepted and inspected the suppressors on February 14. Notably, on February 14, 2013,
Hall was on administrative leave for an unrelated matter and thus, could not have
accepted and inspected the suppressors as indicated. Because Hall signed the DD-250,
CACI mailed Mark Landersman a check for the $828,875 balance on the contract.
A few weeks later, Nugent saw the DD-250 and realized the money intended for
intelligence studies was actually used for suppressors. As a result, the matter was
referred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Services (“NCIS”). The boxes containing
the Landersman suppressors were finally opened when they were seized by NCIS agents
in April 2013, two months after they were delivered. The boxes were located “next to a
photocopier and in an otherwise inappropriate area for classified materials as they were
. . . accessible to anyone in that space.” J.A. 1014. Thereafter, Jason Davis, a
mechanical engineer for the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Crane, Indiana, tested the
suppressors to see if they would meet Navy performance standards for sound and flash. 7
Davis’s report reveals that the suppressors failed to meet those performance standards.
Indeed, the report states that the suppressors were deemed “[u]nacceptable” in multiple
ways, which “would have made this suppressor ineligible for [a Navy] contract award.”
7
The standards for sound and flash used by Davis, explained more fully in section
II.B., infra, are that a suppressor must create a 25 decibel reduction in sound and 85%
reduction in light emission after the first shot. See J.A. 1016–17, see also id. at 797, 804.
11
Id. at 1783. After an investigation, Mark Landersman was identified as the manufacturer
of the suppressors, and he was indicted singly for conspiracy on November 14, 2013.
B.
On March 13, 2014, a grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia returned
a two-count superseding indictment, charging Hall and Mark Landersman together with a
conspiracy containing three objects: (a) the unlicensed manufacture of firearms; (b)
shipping of unregistered firearms; and (c) mail fraud (“Count One”); and charging Hall
alone with converting Navy funds without authority (“Count Two”). Hall and Mark
consented to a bench trial, and on June 20, 2014, they jointly filed a notice pursuant to
CIPA to use classified information. 8
On September 25, 2014, the district court granted Mark Landersman’s motion to
sever, scheduling Hall’s bench trial for October 20, and Mark’s for October 27. At the
hearing on the motion to sever, Hall represented that he would testify at Mark’s trial.
However, on October 9, Hall rescinded that representation. The district court nonetheless
allowed the cases to proceed separately.
8
David Landersman was indicted on September 24, 2015. His charges mirrored
Hall’s (conspiracy and conversion of government property without authority). David’s
jury was empaneled February 27, 2017, but because he began to suffer from serious
health problems, the district court dismissed his case. See Order, United States v. David
Landersman, No. 1:15-cr-283 (E.D. Va. March 2, 2017), ECF No. 121 at 3.
12
1.
Pre-Trial Motions
a.
On June 20, 2014, Appellants moved to dismiss the indictment based on the
allegation that some of Hall’s personal notes were destroyed by Pentagon officials while
he was on administrative leave. At a hearing on July 14, 2014, Hall posited that the
missing notes would have demonstrated that: (1) he communicated with a man named
Robert Gudz, president of the International Police Supply and a firearms dealer, who
represented to him that suppressors meeting Hall’s requirements 9 would cost between
$10,000 and $12,000 a piece; (2) Hall informed Lucchino they could no longer carry out
the studies for which they initially requested funds, but Lucchino had no objection to
using the money for another purpose; (3) Shellenbarger, the other PPOI director who
attended the CACI meeting, had a contract vehicle for purchase of the suppressors, and
they talked about the contract at the meeting; (4) Hall spoke with Zalewski about holding
the boxes in a secure facility; and (5) Hall had a meeting with Martinage about the
suppressor purchase.
From the bench, the district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment but
explained:
9
At the July 14 hearing, Hall did not testify about what those precise requirements
were.
13
[T]here’ll be an inference drawn against the government on
th[e] issue [of the handwritten notes], and it will come out to
play as it comes out to play.
Again, it may be moot. These witnesses . . . may say exactly
what Mr. Hall recalls them saying. If they don’t then he’ll be
permitted to testify, and as I said, if he says under oath that
he had a note that memorialized that, I’m going to accept
that.
J.A. 260 (emphasis supplied). The court then explained in a follow up written order, “the
Court will draw all inferences in favor of defendant Lee Hall regarding any of his
handwritten notes memorializing meetings and conversations that were destroyed as a
result of the government’s negligent handling of evidence.” Id. at 60.
b.
On October 17, 2014, three days before Hall’s trial was to begin, he and Mark
Landersman filed a joint motion to dismiss based on an alleged Brady violation. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Three days prior, the Government disclosed a
report of an NCIS interview with Steve Roddel, owner of a suppressor company and a
Government witness. The report shows that Roddel was interviewed five months earlier,
on May 13, 2014, and provided information that Appellants claimed “directly
undermined” one of the government’s theories, which was that the cost of the
Landersman suppressors was excessive. J.A. 310. Specifically, when asked “what would
make an AK-47 suppressor worth approximately $5,000,” Roddel responded that it was
possible if they “lack[ed] traceability” and “were totally rogue.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). He surmised that a manufacturer could charge a higher price if “there
14
are not many . . . out there, thus less sales and the price would need to cover the
development.” Id.
On the morning Hall’s trial began, the district court declined Appellants’ request
to dismiss the indictment, but it explained, “I most likely will be drawing inferences
against the government because of the way they have handled a lot of the Brady”
material. J.A. 338. The court further explained, “I am going to make a finding at this
time based upon the statement in the Roddel document that you got, and this is a finding
I’m making based upon this record, that the devices at issue were priced reasonably [at
$5,000 per suppressor] given the conditions under which they were purchased.” Id.
2.
Bench Trials
Hall’s trial began on October 20, 2014, and lasted until October 23. Mark
Landersman’s trial began October 28 and concluded the following day. On October 29,
2014, after addressing motions for acquittal, the district court issued a guilty verdict from
the bench as to both Hall and Mark Landersman. Specifically, Mark was found guilty of
all three objects of the Count One conspiracy. Hall was
• acquitted of the first object of the Count One
conspiracy, manufacturing firearms without a
10
license;
10
This acquittal was based on the Government’s failure to introduce into evidence
an email, discussed below, which would have attributed knowledge of the license
requirement to Hall.
15
• convicted of the second object of Count One,
transporting unregistered firearms;
• convicted of the third object of Count One, mail fraud;
and
• convicted of Count Two, unlawful conversion of
government funds without authority.
The district court issued its memorandum opinion with findings of fact and
conclusions of law one year later, on November 6, 2015. Notably, the district court
clarified its earlier finding that the suppressors were reasonably priced. It explained:
Because of problems with discovery and the late production
of interview reports with Steven Roddell [sic], the Court
found that a cost of $5,000 per suppressor might be
reasonable if the suppressor were unserialized. That finding,
of course, assumed the suppressor would actually meet the
standards for flash and sound suppression. The Court did not
find that Mark Landersman’s price of $5,000 per suppressor
was reasonable given the poor quality of the product.
J.A. 1013 n.16 (emphasis supplied).
3.
Post-trial
On December 4, 2015, Appellants filed renewed motions for acquittal or new trial.
Hall argued:
In support of its guilty verdict on the second and third objects
of the Count I conspiracy and Count II, the Court found that
the “government showed [] there were other established
manufacturers who could make suppressors, and Hall and
David Landersman were aware of that fact.” Mem. Op. at 16.
In making its finding, the Court relied exclusively on [a]
government Exhibit [], which was not admitted at Mr. Hall’s
trial.
16
J.A. 1045. The exhibit referenced here is an email dated September 3, 2012, from Robert
Gudz, the aforementioned president of the International Police Supply and a firearms
dealer, to both David Landersman and Hall (the “Gudz email”). The Gudz email
contained the subject line “Suppressor project” and explained that Gudz’s company,
SureFire, could “custom build” the type of suppressor “that [David and Hall] requested.”
Id. at 1009, 2324. The Gudz email explained that SureFire could quickly make a
prototype and transfer it with approved Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”)
paperwork. The Gudz email further explained that the suppressors would need to comply
with ATF rules. Thus, the Gudz email demonstrated that Hall’s October 2012 email
statement to CACI -- that no other company had the required expertise to produce the
suppressors he needed -- was knowingly false.
Nevertheless, Hall argued that because the Gudz email was not admitted at his trial
(rather, only in Mark Landersman’s trial), but was mentioned in the district court’s
opinion as a ground supporting conviction, his due process right to a fair trial was
violated. On January 5, 2016, the district court granted the motion in part, explaining, “I
should not have considered that [email], and I did reference it three times in the opinion.”
J.A. 1140. Thus, “out of an abundance of caution and giving [Hall] the benefit of the
doubt,” the court acquitted Hall of the second object of the Count One conspiracy
(shipping of unregistered firearms). Id. at 1140, 1161.
Hall also claimed that the district court “fail[ed] to consider” a stipulation that
“established . . . his good faith defense” based on the idea that Hall knew of a need for the
17
Landersman suppressors. J.A. 1048. Specifically, the stipulation involved Sterling Gill,
a Navy official who told Hall that with regard to a classified government program to
which Gill and Hall were both privy, “the need for suppressors remains unfulfilled.” Id.
at 969 (the “Gill Stipulation”). The court rejected this argument, explaining:
[Y]ou still have not convinced me that he acted in good faith,
because to me, the core issues [are] . . . why choose Mark
Landersman, an absolutely unknown, untested machinist?
That’s number one.
Number two, if this was that important a project, why not []
have had actual criteria, actual requirements for what was to
be done?
Id. at 1136–37. Ultimately, at the conclusion of all post-trial motions, Hall ultimately
stood convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud (object three) and conversion of
Navy funds.
4.
Sentencing
On January 29, 2016, Hall was sentenced to six months in prison on each count of
conviction, to run concurrently, to be followed by two years of supervised release. Mark
was sentenced to 60 days in prison on Count One. Appellants were also deemed jointly
and severally liable for $1,657,750 in restitution, and a forfeiture order was entered with
respect to that amount. On February 11, 2016, Appellants filed separate motions to stay
18
the execution of their sentences pursuant to Rules of Criminal Procedure 38 and 32.2, 11
which district court granted.
Appellants filed timely notices of appeal of their convictions, and we consolidated
those appeals. “[W]e review judgments resulting from a bench trial under a mixed
standard of review: factual findings may be reversed only if clearly erroneous, while
conclusions of law are examined de novo.” Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty.
Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2016).
II.
A.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
We first address Appellants’ arguments that their convictions were not based on
sufficient evidence.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a
bench trial, we must uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the
view most favorable to the Government, there is substantial
evidence to support the verdict. “Substantial evidence”
means evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept
as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
11
Rule 38 provides that a district court must stay a sentence of imprisonment if the
defendant is released pending appeal, and that court may also stay an order to pay a fine.
See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 38(b)(1), (c). Rule 32.2 provides that if a defendant appeals from
a forfeiture order, the district court may stay that order as well. See Fed. R. Crim. Proc.
32.2(d).
19
United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
1.
Count One – conspiracy to commit mail fraud
In order to prove that Appellants were guilty of mail fraud conspiracy pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government was required to demonstrate: an agreement to commit
mail fraud; willing participation in the conspiracy; and an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. See United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284, 298 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012).
To uphold a conspiracy conviction, “there need only be a showing that the
defendant knew of the conspiracy’s purpose and some action indicating his participation.
These elements can be shown by circumstantial evidence such as his relationship with
other members of the conspiracy, the length of this association, his attitude, conduct, and
the nature of the conspiracy.” United States v. Whittington, 26 F.3d 456, 465 (4th Cir.
1994) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Roberts,
881 F.2d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[O]ne may become a member of the conspiracy
without full knowledge of all of its details, but if he joins the conspiracy with an
understanding of the unlawful nature thereof and willfully joins in the plan on one
occasion, it is sufficient to convict him of conspiracy, . . . even though he played only a
minor part.”).
20
a.
An agreement to join -- and participation in -- a conspiracy “need not be explicit;
it may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
858 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there must have
been an agreement to participate in a scheme to defraud using the mail. The scheme “can
be in the form of an assertion of a material falsehood with the intent to deceive or active
concealment of a material fact with the intent to deceive.” United States v. Pasquantino,
336 F.3d 321, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), aff’d, 544 U.S. 349 (2005). According to
the district court, “the scheme involved . . . having an unqualified entity to serve as a sole
source for a $1.6 million contract to supply items to the government that were never
authorized by the government.” J.A. 980.
The Government presented copious evidence to support an agreement among Hall,
Mark, and David 12 to participate in a scheme to defraud. To begin, in 2011, David
Landersman informed a fellow Navy official, Loren Bremseth, that Mark “was able to
produce suppressors that were substantially cheaper than anything that was currently out
there and could outperform anything that was out there.” J.A. 858. David asked
Bremseth if he would be willing to call the chief of staff of another government agency,
which may have had a need for suppressors, on behalf of his brother Mark. Bremseth
declined to do so.
12
The parties stipulated that David Landersman was “the only unindicted co-
conspirator in the Count One conspiracy.” J.A. 972.
21
Thereafter, David and Hall approached Martinage about procuring $3 million in
funding. David emailed Mark with instructions on how to make a suppressor. Mark
responded that the process looked easy. Mark sent AME’s information, which David
forwarded to Hall. Hall used this information to procure funds for the purchase of
suppressors, claiming the funds would be used for intelligence studies and assessments.
And ultimately, once the contract was awarded to AME and the manufacturing process
was underway, Mark referred CACI questions to Hall, and Hall made arrangements for
shipping. The first element of the conspiracy charge is supported by substantial
evidence. See Armel, 585 F.3d at 184.
b.
The Government also produced sufficient evidence that Appellants willfully
participated in the mail fraud conspiracy and committed overt acts in furtherance of the
mail fraud conspiracy. As for Hall:
• In the email submitted to CACI, Hall described AME’s
suppressor as being a “product that is the first that . . .
significantly reduces the decibel ratings to near background
levels.” J.A. 1207. But the district court correctly found this
statement was “completely false” because “there was no
evidence produced during the trial that either AME or the
[Navy] had ever tested any of AME’s suppressors.” Id. at
1009. Moreover, the suppressors failed to meet Navy flash
and sound suppression standards when they arrived.
• The October 19, 2012 email from Hall to CACI “was one of
many containing false statements. Not only did Hall provide
an incorrect name for Mark Landersman and AME, there was
no evidence introduced at trial of anyone in the [Navy]
having an accelerated interest in delivering the products,” as
22
Hall originally claimed. J.A. 1007. Hall also gave an
incorrect phone number of Mark’s company.
• Hall tried to hide the Landersman name throughout the entire
scheme. In response to an email from a CACI analyst, in
which he asked Hall to “contact Mark Landersman,” Hall
responded, “[P]lease refrain from user [sic] vendor names.
Just use AME.” J.A. 1028–29. Hall did not give Mark’s last
name in the initial submission to CACI, and Hall directed
Zalewski to remove the labels, which contained Mark’s last
name, from the boxes once they were delivered.
• Hall told CACI the “past performance and service, and the
proprietary information” of AME would “make[] for potential
problems later regarding security and classification.” J.A.
1415. The district court found this reference to past
performance “was a completely false statement as there was
no evidence in the record of AME having provided any
products or services to the Navy in the past.” Id. at 1011–12.
• Hall changed the funding request from studies to suppressors
without formal documentation to or from DON/AA, without
written approval from Lucchino or Nugent, and
notwithstanding that Lucchino testified she could not approve
the purchase of weapons or small arms.
• Hall told CACI that Mark’s labor quote of $85 per hour for
29 hours per part was “fair, reasonable, and accurate.” J.A.
1416. But “[t]here was no evidence produced during the trial
that Hall or anyone within [the Navy] had performed any kind
of analysis to determine whether AME’s price was fair,
reasonable, or accurate.” Id. at 1013.
• Hall asked Zalewski if he could receive boxes at the
Maryland warehouse after he had already scheduled to have
them shipped there. Hall refused to tell Zalewski the
specifics of the contents of the box shipped from California.
Rather, he told him the contents were classified. But he
allowed the boxes to be held in a warehouse next to a
photocopier and in an otherwise inappropriate area for
classified materials. Hall also asked Zalewski to remove the
shipping labels from the boxes.
23
• Hall signed a DD-250 Form (Material Inspection and
Receiving Report), acknowledging that he had accepted the
suppressors on February 14, 2013, and that they conformed to
the contract. However, he was on administrative leave at that
time and had no authority to act on behalf of the Navy; the
suppressors were actually received February 19; and there is
no evidence he actually inspected or even saw the suppressors
once they arrived. Based on his signature, however, CACI
was able to cut Mark’s second check for $828,875.
And as to Mark, there is likewise sufficient evidence that he “knew of the
conspiracy’s purpose” and took “some action indicating his participation.” Whittington,
26 F.3d at 465.
• Mark would generally not speak to CACI directly, directing
all questions to Hall;
• Mark quoted CACI a labor rate of $85 per hour for 29 hours
per part, coming to $860,285, when he paid Robles less than
$10,000 for his labor;
• Mark told CACI he needed money to get started, when he had
already given Robles all the money for materials and directed
Robles to start on the work; and
• Mark received emails from David about how to manufacture
suppressors on the same day David was obtaining funding
authorization from DON/AA.
c.
Taking all of this evidence into account, the Government has proven that
Appellants conspired to “make [] assertion[s] of [] material falsehood[s] with the intent to
deceive”; that is, they engaged in a fraudulent scheme to funnel government money to
24
Mark’s flailing business. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 333. Thus, sufficient evidence
existed for the convictions on Count One. 13
2.
Count Two – conversion of Government funds
Hall was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Count Two), which
provides,
Whoever . . .
[1] knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or
[2] without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of
[3] any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the
United States . . . , or
[4] any property made or being made under contract for the
United States . . .
shall be guilty of a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 641. “Section 641 prohibits two separate acts.
The first is to embezzle, steal, or knowingly convert United States property and the
second is to sell, convey, or dispose of United States property without authority.” United
States v. Zettl, 889 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1989). Although the indictment here charged
both acts, the conviction was based on the first. See J.A. 1030 (district court explaining
that the Government was required to prove “Hall knowingly converted or caused to be
13
The district court’s careful delineation of guilt as to the three objects at trial
obviates any need to address Mark Landersman’s arguments on the first two objects of
the conspiracy because “the conspiracy conviction[] in this case [is] supported by a valid
and independent” conclusion on mail fraud. United States v. Cone, 714 F.3d 197, 211
(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lawson, 677
F.3d 629, 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Head, 641 F.2d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 1981).
25
converted to the use of another (Mark Landersman) monies of the [Navy]”). Thus, in
order to convict Hall on Count Two, the Government had to prove: (1) The money
described in the indictment is a thing of value that belonged to the United States
government; (2) Hall knowingly converted or caused the conversion of that money to his
own use; (3) Hall acted knowingly and willfully with the intent to deprive the
government of the use and benefit of the money; and (4) the value was greater than
$1,000. See United States v. Kiza, 855 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 2017); see also I-23A
Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal, ¶ 23A.01 (2015).
The first and last of these elements are not in dispute. Rather, as a challenge to his
conviction on Count Two, Hall contends that the Government’s theory of liability was
“unclear” as to when the funds were actually converted. Hall’s Opening Br. 29. He
further argues that the funds were converted in an authorized manner, and he had a good
faith belief the suppressors were needed.
The indictment charges Hall with conversion by “direct[ing] CACI to pay Mark
Landersman” over $1.6 million in Navy funds for the manufacture of suppressors. J.A.
48. The Government’s theory at trial was that this government money was misused at
Hall’s direction because he knowingly enabled money allocated for studies to be used for
the purchase of suppressors that were “unwanted, unneeded, and ineffective” in order to
enrich his boss’s brother. Id. at 928 (closing argument).
This is a valid legal theory. In construing § 641, the Supreme Court has stated,
“[K]nowing conversion requires more than knowledge that defendant was taking the
26
property into his possession. [The defendant] must have had knowledge of the facts,
though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion.” Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 270–71 (1952). Conversion
may include misuse or abuse of property. It may reach use in
an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of
property placed in one’s custody for limited use. . . . It is not
difficult to think of intentional and knowing abuses and
unauthorized uses of government property that might be
knowing conversions but which could not be reached as
embezzlement, stealing or purloining. Knowing conversion
adds significantly to the range of protection of government
property without interpreting it to punish unwitting
conversions.
Id. at 272. Thus, conversion occurs when the accused knowingly “misue[s],” “abuse[s],”
or “use[s] [the money] in an unauthorized manner.” Id. at 272; see also United States v.
Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Section 641 is not a theft statute nor is it a
codification of the common law of larceny. [Section 641] is much more inclusive
because it covers unauthorized sale and conversion which the Court has defined as the
‘misuse or abuse of property’ or its use ‘in an unauthorized manner.’” (quoting
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 272)). Indeed, § 641 “broaden[s] the [common law] offense of
conversion to include intentional and knowing abuses or unauthorized uses of
government property.” United States v. Fogel, 901 F.2d 23, 25 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
supplied). Moreover, in Fogel, this court upheld a § 641 conversion conviction where the
defendant directed that trees on federal property be cut down to enhance the view from
his home and, therefore, his property value. See id. at 24–25. This supports the
27
Government’s theory that a defendant can be guilty for directing or causing that the
government property be abused or misused.
Considering this legal landscape, Hall was provided sufficient notice that his
charge was based on directing Navy funds to be used in an unauthorized manner or
misusing Navy funds, and there is ample evidence supporting Hall’s conviction. Hall
circumnavigated the procurement and due diligence process, resulting in a misuse of
funds, by misrepresenting Mark Landersman’s name, company name, and phone number;
switching the purpose of the funding without official approval from DON/AA; avoiding
and refusing to answer CACI’s questions when they attempted to perform due diligence;
and making false statements on the sole source justification about the accelerated need
for the suppressors and viability and expertise of AME.
There is also sufficient evidence that Hall knew the use of Navy funds to purchase
the Landersman suppressors was not authorized. See United States v. Maisel, 12 F.3d
423, 425 (4th Cir. 1993). First, Hall contends that Navy officials Tedd Shellenbarger or
Chris Bettini ultimately authorized the transfer of funds. But except for an offhand
comment made by Shellenbarger at the CACI meeting, 14 we have no evidence that either
Shellenbarger or Bettini knew that the money for the purported intelligence studies would
actually be used to purchase suppressors from Mark Landersman, an untested and
14
Donahue testified that, at the CACI meeting, Shellenbarger said “something
about how he knew an auto worker out in California who could do [alterations on guns].”
J.A. 480.
28
unlicensed machinist, and the parties stipulated that David Landersman was the only
unindicted coconspirator. Even if Shellenbarger and Bettini did have such knowledge,
their participation still does not render Hall’s conduct any less criminal. Hall did not
disclose the true reason for the funding to DON/AA, and then did not explain to CACI
officials the parameters of the DON/AA approval. He submitted fraudulent statements to
CACI in support of a sole source justification, so that no other businesses could compete
for the suppressor contract.
To be sure, “[a] person who acts on a belief or on an opinion honestly held is not
punishable under the law merely because that honest belief turns out to be incorrect or
wrong.” United States v. Hirschfeld, 964 F.2d 318, 322 (4th Cir. 1992). Hall claims that,
as a good faith defense to all charges, he knew of a classified, unfulfilled need for these
particular suppressors. But the evidence presented to the district court reveals that Hall --
rather than acting in good faith -- knew how the system worked and circumvented the
normal procurement process in order to deliver government money to his boss’s brother.
As a result, it is clear that Hall’s conviction on Count Two is supported by sufficient
evidence.
B.
Expert Testimony
Appellants also contend that the suppressor testing conducted by Navy mechanical
engineer Jason Davis, whom Hall stipulated was an expert in the field, was “highly
prejudicial and irrelevant.” Hall’s Opening Br. 35. Specifically, Hall claims Davis’s
29
testimony “created the false appearance that the suppressors were useless” and “held the
Landersman suppressors to a standard they were never intended to, nor . . . could ever
meet.” Id. at 36. Hall also claims the testing was irrelevant because Davis tested the
suppressors using MK17 requirements, when in reality, the suppressors were intended for
use on a different weapon. We review the district court’s decision to admit expert
testimony for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 167 (4th
Cir. 2010).
We first address Appellants’ claim that the Navy intended to use the suppressors
for a different purpose than the one Davis assumed. Crucially, Hall himself represented
to CACI that the Landersman suppressors possessed “a unique design that significantly
reduces the decibel ratings to near background noise levels.” J.A. 1207. Per this
statement, it was Hall, not the Government, that made the usability of the suppressors a
material issue.
Next, we address the claim that Davis’s testimony and report were inadmissible
because the suppressors were not tested on the proper type of firearm and were held to
improper standards. Davis’s report states that the suppressors “were procured for use on
the AK-47 Soviet-style assault rifle,” but the Navy’s requirements for AK-47 suppressors
“were undefined.” J.A. 1758 (the “Davis Report”). Therefore, Davis assumed the AK-47
suppressors would meet the same requirements as suppressors used for similar weapon
systems, and the most similar rifle was the MK17. Using testing procedures and
standards for the MK17, then, Davis tested the suppressors on the Chinese equivalent of
30
an AK-47, the Chicom Type 56, because it was “[f]unctionally . . . indistinguishable”
from the AK-47, but had a mounting location so it was safer for testing. Id. at 1759; see
also id. at 794–95. Using the MK17 standards, Davis tested eight of the 349 suppressors
and concluded, “If this suppressor had been submitted as a bid sample for a solicitation,
the abundance of ‘Unacceptable’ for the various requirements would have made this
suppressor ineligible for [a] contract award.” Id. at 1783. Specifically, Davis found that
the larger diameter of the Landersman suppressors would “cause[] a lot of issues,”
“obscur[ing] some of your sight picture.” Id. at 806. He also testified that two of the
eight suppressors tested “fell outside th[e] threshold value” of 0.2 inches for accuracy,
“mean[ing] they would fail,” and one suppressor actually “separated from itself” during
testing. Id. at 806–07, 813.
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a qualified expert witness “may testify
in the form of an opinion or otherwise if [his] scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). “Implicit in the text of Rule 702, . . . is a district court’s
gatekeeping responsibility to ‘ensure that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219,
229 (4th Cir. 2017) (alteration omitted, emphasis in original) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). “Relevant evidence, of course, is evidence that
helps ‘the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” Id.
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591). To be admissible, the testimony “must have ‘a valid
31
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
“With respect to reliability, the district court must ensure that the proffered expert
opinion is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and not on belief
or speculation, and inferences must be derived using scientific or other valid methods.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Davis Report and Davis’s testimony were both reliable and relevant to the
usability of the suppressors, and Appellants’ arguments go to weight, rather than
admissibility. Davis successfully demonstrated that the suppressors simply did not work
on a functionally indistinguishable weapon, and he applied standards for weapon systems
used in comparable government special forces operations. See Friend v. Time Mfg. Co.,
422 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082 (D. Ariz. 2005) (expert testimony about a malfunctioning lift
device met Daubert standard where expert had specialized knowledge of “similar
devices”); see also Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 176
(5th Cir. 1990) (professor of mechanical and production engineering allowed to testify
about designing point-of-operation safeguards for press brake industry, though he had
never designed a press brake or safeguards for that device, because he had practical
experience with similar devices), abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994); cf. Dancy v. Hyster Co., 127 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 1997)
(expert testimony about device used on lift truck rejected where there were “significant
differences” between that device’s effectiveness on two pieces of different construction
equipment). While there may have been some differences in the Landersman suppressors
32
versus the suppressors that would normally be used on an AK-47, Appellants have failed
to demonstrate that an “unacceptable” suppressor could still be useful to the Navy at the
time Hall ordered, and Mark manufactured, these suppressors.
In sum, Davis’s testimony had a “valid scientific connection” to the issue at hand
and was based on specialized knowledge. As the district court -- the fact-finder in this
case -- stated, “The bottom line is they’ve got to suppress or they don’t do their job.”
J.A. 837. There was no abuse of discretion here.
C.
Evidentiary and Due Process Arguments
Appellants raise several other evidentiary and constitutional errors. “[W]e review
evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion, but legal conclusions concerning the
Rules of Evidence or the Constitution de novo.” United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562,
566 (4th Cir. 2005).
1.
Appellants argue they were denied a fair trial based on several theories, including
violation of their due process rights. We apply the harmless error standard to evidentiary
rulings, even where an appellant claims these rulings violated due process. See United
States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 2011) (“When a district court commits an
evidentiary error, even one that implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, we
ordinarily review that error for harmlessness.”). However, we conclude that none of the
alleged errors rise to the level of a constitutional violation. As such, we apply the
33
harmless error standard reserved for evidentiary challenges: “In order for an evidentiary
ruling to be harmless, we must find that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the
error.” United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 295 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted);
see also id. (“Often in criminal cases where there is a significant amount of evidence
which inculpates a defendant independent of the erroneous testimony, the error is
considered harmless.”).
We reject all of Appellants’ arguments under a harmless error standard, and
specifically discuss three here: (1) the district court reversed its pretrial factual finding
that the suppressors were reasonably priced; (2) it failed to draw proper inferences in
favor of Appellants in lieu of Hall’s destroyed notes; and (3) it failed to consider the Gill
Stipulation.
a.
First, assuming Appellants had the chance to demonstrate (and did demonstrate)
that the suppressors were reasonably priced at $5,000 a piece, or assuming that the
district court accepted this as fact even though the suppressors did not meet Navy
standards, sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit mail fraud -- and overt acts
committed in furtherance thereof -- abound. See supra, Section II.A.1. Moreover, the
conversion conviction likewise does not rise and fall on the unit price of the suppressors.
See supra, Section II.A.2. Thus, the judgment was not substantially swayed by the
suppressor price.
34
b.
Second, even if the district court failed to draw all permissible inferences in favor
of Appellants in lieu of the handwritten notes, the “possible harm flowing from the
district court’s in limine ruling . . . is wholly speculative,” considering Hall chose not to
testify about the content of those notes. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984). In
any event, the testimony about the content of those notes from the suppression hearing
may have shown general knowledge or tacit approval of a suppressor purchase by
Lucchino or Martinage. But as the district court acknowledged, “[e]ven if such notes had
been preserved they would not have explained why this procurement went to David
Landersman’s brother.” J.A. 1032. Moreover, Hall did not produce any official
documentation memorializing this approval. Thus, any error would likewise be harmless.
c.
Third, even if the district court erred in failing to consider the Gill Stipulation, that
piece of evidence does not establish that Hall acted in good faith. To the contrary, as
explained above, there is a barrage of evidence proving Hall acted with the requisite
knowing and willful intent. See Analytical Eng’g, Inc. v. Baldwin Filters, Inc., 425 F.3d
443, 453 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that if a reviewing court finds error in the district
court’s consideration of the parties’ stipulation, “that error would be harmless” if “the
district court’s consideration of the parties’ stipulation in no way affected the relief
granted”). The court made several other rulings supporting its conclusion that Hall had
not demonstrated a legitimate (and urgent) governmental need for 349 suppressors from
35
an untested machinery company in California. See, e.g., J.A. 1031–32 (“[I]f these
suppressors were needed so urgently, why did [Hall] let them sit in Zalewski’s warehouse
from February 19, 2013 until they were seized . . . ?”); id. at 1032 (“If there had been an
entity in the Navy which really wanted or needed these items, why did that entity not
claim them?”). Therefore, any error in failing to consider the Gill Stipulation is harmless,
as it surely would not have substantially swayed the judgment.
2.
Finally, we address Mark Landersman’s argument that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to admit Hall’s suppression hearing testimony regarding the
destruction of his notes. Rule 804 allows the admissibility of prior testimony of an
unavailable witness, including a witness who invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege.
The prior testimony meets an exception to the hearsay rule if the testimony was (1)
“given as a witness at a . . . hearing . . . , whether given during the current proceeding or a
different one,” and (2) “is not offered against a party who had . . . an opportunity and
similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.” Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(1). However, even if the testimony meets a hearsay exception, the court must still
perform a balancing test under Rule 403 in order to determine whether any probative
value “is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly preventing cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; see Precision Piping &
Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 951 F.2d 613, 620 (4th Cir. 1991)
(“Certainly, the trial judge has discretion under Rule 403 to exclude a [hearsay
36
statement], even if [it] meets the requirements of an exception.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). And here, “[t]he record reflects that, without mentioning Fed[eral]
Evidence Rule 403, the district court did undertake the requisite balancing” and excluded
Hall’s prior testimony on that ground. United States v. Gallo, 782 F.2d 1191, 1193–94
(4th Cir. 1986). As a result, we cannot say the court abused its discretion.
Therefore, Appellants’ evidentiary and constitutional arguments do not undermine
the verdicts rendered in this case. 15
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellants’ convictions.
16-4066, AFFIRMED
16-4067, AFFIRMED
15
Appellants also jointly raise a separate argument in the classified briefing. See
Hall’s Opening Br. 1, Landersman’s Opening Br. 20. We have independently reviewed
this argument and find no reversible error.
37