United States v. Naeem

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4501
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
NADIA NAEEM,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 08-4502
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MOHAMMAD AMIN DOUDZAI,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:06-cr-00395-MJG-2; 1:06-cr-00395-MJG-3)
Submitted: July 1, 2010 Decided: July 22, 2010
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William C. Brennan, Jr., William A. Mitchell, Jr., BRENNAN
SULLIVAN & MCKENNA LLP, Greenbelt, Maryland, Robert C. Bonsib,
Megan E. Green, MARCUS BONSIB LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Harvey
E. Eisenberg, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Nadia Naeem and Mohammad Amin Doudzai appeal their
convictions for conspiracy to obstruct proceedings before an
agency of the United States, namely, the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); endeavoring to obstruct proceedings
before an agency of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 1505 (2006); and making false statements, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006). On appeal, they contend that the
district court erred in denying their motions for judgment of
acquittal and for severance, instructing the jury, and granting
the Government’s request for a protective order. We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Osborne, 514
F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2008). We are obliged to sustain a
guilty verdict that, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, is supported by substantial
evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). A defendant bringing a sufficiency
challenge bears a “heavy burden.” United States v. Hoyte, 51
F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th Cir. 1995). The Government must be given
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the benefit of every reasonable inference. Id. Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
Government’s failure is clear. United States v. Beidler, 110
F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997).
Appellants first contend the evidence was insufficient
for the jury to find the existence of a conspiracy to obstruct
proceedings. They argue, inter alia, that even if they made
false statements, there were innumerable reasons why they may
have lied, and the Government failed to link their statements
with the alleged conspiracy to obstruct USCIS proceedings.
Because a conspiracy is by its nature clandestine and
covert, it is generally proved by circumstantial evidence.
Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857. Evidence tending to prove a conspiracy
may include a defendant’s relationship with other members of the
conspiracy, and the existence of a conspiracy may be inferred
from a development and collocation of circumstances. Id. at 858
(quotations and citations omitted). “Circumstantial evidence
sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction need not exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, provided the summation
of the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). We have reviewed
the record and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support the Appellants’ conspiracy convictions.
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Appellants also contend the evidence was insufficient
to support their convictions for endeavoring to obstruct
proceedings and making false statements, because the Government
failed to prove the existence of a valid marriage between them
under Maryland law or that they knowingly lied about being
parents of a son. We have reviewed the record and conclude that
the evidence was sufficient to support these convictions.
Appellants next contend that the district court erred
in denying their motions for severance, thus admitting evidence
of their false statements against the other in violation of the
Confrontation Clause. “There is a preference in the federal
system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted
together,” and a district court should grant a severance “only
if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a
specific right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury
from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537-38 (1993). The
presumption that defendants indicted together should be tried
together is especially strong in conspiracy cases. United
States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 114 (4th Cir. 1990). We review
a district court’s decision to deny a motion to sever for abuse
of discretion, which we will find only where the decision
deprives the defendants of a fair trial and results in a
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miscarriage of justice. United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278,
291 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted).
Appellants contend that the denial of their motions
resulted in the erroneous admission of testimonial statements in
violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and
their inability to challenge these statements was a fundamental
violation of their Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
Because the district court admitted these statements under Fed.
R. Evid. 801(c), (d)(2)(E), as they were offered not to prove
the truth of the matters asserted but to show the statements
were made in furtherance of the conspiracy, we conclude there
was no violation of the Confrontation Clause. See United States
v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 272 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Sullivan, 466 F.3d 248, 258 (4th Cir. 2006).
Appellants next contend that the district court erred
in instructing the jury as to the essential elements of the
conspiracy charge. While they acknowledge that the district
court instructed the jury on the four elements of the offense,
they argue that the instructions were not specific enough.
“District courts are necessarily vested with a great deal of
discretion in constructing the specific form and content of jury
instructions.” Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1293
(4th Cir. 1995). Because Appellants did not object to the
instruction in the district court, we review this issue for
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plain error. See United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 279
(4th Cir. 2007). Thus, Appellants must show error, that was
plain, and that the error affected their substantial rights.
Id. Even if they make this showing, we will not exercise our
discretion to correct the error unless it seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Id. We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Appellants have failed to show plain error.
Appellants further contend that the district court
erred in denying their requested instruction defining reasonable
doubt. We find this contention without merit. See United
States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1300-01 (4th Cir. 1995).
Finally, Appellants contend that the district court
erred in granting the Government’s motion for a protective order
in accordance with the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18
U.S.C. app. 3 § 3 (2006), and that the protective order
prevented counsel from providing effective representation.
After in camera review, the district court concluded that the
classified information at issue was all either irrelevant or
inculpatory. See United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107
(4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Government’s privilege with
regard to classified information must give way when the
information “‘is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause’”)
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(quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in issuing the protective order. See United States v.
Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 155 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating standard).
Moreover, Appellants do not contend on appeal that they were
precluded from raising any particular argument or defense as the
result of the protective order. Accordingly, this claim must
fail.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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