United States v. Jonathan Lamb

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4595
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN MAURICE LAMB,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00235-BO-1)
Submitted: April 29, 2014 Decided: May 6, 2014
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Maurice Lamb pleaded guilty to making a false
statement to a licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Lamb to
five years of probation in February 2013. Lamb subsequently
pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his probation and the
district court sentenced Lamb to sixty months of imprisonment.
Lamb has appealed, arguing that the variant sentence imposed
upon him is procedurally and substantively unreasonable because
the district court improperly considered his need for
educational or vocational training while incarcerated. Finding
no error, we affirm.
Upon finding a probation violation, the district court
may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any
sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2006); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d
505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). “[W]e review probation revocation
sentences, like supervised release revocation sentences, to
determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). We first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we determine that a
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sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
“decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.
“[18 U.S.C.] Section 3582(a) [(2012)] precludes
sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to
promote an offender’s rehabilitation.” Tapia v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391 (2011); see also United States v. Bennett,
698 F.3d 194, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2012) (court may not consider
need for rehabilitation in imposing revocation sentence). Here,
Lamb “did not object at the revocation hearing on the grounds
asserted here,” and we therefore review this issue for plain
error. Bennett, 698 F.3d at 199. To establish plain error,
Lamb must demonstrate that (1) the district court erred, (2) the
error was plain, and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights. Id. at 200 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 732 (1993)). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and
conclude that the sentence imposed is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable; it follows, therefore, that the
sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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