United States v. John McLendon

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4864
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOHN BARRY MCLENDON, a/k/a Dog,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:99-cr-00024-FDW-14)
Submitted: May 5, 2015 Decided: May 18, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Denzil H. Forrester, THE LAW OFFICES OF DENZIL H. FORRESTER,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted John Barry McLendon of conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine and
cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).
The district court originally sentenced McLendon to 324 months
of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release.
The court subsequently lowered McLendon’s sentence twice on his
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motions, based on two
retroactively-applicable amendments to the Guidelines that
lowered the offense levels for offenses involving crack. The
court first lowered the sentence to 262 months of imprisonment,
and later reduced the sentence to time-served plus 10 days.
After his release, McLendon pleaded guilty to violating the
terms of his supervised release and the district court sentenced
McLendon to six months of imprisonment, followed by a further
three years of supervised release. McLendon now appeals.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the
revocation sentence is reasonable. McLendon was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done
so. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review a sentence imposed as a result of a supervised
release violation to determine whether the sentence was plainly
unreasonable, generally following the procedural and substantive
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considerations employed in reviewing original sentences. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a
district court must consider the policy statements in Chapter
Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012), “the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation
marks omitted). While the court must provide a statement of
reasons for the sentence imposed, this statement “need not be as
detailed or specific” as that required for an original sentence.
See United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir.
2010). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that
the sentence imposed is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable; it follows, therefore, that the sentence is not
plainly unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform McLendon, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If McLendon requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
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leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on McLendon. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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